PREVIOUS HOUR

-SK/YSR-NB/3.00/2O

SHRI YASHWANT SINHA (CONTD.): This is incorporated in Article 12(2)(a) of the Hyde Act and I quote, "No country party to this shall secure unfair commercial or industrial advantages or restrict trade to the disadvantage of persons and undertakings of either Party or hamper their commercial or industrial interests, whether international or domestic, fully protected in the 123 Agreement"

ױ and again I am quoting, "Equally important is the need to ensure that the U.S. cooperation does not assist the Indian nuclear weapons programme directly or indirectly." Again I am quoting, "Indian officials have publicly stated that under the US-India Agreement, India will be able to produce as much fissile material for weapons purposes as it desires. At the same time, however, many experts have said that there is no reason why India would need or want to increase that production significantly. The conferees hope that India will demonstrate restraint and not increase significantly its production of fissile material." And this is very important and I would like the House to take note of this. I am quoting from the Joint Memorandum, "If civil nuclear commerce were to be seen, some years from now as having in fact contributed to India's nuclear weapons programme, there could be severe consequences for nuclear cooperation, for U.S.-Indian relations, and for the world-wide nuclear non-proliferation regime." "Severe consequences," ָ ֤ warn , there will be "severe consequences" for US-Indian relations. ̸֕Ӥ֕ , ֋ ?

ֳ֯ן , ִ ֕ և ֻ ֟ ֲ ָ ֣ Nuclear Deal ֟ , ָ ו֮֟ ֌־ ֋ , פ פ֟ , ָ ָ ֌־ ֋ , ָ פ פ֟ purpose ָ ָ Non- Proliferation Network Regime ֆ ָ-ָ energy ֟ energy ׻֋ ֲ ָ ߕ ֮ ̸֕Ӥ֕

123 ִ ߮ ֟ , ߟִָ ָָ ߮ ֛ ֵ֤ ֻ - ִ nuclear isolation and nuclear apartheid ֟ ֋օ ֟ nuclear isolation ֕ 2007 ֮ ؓ֟ և ? ו֮֟ ֟ , ևיÙ ߻ ִ , ָ ָ 1974 , ֲ ߴ֟ פ Ӭ ָ-1 Ù , ֤ ו֮֟ ןֲӬ , ֕ ֮ ֻ ֋ , 33 years have gone by, in these 33 years Indian nuclear technology has only progressed. ֜ , ׯ֔ ֋ ? Ϭ֮ ӡ ׌ֵָ , miss ֋ ָ ׮ֵ ֕ כ֮ ֜ ׿ֿ ؓ֟ ֟ miss ? ו֮֟ ևיÙ ָ ֟ , this nuclear isolation has proved to be a boon for India, not a bane for India. ֻ֟ ֲ Ϭ֮ ӡ 18 և, 2005 ؿ֙ ևә Ù issue , ִ ֵ , 'India is a responsible State with advanced nuclear technology.' advanced nuclear technology ֻ ֮ ֋, ָ ִ ֛ ֋ ? ֮ ևיÙ ֟ ֻ֟, ֮ technology ֟ ֻ֟, ָ ִ ֛ ֋

2P/VNK ָ ֿ:

-NB/VNK-RSS/2p/3.05

ֿ־ӟ (֟) : ָ ָ Nuclear Isolation ָ ֛, ׻֋ Nuclear Isolation, Nuclear Apathy Ӥ ֛ ֮ , ߮ ߕ ֵ֤ , - ߮ ߕ ֵ֤ ߅ - ֱ, ֯ օ ִ 123 ߴ , ִ article 5(2) , ֜ ֮ , Sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities may be transferred under this Agreement, pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement. ߴ , ָ ßָ , and already it is talking of amendment of this. ֲ ޛ , ߻ , ֤ 123 ִ , ֤ ޛ , ֲ ֤ י 挻ߵָ ֯ ..(־֮֬).. ֤ ֯և ֟ ֟ , ֲ ֛ ֟ , ָ-ָ ָָ ָ ״֣ ϓָ fuel supply for the life time of the nuclear reactor ״ֻ ֋օ 挻ߵָ ׸ և և ֻ , ֻ ֻ , -ֻ ֻ , ֣ ֯ ֋օ Ù ֟ , ָ Ϭ֮ ӡ ׾֢ ӡ , ֲ ֲ, External Affairs Minister, , ׾֢ ӡ , Ù ؓ֟ ָ ִԻ ־ָ Ù֮ ֮ -ֻ ֻ ׻֋ ֻ ֯և ֋, Ù , Ù , ֟ , ָ ֯ ֮֟ assurance ָ , assurance article (6) , article (6) , The United States has conveyed its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel to India etc. ֳ֯ן , ִ ֵ ֮ , , this whole Article 6 has been lifted.

SHRI KAPIL SIBAL: It is Article 5, sub-clause 6, and not Article 6.

SHRI YASHWANT SINHA: Okay. Article 5, sub-clause 6, a, b, 1,2,3, 4, of Article 5, ָ ָ article 5 , It has been bodily lifted in the same language in which the Prime Minister had included it in his statement last March. , ֯ ֋ ִ ֮ õï֤ , It is so ridiculous. ? ָ ֓, 2006 ִֵ ָ ׾µ ֟ , ׾µ ֟ : As part of its implementation of July 18, 2005 joint statement, the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the US Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to work in the energy. , ֓, 2006 ֵ֤ և 123 ߴ , ֵ ֕ ׮ ֮ Ù ֵ , Ϭ֮ ӡ Ù ֵ, This is casting stone. ֤ , ֲֻ֟ ֲ ֤ ֋օ ׸ ֻ ׻֋ ֋, ׸ ֻ ִֵ ? ֳ֯ן , , the US is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral US-Indo agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the US Congress. I hope you have imbibed it. 123 ִ ֲ ָ ֣ , ִ 挻ߵָ ֯և assurance incorporated , ֲ ׸ ִ֮ ֻ ׻֋ ֋߅ և, ָ ״֡ ֡㑮 ֮ , ָ , 123 ߴ , ִ ִ

THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI ANAND SHARMA): You read the first two lines. ..(Interruption)..

ֿ־ӟ : ֮Ӥ ִ , ֮ ֲ և ֜ ׻ֵ ..(־֮֬)..

('2q/sc' ָ ָ)

-RSS-TMV-SC/2Q/3.10

SHRI ANAND SHARMA: You are misleading.

SHRI YASHWANT SINHA: No. I am not misleading. The first two lines is, "To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the US is prepared to take the following additional steps". What are the following additional steps? "That we will go to the US Congress after the 123 Agreement is signed. We will incorporate it". Where is that assurance in this 123 Agreement? where is that assurance of fuel supply for the life-time of the reactors? ָ ֟ ֳ֯ן , ֵ֤ ל ֋ - և ߯ ״ֻ ֵօ ߯ , that is incorporated in article 14. և ߯ ? ֯ ָ existing facilities , ִ ߯ ߯ ״ֻ߅ כ, ߯ ָ ִ ? We will be required to set up a dedicated facility to reprocess the imported spent fuel. ִ ߕ , ָ we will have a separate agreement with the US. ױ ߴ օ ֲ ߴ ֋օ ֋ ִֵ ™ן ? ֟ , ֟ ױ , ״֡ ״֡ , ?

ק : ױ ֋ ..(־֮֬).. þֵ ֛ ׿ ֋օ

شری شاہد صدیقی : یہ خود کہہ رہے ہیں کہ ڈیموکریٹ ہوگا اور فٹ نہیں ہو پائے گا ۔۔مداخلت۔۔ یہ خود کہہ رہے ہیں۔ ڈیموکریٹ ہوگا اور بڑا مشکل ہو جائے گا۔

ֿ־ӟ ֮ : ֯ י , ֯և , ߯ և , ו ָ ָ ׮ֵ ؜ ߙ , ָֻ֮ ׿ֿ ֲ ״ֻ ֵ ״ֻ ֲ ״֣ ֟ ָ ֟ To supplement what I am saying, I would again like to quote from the Joint Explanatory Memorandum. ?

"The US will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the life of India's reactors".

֓ 2006 I am quoting:

"The Congress has not been able to determine precisely what was said on this matter in high level US-India discussions. The US officials testified, however, that the United States does not intend to help India to build a stockpile of nuclear fuel for the purpose of riding out any sanctions that might be imposed in response to Indian actions such as conducting another nuclear test. The conferees understand that nuclear reactor facilities commonly have some fresh fuel stored, so as to minimise bound time when reactor cores are removed. They endorse the Senate proposal, however, that there will be a clear use policy that any fuel reserve provided to India should be commensurate with normal operating requirements for India's safeguarded reactors."

Again, I am quoting:

"The conferees understand and expect that such assurance of supply arrangements that the US is party to will be concerned with only disruption of supply of fuel due to market failures or similar reasons and not due to Indian actions that are inconsistent with the July 18, 2005 commitment such as nuclear explosive testing."

ֳ֯ : ֮ , ֯ ׻֋ ִֵ ֛օ

ֿ־ӟ ֮ : ָ, ֟ և ״ֻ ָ ㌻ߵָ ߻ ָ , if he does not know anything, then it is not worth knowing. That is why I want him to give time. ֟ ֵ߅ ׾֤ ן ֟ ָ ״֡ ߟִָ ֟ Ը֮ ? LNG ߻ ֟ ֵ, և և ߻ ֟ ֵ, Ù כ ָ ֵ, ָ ֮, ָ ֮ , ֮ ֮ ß־ ֯ ׻ֵօ ֲ

(2ָ ָ ֟)

MCM-VK/2R/3-15

ֿ־ӟ ֮ (֟) : ӑև ָ֮֯ ߴ ״ֻ ׻֋ ׸ִ օ ִ ״ֻ ֋ ־Ը Ù ״ֻ ֵ ֤ , ָ ״֙ ؙ ևԅ ָ և ״׮Ù, ߛ ԟ ӑև ָ֮֯ ߴ ״ֻ ָ Ϭ֮ ӡ ָ ״ֻ ִ ״ֻ օ , ӑև ָ֮֯ ߴ ׸ Ӥ ׻֋ ׸ ֋ ׻֋ ӑև ָ֮֯ ߴ ֋

THE PRIME MINISTER (DR. MANMOHAN SINGH): Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, I respectfully submit that the hon. Member is levelling false charges. There was never any pressure on us or on me to join or not going to Shanghai meeting. All that I was interested was that if the Indian Prime Minister goes to these meetings, he should not sit in the side lounge, coffee lounge and not be involved in an active manner.

ֿ־ӟ ֮ : ל, ׻ֵ ֕߅.....(־֮֬)

THE MINISTER OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND MINISTER OF EARTH SCIENCES (SHRI KAPIL SIBAL): Your Prime Minister would have done that.

SHRIMATI SUSHMA SWARAJ: The Prime Minister is of the country. The Prime Minister is not yours or ours.

SHRI YASHWANT SINHA: Yes, of course. Our Prime Minister never sat on any international high table. ֯ ߸ ֻ ֕և ֮֯ Ϭ֮ ӡ ֋, ָ , ֻ ָ ӟָ֕ ֲ ֯ ׸ִ ֻ֟, ֯ ֻ֟ ֲ և ֻ ֋ ֲ ֯ ӑև ָ֮֯ ߴ ֋ ֟ ָ ֤ , ֲ ָ Ϭ֮ ӡ ӑև ָ֮֯ ߴ ״֙ ؙ ֋, ֲֻ֟ ו֋ ֮ ֣ , ֣ Kudamkulam ָ ׸ ִ օ ָ ֕ , וִ ײֻ ֱ ï™ ֣ ִ ß֟ ׻֋ ָ օ ֮ - פ և Ϭ֮ ӡ Kudamkulam ָ ׸ ִ ָ ßָ ؓ֟ , פ ӡֵֻ ֵ ׻֋ ؓ֟ ֟ ָ ָ ӲӬ ָ ׾֤ ӡ ֟ ™ן ֟ ו֋ ׾֤ ӡ ֟ ָ כ ״׮Ù ֟ ߛ ֟ ָ Ϭ֮ ӡ ֟ ֕ ߛ פ וֿ֮ , 28 ә ׻֋ ֟ Kudamkulam ָ ׸ ִ ָ ßָ ? Ϭ֮ ӡ , ׾֤ ӡ ï™ ֤ ֬֟ և, ֲ֕ ו ֻ֟ ֣ ֮ ִ ֵ֜օ

DR. MANMOHAN SINGH: I am willing to do that right away and that will show, I think, what falsehood you are preaching in this House. It is true that there was a draft of an agreement for four additional reactors. But it has always been understood that that agreement can be operationalised only if India had the approval of the IAEA for an India specific safeguards agreement and also if India had the exemption granted to it by the NSG. Since these issues are now being debated and for the reasons which I do not have to go into, it was quite obvious that that agreement would not be operationalised in the absence of these two requirements which are now under discussion in various fora. The impression that you are trying to create, I think, the Russians fully understand it and all this false propaganda that is being made here and outside is not related to the facts of the case. (Followed by 2S)

ASC-RG/3.20/2S

 

ֿ־ӟ ֮ : ֳ֯ן , Ϭ֮ ӡ ו֮ ֲ , ֟ ֱև ֟ ִ ֟, ֲ ׿֮ ױ׿ֵֻ ׾ו֙ ָ ֋, ֲ ָ ׾֤ ӡ ׾ו֙ ֋, ֲ ָ ӡ ׾ו֙ ֋ ָ ֵ ֵ, ֕ ßָ ׻֋ ָ ֋, ֲ ...(־֮֬).. ֮ Kudamkulam ׸ ֤ ָ IAEA ֛, ׸ ñױ ֛ , ֮ ו֋ , ֮ ו֋ NSG , ֮ ו֋ IAEA , ϴ ֲ ֵԾ ֟, ֲ ֤ ßָ ֻ֮և ־ֻ ֟, Ϭ֮ ӡ ֮ ßָ , subject to the NSG approving this...

(־֮֬).. ? ױ ӳ߸ ֣ ...(־֮֬)

ֳ֯ : ״Ù ֿ־ӟ ֮ , ֋ ֯ և ..(־֮֬).

ֿ־ӟ ֮ : ӳ߸ ֣ ָָ ָ ָ ֟ ֮֯ ׸ ־ ָ ßָ ..(־֮֬).. ֱ ֟ , ֯ ׸ ־ ֋ ...(־֮֬)..

DR. MANMOHAN SINGH: Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, Shri Sinha is levying false charges against our Government. Perhaps he is reminded of his own performance, when as India's Finance Minister, he went to Japan and he was not allowed to meet the Finance Minister there. He thinks all people are like him.

SHRI YASHWANT SINHA: I am sorry, the Prime Minister has got personal...(Interruptions) Do you expect the Prime Minister to get so personal?(Interruptions)

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: When you say that, you have to be prepared to take it also...(Interruptions) Why are you all getting up?(Interruptions) Yashwant Sinhaji, there is another speaker from your party and you have already taken 50 minutes. It is more than the allotted time...(Interruptions) Please conclude...(Interruptions) ߕ, ֯ ך, ֯ ך Ƥ , ..(־֮֬). Why are ... ֯ ך ..(־֮֬). ״Ù ֿ־ӟ ֮ , ,.....(־֮֬)..

ֿ־ӟ ֮ : ֳ֯ן , ׌֟ , ׾ ֣ Ϭ֮ ӡ ֤ ֌־ , ָָ ֻ֟ ....(־֮֬) ֻ֟ ..(־֮֬).Ϭ֮ ӡ ִֵ ו Ϭ֮ ӡ ߓ , ׾֢ ӡ , ٣ ָֻ ..(־֮֬).. , ...(־֮֬)..

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Please sit down. When your leaders are speaking, you kindly sit down...(Interruptions)

ֻ ֤ : ֿ־ӟ ֮ , ָ Ը ִܵӡ , PA ...(־֮֬)..

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: What is this happening?(Interruptions) ֋,..(־֮֬).. ? ..(־֮֬).. ? ..(־֮֬)..

(2T/AKG ָ ָ)

AKG-KS/2T/3.25

ֳ֯ : ֯ כ ֻ ָ ֟ և ... (־֮֬) ... Sinhaji, please conclude. Otherwise, Mr. Arun Shourie will not get the time. I am making it clear that Mr. Arun Shourie will not get the time.

ֿ־ӟ ֮ : ֳ֯ן , ֻ ײֻ ׾ָ ײֻ ֲ Ը ... (־֮֬) ... ֲ Ը ײָ ܵ ӡ , Ϭ֮ ד־ օ ֟ ֻ ָ ֱ׸ ֟ ... (־֮֬) ...

ֻ ֤ : ֋ ... (־֮֬) ...

. ִ ӛָ : ֯ ػ Ը ... (־֮֬) ... ֯ ָ ֟ ... (־֮֬) ...

ֿ־ӟ ֮ : ֳ֯ן , פ ָ ֱ׸ ֋ ֣ օ ֵ֤ ֵ ֿ ֮֮ ֵ ֲ ֕-֡ ׮ֻ, ֟ ֻ , ... (־֮֬) ...

ֳ֯ : ֯ ... (־֮֬) ... ֮ , ֯ ߕ ו֋ There are 34 Members to speak. I have to regulate the time. Please cooperate.

ֿ־ӟ ֮ : ָ, ׮ִ ֟ ... (־֮֬) ...

ֳ֯ : ֯ ו֋

ֿ־ӟ ֮ : ֳ֯ן , ֲ ָ ֕ , ֲ Ϭ֮ ӡ 2005 ؿ֙ ֋ , ֲ 18 և ßָ , 20 և כ ִ֮ ã֟ , , transcript , ־ֻ ֵ "Mr. Prime Minister, do you see any resistance coming forward from your allies and the Opposition in putting the new India-US policy to practice and will you seek a parliamentary consensus or approval to the new direction you seem to be taking in foreign policy?" ־ֻ ָ and I am quoting, "Well, the Parliament in our country is sovereign. It is my intention to make a statement in Parliament when I go back home, and it goes without saying that we can move forward only on the basis of a broad national consensus". ָ ֟ ִ פ "I am confident that what we have done and what we have achieved will command universal support of the thinking segment of our country". ָ ָ , ߟִָ , פݾֵ֕ , ָ ָ ָ ֣, ָ , ֈ majority , ָ thinking segment of population belong ֲ unthinking ׻֋ ׾ָ ֮ ָ ײֻ ׾ָ ָ ָ ֢ ֋, ֋, ײֻ re-negotiate , ײֻ ֮ ֯

(ִ֯)

(2 ָ ָ)


TDB/2U/3.30

DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (RAJASTHAN): Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, I rise on a debate which, Sir, is an unusual amalgam of politics, of economics, of technical jargons, of statistical analyses and, indeed, of law. It is a debate, Sir, which has been oozing out of our respective ears for so many months, and perhaps, this delayed debate would have dampened some interest in it. But the issues are no less important. The issues retain their vital importance. And we hope that especially since it is a parliamentary debate, there will be far less of explosion or implosion and far more of fusion and fission, or, at least, far more of light than heat. Sir, this is a matter where we should keep out of our mind some premeditated notions and approach the subject with a critical enquiring eye and an open mind and then allow the power of reason and logic to operate.

Sir, may I say at the outset that this is a good deal for a good and responsible nation by a good Government headed by a good Prime Minister? It is a key which unlocks the door not only to a large hall but indeed to the universe. It turns us from * and outcasts to mainstream players. And, Sir, we have to judge it not by what we may imagine or dream about; we have to judge it not by somebody's fanciful imagination, but by what we can get, what we have got. Sir, we cannot allow the perfect to be the enemy of the good. I shall endeavour, Sir, to deal with each of the issues; important, less important, boring, more sensational, as made by the hon. previous speakers whom I have heard with rapt attention. So, let me start, Sir, with the issue of energy security made by my friend, Mr. Yechury. Sir, the basic point on energy security

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* Expunged, as ordered by the Chair.


is that there is no one source of energy on which we can give more focus or more importance. The approach has to be multi-pronged, multi-faceted, and holistic. And that is the complete error, that is the fundamental error, of the arguments which have gone by earlier regarding energy security. Sir, as somebody has said, statistics can be misleading like certain articles of clothing. What they reveal is interesting, what they conceal is vital. But, Sir, statistics can be instructive. Let us start with the per-capita energy consumption; -- and we measure this in a special measure called KGOE, Kilogram of Oil Equivalent. For India, the KGOE is roughly 515. Sir, that is 16 times less than the US; it is nine times less than Japan; it is eight times less than UK and it is less than many, many other countries in the world, and, of course, of the countries which have nuclear power, we rank almost in the last two or three, globally. Now, the argument made is that at the end of the day, if we have nuclear power, we will have only seven per cent. Six per cent is what Mr. Yechury says. The correct figure is seven per cent. He forgets that even seven per cent would be roughly, -- and this is only by 2020, -- over 30000 megawatts, which is an eight-fold increase. It would still be a small percentage because by then our other sources of energy would also be growing. When other sources grow, the nuclear component percentage will remain small. But that is no reason not to approach it. Let me give you a startling statistic. In all of our last two or three Five Year Plans, the capacity addition of electricity has been half of what we have projected. We have the figures for the earlier Plans, and in each Plan the actual capacity added by us is half of what we have projected. Now, Sir, if we will have 30,000 MW by 2020 through this deal, if you extrapolate the total amount of energy by 2050 or 2045, the Planning Commission estimates it to be about 1.3 million MW. There is no reason why by 2050, out of the total 1.3 million MW, we should not have 10, 15, 20 per cent by nuclear sources. And, what would be 20 per cent of that? Sir, 20 per cent of that would be the very impressive figure of 2.6 lakh megawatts from nuclear energy. Today's figure is something like 3000 MW. (Contd. by 2w-kgg)

kgg/2w/3.35

DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (contd.): Therefore, the fact that you have energy from other sources, and that you should pursue energy from other sources, cannot ever mean a lackadaisical approach on energy regarding nuclear sources. Why is it that countries like France---of course, it has a very high percentage---countries like Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland and Japan have a high percentage? The lowest figures are 20 per cent for the USA and the UK, 20 per cent being the figure of the total energy met from nuclear sources. These countries are not foolish, these countries are not suicidal. Belgium has 60 per cent, Sweden has 42 per cent, Switzerland has 39 per cent. But the minimum figure, the lower figures for the US, and the UK are still 20 per cent! So, if we aspire to jumpstart our figures to 6 or 7 per cent, what is wrong in that?

My friend, Mr. Yechury mentioned other sources. Well, Sir, the actual procurement from all other sources, if you take the published studies, by 2031, according to the Ministry of Power, we may require 1 million MWs. According to the Planning Commission, we may require 7,78,000 MWs. Let us take the lower figure of the Planning Commission, 7,78,000 MWs. Out of 7,78,000 MWs, the total power projected by coal would be 1,70,000 MWs; by imported coal would be another 80,000 MWs; by gas, including all forms of gas, 90,000 MWs. Adding everything, including hydro, including the unutilised Nepal portion, would be a total of less than 3.5 lakh MWs. These are figures and we may get lost in figures. This is what the point I am making. The point is two-fold. Even by the Planning Commission estimate of 2031, our total sources of all supplies put together, will give us half of our requirement. The total being 7,78,000 MWs and the total available being 3,40,000 MWs or 3.5 lakh MWs. Well, if we can add to it the nuclear source, why should we look a gift horse in the mouth? This 7 per cent is not a static figure. The 7 per cent we believe will increase to 15 per cent by 2050. By 2050, if you have 15 per cent, it is 15 per cent of over 1.2 million MWs, which is over a lakh-and-a-half or 2 lakh MWs. That is the power of nuclear power. Before I leave the issue of energy security, let me tell you a figure published just two days ago by the World Energy Outlook of 2007 which has recorded that from 2005 to 2030, the maximum increase in energy demand will be in two countries, China and India. And, 45 per cent of the total 55 per cent increase in demand in these 25 years will be from India alone! Well, India will be like that because India has a great expectation of the GDP growth. Our growth engine is bound to be powered only by the demand and need for power.

If 55 per cent of the global energy increase is from 2005 to 2030, 45 per cent out of a total of 55 per cent from India alone, what are we doing in India? Are we twiddling our thumbs while China is going rampaging and increasing a huge amount of nuclear energy sources?

Sir, let me turn to costs; it is good to look at costs; it is important to look at costs. But, Sir, just to digress for a moment, the price of crude oil in 1973 was roughly 2 US$ per barrel. Last month, it was 75 US$ per barrel. Well, do my friends ever talk of the price of oil? Do they talk of the cost of oil? (Interruptions) Let me come to that, I have not reached that. Have some patience. I am only starting with the price of oil which you, my friends, have been using in this country for the last 30 years at an unaffordable cost. It increases every day. You have no control over it. It is usually an imported item. You have hardly any indigenous sources, but oil is the mainstay of our consumption. We will come to nuclear energy cost in a moment.

Let me talk about the cost. No doubt a coal plant is cheaper at the initial cost. It incidentally has a life of only 25-30 years and, let me tell you, a nuclear plant has 40-50-year life-cycle, but no doubt, a coal plant is cheaper as far as the initial capital cost is concerned. But two points here. Coal is a very transport-intensive product. By the time it reaches you, at what is called the load-centre where you and I can use it, the cost of coal--that is, the relevant cost of coal--comes to around Rs.3 per unit. (Contd. by kls/2x)

KLS/2X-3.40

(THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (PROF. P.J. KURIEN) IN THE CHAIR)

DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD): Secondly, coal is highly polluting. You do not add the cost of pollution; you do not add the cost of transport. As against that nuclear, first of all, nuclear is not 11 crores, the figure given by the previous speakers. If you buy nuclear plants from other parts of the world than the USA, it can be significantly cheaper in the region of 8 to 9 crores. But more important than that, the only statistical study published about nuclear plant cost is a study published by Mr. Grover of the DAE. It is a statistical study of 19 countries, which has published and proved that nuclear plants are the cheapest if you even count a 20-year cycle. And remember, a cycle of a nuclear plant is 50 years; the cycle of a coal plant is 20 to 30 years. Let me give you the four conclusions of the study by Dr. Grover published. The report gives ratios on a study in which 19 countries participated. And if you take a lower discount rate of only 5 per cent -- I am reading from the report -- nuclear power is cheaper as compared to gas in all the 19 countries. Secondly, if you take coal except for South Korea and the USA, nuclear power is cheaper in all the 19 countries again. If you take 10 per cent discounting, then it is cheaper in more than 15 of the 19 countries. Again let us not get bogged down in details. The point is it is a myth to call a nuclear plant more expensive. Yes, a nuclear plant appears to be more expensive because the initial upfront capital cost is higher. The amortised cost over the cycle of a nuclear plant which is 50 years is not cheaper, it is significantly cheaper than coal even if you do not take the pollution cost of coal, it is significantly cheaper than oil which we import and over which we have no control. It is significantly cheaper than gas; in whose in any case we use mostly oil. And, Sir, let me add, do we know that one GW, i.e., 1000 MW, needs only one tonne of uranium. Uranium what you are going to use 235 for producing one GW of electricity 1000 MW, you need one tonne of uranium. The equivalent coal you need to fire to produce that amount of energy is 3 million tonnes of black coal. That is the equation. So, both the arguments, ignoring the energy security because when you talk of nuclear somebody will point to hydro, somebody will point to coal, somebody will point to gas, that is fallacy. You have to move ahead of all fronts and the 7 per cent argument is the initial argument till 2020, the 7 per cent argument is wrong because in 2040 and 2050 our percentage of 10 or 50 per cent of energy of nuclear energy will be a very large absolute figure. Equally the cost argument is fallacious; it looks at the initial capital cost alone. Let me, Sir, with your permission now turn to a very important part of the argument, the Hyde Act. They Hyde Act has become a kind of hydra-headed monster as far as those who oppose the Bill are concerned and I can understand that because those unfamiliar with the US Constitutional law will find that the Hyde Act is very peculiar, it, in fact, hides more from them than it reveals, and let me explain why. But the story has to start a little before. The story actually has to start with the fundamental difference between the Indian Constitution and to what you and I are used to or the British Parliamentary model which you and I are used to and the American Constitutional model. And the story, therefore, starts on the separation of power principle which is enshrined in the US Constitutions and in particular in article 6 of that Constitution. The point I am making is that under the US Constitution, and I will just read to you, their own Constitution, their own supreme law and the judgements of their own Supreme Court and that law, namely, the US Constitution and the US Supreme Court, the 123 is the supreme law of the land even under US law. In the first place, no conflict will be imagined between the 123 and Hyde. In the event that there is an irreconcilable conflict, the 123 will prevail. That is the law, the Constitution of the US, that is the law of the US Supreme Court and let me read that to you. That is why I can understand that this is why the Hyde Act has this mesmeric influence. First, article 6 of the US Constitution, it is a long article, the relevant part I am reading. (Contd by 2Y/SSS)

SSS/3.45/2Y

DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD): I quote, "The Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof and all treaties made or which shall be made..." and the 123 will be a treaty when it is made "...and all treaties made or shall be made under the authority of the US shall be the supreme law of the land and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby anything in the Constitution itself or the laws of that country notwithstanding." In other words, unlike our country where a treaty will give way even to a Parliamentary statute, unlike in our country, where a treaty by India with in another country will give way to the Indian Constitution, in the US scheme of things, a treaty once entered under the Constitution will not be over-ridden even by the US Constitution. The last four words are, "Anything in the Constitution or the laws of any State to the contrary, notwithstanding." So that is point one. So, treaty 123 will become the supreme law of the USA. Point No. 2, if you still don't believe me and if you don't believe the declarations by the US President, let us read the US Supreme Court Law. It is all very easy to express incredulity. But unless you have read the US Constitution and the judgements, you can keep on expressing incredulity. That is wrong. Now, let me read to you a US Supreme Court judgement which clearly says the same thing and there are many judgements...

SHRI RAVI SHANKAR PRASAD: Abhishek, will the US Congress accept your proposition? Are you serious about it?

DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI: Well, I am reading to you the US Constitution and the US Supreme Court law.

SHRI RAVI SHANKAR PRASAD: What are you talking about?

DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI: It is very easy, Mr. Ravi Shankar Prasad, to debunk it. The difference between debunking something and reading the law is obvious from your statement. You obviously have not read the law. For your benefit, let me read the law. (Interruptions).

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (PROF. P. J. KURIEN): Please, listen to him.

DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI: Now, I am reading one out of several judgments. It is obvious that you have not bothered to research US law. It is obvious that you have not bothered to look at your Supreme Court judgements. But, let me, for your benefit, read one. There are three or four judgements of the US Supreme Court and I am only reading one and this is what it says. "When a statute conflicts with a treaty..." and I am not assuming any conflict. I will show in a moment why the Hyde Act does not conflict. But, assume it conflicts. "When a statute conflicts with a treaty, the later of the two enactments prevails over the earlier under the last-in-time rule." In Whitney versus Robertson, the Supreme Court of US said this, "By the Constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing and made of like obligation as an Act of legislation. Both are declared by the instrument to be the Supreme law of the land and no superior efficacy is given to the law over the treaty. If the two are inconsistent, the later one will prevail. And immediately pause and think why is the sequencing of the 123 agreement, what is now being done?" Have you noticed the sequencing? The sequencing is, a draft 123, that is then a Hyde Act, and after the Hyde Act, this 123 goes back to US Congress. The last in point of time to which the US Congress will affirm and give its seal of approval will be the 123 which is why the last in point of time will prevail. The sequencing of 123 is not accidental. The sequencing is built in and the sequencing is built in because whenever the US legislature intends the treaty to be the last expression of the sovereign will, they take it back to their Congress and the last expression of the sovereign will of the US legislature will be and shall be the 123 treaty, if and when, it is approved by the US legislature, not the Hyde Act.

Now, come to the fourth point. It is wrong to suppose that the Hyde Act, in fact, conflicts. The Hyde Act is seen by you to conflict because you read portions like sections 101. Mr. Sinha, my friend read the whole of the Joint Conference which is about 50 pages. Then, 101, 103 and 109. These are provisions which have what they call 'the sense of the House'. They have provisions which have a statement of policy. These are words from the Hyde Act, not my words. There are words there which say that we must follow a policy of global non-proliferation. We should not allow or encourage Iran or Iraq and that we hope and trust that countries will reduce their nuclear arsenal and so on and so forth. Well, Sir, the Hyde Act, without the 123, even without the 123, has two portions as does every similar US enactment, again unlike our law. (Contd. by NBR/2Z)

-SSS/NBR-AKA/2Z/3.50.

DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD.): Again, unlike our law. And, if you do not know that distinction and if you do not care to find that distinction, you are bound to make this mistake. The two parts are: the Hortatory, the Exhortatory, the Declaratory, the Policy part and the second part is the Prescriptive part. 101, which is called the Sense of the House, 103, which is called Statement of Policy, 109, which talks about the Exhortations about the global non-proliferation and the entirety of the 50 pages...

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: 104 which says is prescriptive...(Interruptions)...

DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI: Absolutely. That is valid. I did not say that. I did not mention 104.

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Then, 106 which says...

DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI: Mr. Shourie, I agree that 104 and 106 are prescriptive. I have said so. I deal with it...(Interruptions)...Let me go to one-by-one.

THE VICE-CHAIRMAN (PROF. P.J. KURIEN): Mr. Shourie, when you get your chance, you speak and reply to these points...(Interruptions)...

DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI: I am only dealing with 101, 103, 109 and the 50 pages which Mr. Yeshwant Sinha read partially on Joint Conference. A Joint Conference is worse than our Statement of Objects and Reasons which we attach to every Bill. It is not prescriptive. It is not binding. It is not applicable at all. My friend reads it chapter and verse of 50 pages. Well. What is applicable? And, why is that? The reason is simple. Under the US law, there is a separation of powers and all parts of a statute are not applicable. Only those parts which are set to be binding are applicable. That is what was clarified categorically twice over even when we had the earlier debate. Even when I was speaking in the earlier debate on 16th June, 2006, it was said by the US Ambassador and then by President Bush himself that we have declared that these parts of the Hyde Act are advisory, are non-binding. This was said by President Bush. It was said by the US Ambassador. And, here, we are saying, 'We will not believe what the US administration says about its own law. We will not believe what the US Supreme Court says about its own treaties. We will not believe what the article 6 of the US Constitution says about its own treaties.' But, we will believe, what we want to believe. I want to say about these treaties is like Alice in Wonderland. You want to live in your own dream world.

Sir, article 21 of 123 was also read which talks of each party shall implement this agreement in accordance with the respective applicable treaties, national laws and regulations. First of all, the word used is 'applicable treaties.' And, 123 is a treaty. But, secondly, this is a clause only dealing with implementation. It is in the nitty-gritty of getting permissions, of getting authorisations under local laws. For example import taxes, cesses, duties, etc. That is what it means. There is nothing whatsoever to do of what is told to you that it is a hindrance or a bar to activating the 123. There is also a clause 16.4, which is frequently forgotten, in 123. Sir, 16.4 says, 'This Agreement shall be implemented in good faith and in accordance with the principles of international law.' This is a separate ground. This Agreement is supreme under the US Constitution and the US law. But, separately and apart from that, it is also very important under the Vienna Convention, because it shall be implemented in good faith and in accordance with the international law, because it is an international treaty. And, articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention -- I remember, although the USA has not ratified it, would be bound by the spirit of Vienna Convention. So, it is completely wrong and misleading to read the Hyde Act as if it is a statute which overrides, which comes into the domestic law, which is written into and incorporated into the 123 is completely misleading.

Sir, may I now turn to the other aspect, which was, of course, partly discussed in the Lower House. It is about China. Is China less concerned about its own sovereignty? Is China anything less concerned about overwhelmed by US's subjectivity? The Indo-US Plan Vs the China-US 123, if I may call it, is so striking in its departures that it is worth commenting upon. We are so concerned and so much concerned about overwhelm in terms of our sovereignty. I will just give you a few examples as a comparison of the 123 which China has happily begged for, happily got and happily implementing is ten times more inferior than our 123. And, we are "Looking A Gift Horse In The Mouth." (1) Under the China Agreement, there is a separate Uranium Agreement required with Australia. Nothing they get from the USA as far as Uranium is concerned. So, all their actual consumables and supplies have to come from a third country with which they have to enter a second and very much more a stringent agreement and which is apart from the US. The US promises for nothing. (CONTD. BY VP "3A")

VP/3.55/3A

DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD.): In India, we get direct supplies and we do not have to go to a third country. We can go to any of the NSG countries.

Secondly, the separation plan in the case of China would have to be worked out jointly, consultatively, between China and Australia because Australia is supplying them Uranium. In other words, Australia has a veto in terms of separation of those plans which China wants to dedicate to military uses, versus, those which China wants to dedicate to civilian use. And, what do we do? We have absolute sovereignty to decide how many we dedicate to military and how many to civilian. Tomorrow, theoretically, we can dedicate all our future plants to military. And, there is no compromise, nobody inspects and nobody comes. And, we say, 'no', this is an assault on our sovereignty.'

No upfront reprocessing permission is granted to China. There is none. Apart from Japan, we are the only country in the world which has an upfront, advance U.S. permission for reprocessing rights subject to safeguards that we will have a separate national reprocessing facility. In any case, China has no agreement like this.

Now, I come to perpetual safeguards. Well, we have absolutely no possibility of any non-IAEA Inspector coming; none. In the China Agreement, there are possibilities and potentialities for U.S. Inspectors and, indeed, even Australian inspectors to visit. There is nothing like that as far as we are concerned. And, why is that? It is because China has decided that it wants to play a major role in the energy demand, which is going to increase in the next 20-30 years, to sustain its 10 per cent, 11 per cent or 9 per cent rate of growth to become truly a dragon and an elephant. It is proposed in China, incidentally, that by 2050 they will have 150 reactors with 1,50,000 MW of energy from nuclear sources alone. Well, I know that we have, and we are proud of that, a democracy. Sometimes, it is a very acceptable and desirable price that democracy has to pay. But, then, we cannot twiddle our thumbs while China which goes and gets 150 reactors with 1,50,000 MW towards which they are racing. Is it not ironic and interesting that there are only two places on earth which are opposing us tooth and nail? There are only spots on earth which oppose us vehemently. One is China and the other is Pakistan. Is there a reason for it? Is there a pattern to it? Well, ironically, the third place, in a democracy, where we have opposition, is ourselves in India. Well, these are the only three places that have opposition to this Agreement. That is a question which you need to turnover in your minds. Incidentally, the military part of the programme is completely and will remain completely untouched. This is a bogie. Mr. Yashwant Sinha talked of our deterrent. Well, there is absolutely no touching on our deterrent. I will deal with testing in a moment. You can have as many nuclear plants as you want. This is really a separation given by the USA, uniquely, to India. Let me end on this point by saying that, perhaps, today, we have 8 units out of 22, which we kept apart for our military. Well, these eight units or reactors can produce about 200 bombs. Let me assure you that 200 bombs are more than what we need; more than the whole world needs, to bomb ourselves; all of us twice over, out of existence. We don't need any more. We already have eight. But, remember, in case you want more than 200 bombs out of eight reactors, you can have 20 more reactors like that; no questions asked, no inspections.

But, let me come now to an argument, which is equally like a red flag, as the Hyde Act. I have dealt with the Hyde Act. Let me deal with testing now. We have dealt with energy security. We have dealt with cost. We have dealt with the Hyde Act. We have dealt with Indo-China comparisons. The fifth point is about testing. The question put bluntly is: Can we have Pokharan -III after Pokharan - II? The answer categorically, unequivocally, unambiguously is, 'yes, we can.' The question was: Can we do it? Yes, of course, we can do it. Now, do you want affirmative U.S. permission? Do you want affirmative U.S support to do a third test? Can you imagine a world where you will go to the U.S. and say, 'Please support me for doing my third test.' Is that conceivable? Your question is: Can we do it? The answer unequivocally is: 'Yes'. But you want to frame the question in a manner where it appears that the U.S. must go out of its way to pat you on your back and support you for doing the third test.

(Contd. By PK/3B)

 

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