PREVIOUS HOUR

PK/10.00/6B

SHRI KAPIL SIBAL (CONTD.): Now, we want an India-specific Safeguard Agreement to ensure that we have uninterrupted supply of fuel and strategic reserves, so that our nuclear weapons programme is out of the net. For those reactors which are part of safeguards will get uninterrupted supply. In addition to that, we get a strategic reserve, and if for any reason, whatsoever, there is interruption of supply, the United States commits itself under 123 to ensure that we do not have any interruption. What is the Frankenstein monster that we are talking about? That process is on. We are in the IAEA, we will negotiate, and we will come back. Then, my learned friend says, look, what about the Chinese? The Chinese have got a much better agreement than us and he talked about article 2. What does article 2 say? It says, "The parties shall cooperate on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Each party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations and licence requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." Mark the words "...that each party shall implement this Agreement." It is not that this Agreement is subject to the US laws. How do you implement this Agreement, Sir? May I just explain that? Most of the nuclear energy is in private hands in the United States. Under the Export Administration Act of the United States, there is a control list. Every export, especially, in the context of nuclear energy has to be agreed to and has to be approved. There are licensing requirements. So, once the Agreement is entered into and we enter into an import of a nuclear reactor, or, any other thing, a component, whatsoever, then, what happens? Implementation of that process, that means, exports from the United States will be governed by their laws. "The implementation of this Agreement", the words are not like this, "that this Agreement is subject to the US National laws." It says, "Each party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with the respective applicable laws and treaties." So, the Export Control Act will apply, our Customs Act will apply. Their licensing procedures will apply. Our laws under the Atomic Energy Act will apply. In other words, why, because you are implementing the Agreement. What has been said to the country, time and again, ad nauseam, is that we have subordinated ourselves to the national laws of the United States. This is the problem, when politics takes over common sense. (Interruptions).. and it says "each Party". Just as they are subject to their laws, we are subject to ours. It does not say that India is subject to the US laws. It says each Party in implementing this Agreement will be subject to their national laws, which is right, which is true. Let me tell you this is true of the Chinese Agreement also. It is very interesting that this is true of the Chinese Agreement. May I read the Chinese Agreement? Again, article 2 says, 'Each party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations and licence requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." This is exactly the same clause.

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Please read the next sentence.

SHRI KAPIL SIBAL: I am reading it, Mr. Shourie. But you didn't read this, Mr. Shourie. I will read the next sentence, but you never read this. You read only the later sentence. You never read this. Now I will read the next sentence. Don't worry, I am not afraid of reading like you are. "The parties recognise with respect to the observance of this Agreement the principle of international law that provides that the party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as a justification for its failure to perform a treaty"; perfectly, good. That is part of an international law. That international law applies to China, it applies to India. The international law does not change, because it entails a clause in the Chinese Agreement and there is no part of that clause in the Indian Agreement. (Contd. by SKC/6C)

6c/10.05/skc

SHRI KAPIL SIBAL (CONTD.): Does the international law change, Mr. Shourie? I am surprise at the quality of debate here. Instead of ...(Interruptions)... Did I interrupt you, Sir? I am reading...(Interruptions)...

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: You asked me the question. You said just now...(Interruptions)...

SHRI KAPIL SIBAL: I did not ask you. I only remarked, Mr. Shourie, why did you not read it? I did not ask you. You should have read it. ...(Interruptions)...

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Mr. Arun Shourie, please.

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: I said..(Interruptions)...

SHRI KAPIL SIBAL: It does not. International law cannot change, as a matter of law.

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Why didn't they think it necessary to put it in China and not...(Interruptions)...

SHRI KAPIL SIBAL: Because, Mr. Shourie, sometimes the obvious is not stated. It is the obvious, incidentally. May I tell you this? We have a lot of disputes in the domestic law. We have divorces; we have payments to be made to husbands and wives. The national laws of the US are different. The national laws of India are different. And yet, decrees are executed in the United States of America. Why? Because, it is part of customary international law; because, under international law, an international treaty cannot be subverted by the application of national laws. That is a principle of international law.

Now, unfortunately, when a whole ghost is created, when a Frankenstein monster is created, without realising the simple import of solemn agreements between the US and India, that is where the confusion occurs.

So, what do we have here? We have an agreement where our reactors are assured of supplies. We have an agreement where we can have a strategic reserve. We have an agreement where our nuclear weapons programme will not be affected. And we have an agreement the implementation of which will be subject to the respective laws. But we have much more in this Agreement than any other country ever had. The Chinese, for example, way back in 1985, were told that when they are given the nuclear fuel, they would not be able to use it further, except for a one-time use in a nuclear reactor. This is what is called, in this Agreement, the right to reprocess. I want to explain to this House what this right to reprocess means. There are, Sir, five kinds of nuclear materials in the world. There is Thorium; there is Uranium-238; there is Uranium-235; there is Uranium-233; and there is Plutonium. There is no sixth material. Of these five materials, two are in their natural state and they are Uranium-238 and Thorium. The others are man-made, Uranium-235, Uranium-233, which is most fissile, and Plutonium. What happens is, when you use Uranium in a reactor, what comes out is spent fuel. When the spent fuel comes out, it is called 'depleted Uranium'. If you use that depleted Uranium and process it, that is, reprocess it, then what happens is that more Plutonium is produced at the point of reprocessing. In other words, at the second stage, the reactor produces more Plutonium than it consumes. So, you can keep on reprocessing it to produce more and more fissile material, which then allows you to multiply the production of electricity by reprocessing the nuclear fuel again and again. So, the one-time use which is given in the Chinese agreement does not allow the Chinese to reprocess the depleted Uranium for generation of more power. But it has been given to us. Why? What it means to us is the following : If we have more Thorium which is fissile material, or more Plutonium which is fissile material, and then we use it at the third-stage fast breeder reactors, then the fuel cycle will have Thorium and Uranium-233. This is something that no other country has got. Even the Chinese don't have it The Chinese, in 1985, had objected. (Contd. by 6d/hk)

HK/10.10/6d

SHRI KAPIL SIBAL: They said, "Why should we agree to this? This denies our sovereign right to reprocess fuel which you have supplied to us, which we are buying. And the Americans said, no, we will not allow you to reprocess. And, the Chinese had to take it. So, the Chinese Agreement does not have the right to reprocess. And my learned friend, Shourie, made fun of it saying what is this right to reprocess because you have to set up a facility and when you set up a facility, IAEA safeguards will be there. Lot of dramatics. Naturally, because IAEA wants to ensure that if you get imported uranium and you want to use it in safeguarded reactors, then the processing must also be done in a safeguarded fashion so that no parts of that nuclear fuel is diverted for your nuclear weapons programme. So, naturally your facility will have to be safeguarded and your processing units will have to be safeguarded. So, what is wrong with that? What is the unethical thing that the Americans are doing in doing this? I don't understand. The next issue, Sir, is the other argument that my learned friend was making in respect of the Hyde Act. Let me come to that. My learned friend referred to several provisions of the Hyde Act, and those provisions, as you know, are Statements of Policy in Section 103 of the Hyde Act. Just as our Statements of Policy don't bind the American Government, the American Government's Statement of Policy cannot bind us. It is their Statement of Policy. We are not contractually obliged. But they say, no, no, the President of the United States is obliged. But the President of the United States is, at the time of the 123 Agreement, going to give a determination that we have complied with everything under Section 104. It has to be a one-time determination. Nothing after that. So, at the time, when the 123 Agreement comes to Congress under Section 104, he has to give a determination that India has complied with everything. Otherwise, you won't have the 123 Agreement. So, he will make that determination with reference to his obligations under the Hyde Act. And when he makes that determination and Congress accepts it, that is the end of the matter. No further determination to be made. But you don't read what is to be done. This is part of the Hyde Act, Sir. Where are the inspectors? There are no inspectors under the 123 Agreement. There are inspectors under the Chinese Agreement. There is information that there are no inspectors. Give me one word of inspectors. But then, of course, you say it. No inspections to be done on Indian facilities by the US Government. No visitation rights unlike the Chinese. Why? Because their nuclear spent fuel has to be separately stored and they cannot reuse it because they have no reprocessing rights. So, because it has to be separately stored, the Americans have the right to come and inspect to ensure that no part of it is diverted. So, Section 102 is the scope of the legislation; Section 103 is the Statement of Policy and Section 104 is the operative part. My learned friend makes such a thing about President Bush's Statement as if we are misinterpreting his Statement. What did President Bush say? I just read that so that we remove the cobwebs. Sometimes, people do get confused, and that has happened. It is normal. "Section 103 of the Act purports to establish US Policy with respect to various international affairs or matters." So, it is in Section 103 that the US Congress under the Hyde Act talks about Iran; it talks about other things. So, it is all under Section 103. So, the President says, "Section 103 purports to establish US Policy with respect to various international affairs or matters." He doesn't agree with it. (Contd. by 6e/KSK)

KSK/10.15/6E

SHRI KAPIL SIBAL (CONTD): My approval of the Act does not constitute my adoption of the statements of the Policy as U.S. foreign policy." So, President Bush, who is the Chief Executive of the U.S. Administration, says that what is stated in 103, is not a statement of U.S. foreign policy. "Given the Constitution's commitment to the Presidency of the authority to conduct the nation's foreign affairs because the Constitution obliges the U.S. President to conduct foreign affairs, the Executive Branch shall construe such policy statements as advisory." And, you know what 'advisory' means. It means it is not binding. They say that it is binding. The President of the United States says that it is advisory. So, whom should we believe, Mr. Shourie, who does not run the U.S. Government, and thank God for it, or the U.S. President? Also if section 104(d)(2) of the Act were construed to prohibit the Executive Branch from transferring or approving the transfer of an item to India, contrary to Nuclear Suppliers Group transfer Guidelines, that may be, in effect, at the time of such future transfer, a serious question would arise as to whether the provision unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to an international body. In order to avoid this Constitutional question, the Executive Branch shall construe section 104(d)(2) as advisory. The Executive Branch will give sections 103 and 104(d)(2) the due weight that Committee between Legislative and Executive Branches should require to the extent consistent with U.S. foreign policy. So, that clears the cobweb. There is no problem about Iran. There is no problem of any U.S. foreign policy to which we will have to adhere. And, the beauty is that people talk about as if we have given up our sovereignty. What did the Americans do in Tarapore? What did the Americans do in Vietnam? Today, the largest trading partner of the Vietnam is the United States of America. What about Cold War years between Russia and the United States of America? Those years are over. Some of the Warsaw Pact countries are part of NATO Block. The world has changed. Our thinking must change. We must not resurrect ghosts of the past to forge a future for the country. Let us look ahead. And, they talk about sovereignty. Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, it is very interesting. When I was listening to the debate, I was reminded of what happened when Pranabda was introducing the Dunkel Draft. What did the BJP say then? And, what did my good friends of the Left say? The same words; the same words...

SHRI SITARAM YECHURY: We have not changed.

SHRI KAPIL SIBAL: No, you haven't because I said, "yours is principled, ideological opposition." So, we understand it. We do not understand what they mean. You are right. We are against your ideology, but we appreciate your stand. At least, you are consistent. Let me just remind you, Sir, of Mr. Murli Manohar Joshi -- I will not take too much time of this House -- and what did he say, "I will give you one more example. How do we see the entire Dunkel Draft text? It is nothing but a repeat of what the East India Company did. How it fleeced and looted and the type of mechanism it evolved. You are now accepting it. The country revolted against the East India Company. Now, you are trying to bring it back. For God's sake, you must discriminate between sovereignty and slavery." Don't you find the same kind of language? And, you know what Pranabda said in 1990? He said, "You opposed me in 1970 when the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty was signed; and you changed your mind by 1990. You are opposing me now and you will change your mind later." And, it did happen. You called that era, the Dunkel Draft, the dark hours of Indian history. You made it 'India Shining' in 2004. Yes, you made it India Shining. You embraced the Dunkel Draft; you embraced liberalisation; you embraced globalisation. And, you, at that time, told us that that we would render ourselves slaves.

(continued 6f - gsp)

GSP/10.20/6F

SHRI KAPIL SIBAL (CONTD.): The Left raised the objection that the PDS system in this country would be destroyed. The East India Company and all this; it is the same language I have heard. It has happened time and again. The same language was used. But you have always been proved wrong, and, you will again be proved wrong. India is too big, too strong, too proud a country to be subjugated by the US foreign policy. I have got the full volume of what you said then, but I do not want to take the time of the House. History will show, what you said then and what happened to you.

Now, Sir, let me come to yet another aspect. I told about this Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which was set up in the 70s. You had also the Missile Control Technology Treaty, the Technology regime, and, that is also part of the same club. Nobody can sell components; nobody can sell missiles or technology with a range of 300 km. and a payload of 500, again the same regime; and, most of these technologies are dual-use. So, the international community who are the suppliers have made a global regime to deny all this to those who are not part of the group, -- if you really go to China, you will see it -- one of the reasons why China is ahead of us is that they were not denied it after 1999.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Mr. Sibal, how much more time will you take?

SHRI KAPIL SIBAL: Sir, I do not know how much time I have already taken.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: You have taken exactly one hour.

SHRI KAPIL SIBAL: Sir, I will finish it off very soon. I will finish it soon. I think most of the cobwebs have been cleared. But I just wanted to say please don't look at it only in the context of the nuclear energy. The future of the 21st century and the future of nations in the 21st century will really depend on access to technologies, and, especially dual-use technologies. All your petaflop computers, all your teraflop computers, all research, for example, in bio-technology is done through bio-informatics and bio-informatics includes huge computerisation, which is all dual-use. We won't get any of that. The rest of the world will get it and we will not get it. Why should India be left behind? Why should we be denied this? Here is a Prime Minister who has eyes on the future. (Interruptions) No, no. It very much depends on the nuclear deal because most of these arrangements, dual-use technologies are used in all this, which are denied to us. Your advanced material technologies, ultimately, many of them are dual use. We will be denied this. Most of these advanced materials are used in satellites. Most of these advanced materials would be used in consumer items like cars tomorrow; we will be denied it. Okay, I won't belabour the point. Let me come to the costs. Mr. Shourie gave several numbers regarding the cost of nuclear power. I do not want to really start talking about numbers because I have no time. But I would advise him that there are several articles written on the point where comparative costs of coal, of gas, of nuclear power and the cost of supply are all compared, and, I dare say that if a power plant is a 1200 km. away, then the cost of nuclear power, if discounted at the rate of six per cent, would be the same as that of coal. I don't say this; experts say this. 'Nuclear Power, Nuclear Generation Cost in India'; any number of articles I will give you. All this mathematics has been done but, of course, Shourie's mathematics is entirely different. 'Nuclear Energy-Emerging Trends', 'Economics of Nuclear Power in India', these are not mine, these are theses of experts, and, I can give them to you, which compare all this and mention how, ultimately, in the long term, nuclear energy is comparatively reasonable for supply as much as thermal energy is. (Contd. by 6g-sk)

SK-VNK/10.25/6G

SHRI KAPIL SIBAL (CONTD.): It says so. And, in any case, since pricing has been an issue as far as source material is concerned, we get oil at 100 dollars a barrel, do we price it at that for the people of this country? That is not an issue at all. So, cost is really not an issue. The real issue is, "Should we be a part of the Suppliers Group"? They talked about nuclear reactors. Sir, today, in this country, we have technology. We produce nuclear reactors with a capacity of 240 megawatts. Now, a large number of countries in the world don't require the nuclear reactors which France supplies; that are of 1600 megawatts, or, for that matter, a thousand megawatts. A lot of small countries require nuclear reactors of 240 megawatts and we are the only country which produces them. If we don't become a part of this regime, we will not be able to sell, and you want to deny our country the right to sell these nuclear reactors to the rest of the world. This is what you stand for. Then, with respect to our Fast Breeder Reactors, today, Sir, we have technology. We have reactors of 500 megawatts capacity. But soon we will have reactors of a 1,000 megawatts capacity. Our Fast Breeder Reactors are going to be over 700 megawatts capacity. So, there is a whole new nuclear technology commercial world which will open to Indian industry and commerce. Why should Indian industry be denied? Why do you want us to be left alone in isolation? This kind of flippant arguments are not going to impress the people of this country. They are watching you Mr. Sinha. You had no arguments to make. You have not still told us why you are opposed. The sad part is, and I repeat it, that your ideology is only one -- when you are this side, change your tune and when you sit there, say something different. ...(Interruptions).. Depending on where they sit. You are absolutely right. But, the fact of the matter is, opportunities will multiply if you seize them. You don't want to seize the opportunities because you think you want a political point that you want to score in this House. But, if you oppose this deal, I tell you the nation will not forgive you. Thank you very much. (Ends)

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ׯֻ ֲֻ : , ֿ־ӟ ֮ פ 'I am not as wise as the Prime Minister'. ֮֯ ֮ פ ..(־֮֬).. ֯ ֟ ֮ ׻ֵ ..(־֮֬)..

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شری شاہد صدیقی : مہودے، ہمیں بھی پانچ منٹ دیا جائے ۔۔مداخلت۔۔

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شری شاہد صدیقی : مہودے، میرے 15 منٹ تھے، اس کو کاٹ دیا گیا ۔۔مداخلت۔۔

ֳ֯ן : ֯ 15 ״֮֙ , ײֻ ֻ֟ ..(־֮֬).. ֯ ׮ָ ..(־֮֬).. Please ...(Interruptions).. It is already 10.30 p.m. You should not have done it. You have done it on your own decision. ֯ ׻֋ ..(־֮֬)..

DR. BARUN MUKHERJEE (WEST BENGAL): Thank you, Sir. After so many long speeches, a short speech that I am due to make, may not be matching. But, Sir, still I rise to express our party, All India Forward Bloc's view about the Indo-US Nuclear Deal. As we have been consistently opposing the deal on various technical and political grounds, I reiterate our opposition precisely on ideological ground.(Contd. by 6H)

-SK/YSR/10.30/6H

DR. BARUN MUKHERJEE (CONTD.): It is our firm conviction that the Deal is not merely a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement; it has rather far more political implications. We cannot rule out the apprehension that this Deal will eventually hurt our decades-long image of a non-aligned country and will impede our Independent Foreign Policy and our sovereignty too. We cannot accept such post-deal ominous developments and, hence, we oppose it on ideological ground.

To be more precise, this Nuclear Deal will push India to American military bloc behind United States' apparent benevolent offer of 'Nuclear Cooperation.' America's ulterior motive to make India their strategic partner and a military ally cannot be overlooked.

The text of 123 Agreement reveals that it is "desirous of strengthening the strategic partnership between them." The way America, through many of her high-ranking officials and political leaders, have of late started lobbying for this Nuclear Deal, anybody can easily guess America's vested interests in the Deal. There is no point in assuming that this Deal is only for India's benefit. The Hyde Act states in Section 102 (Sense of Congress) that, "It is in the interest of the United States to enter into an Agreement for nuclear cooperation, pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1954, with a country that has never been a state party to the NPT." That India is not a signatory to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is adequately taken care of by the Hyde Act which imposes so many compulsions, conditionalities and bindings on India, so as to compensate more than necessary for not being an NPT signatory. In other way, it induces India to become an NPT signatory indirectly.

The termination and cessation of cooperation clause of 40 years' term in the 123 Agreement binding on India to 'report on the status of all inventories of material" or "to facilitate entry or stay of experts into our territory" are all matters of serious concern.

We must seriously note Section 103 -- Statements of policy of Hyde Act, which says, "Secure India's full and active participation in United States' efforts to dissuade, isolate and if necessary sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability, etc."

Following this clause, even before operationalising the Deal, India has started feeling the pinch as is evident from the fact that India still falters to finalise the long-pending Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project. The US binds our hands to come to any terms with Iran, even if that may be a highly beneficial gas supply project so greatly needed for our energy security. More damagingly, once we are bound under this Deal, it will hamper our own indigenous nuclear research and development programme. (Contd. by RSS/6J)

RSS/6J/10.35

DR. BARUN MUKHERJEE (CONTD.): India has passed through Pokhran-I and Pokhran-II. We did not need to depend on foreign assistance at that time. Even now, we should not lose confidence in the talented capabilities of Indian scientists and technologists. As reported in the Press, our Department of Atomic Energy, with increased 11th Plan budget provisions and thorium exploration, plans to reach independently the state of nuclear power generation capacity of 20,000 MW. So, why should India run after nuclear dependence on America? Majority of the people of India, majority of the Members of Parliament are convinced that the Indo-US Nuclear Deal will be detrimental to the interest of our country. Hence, along with others, I am opposed to this Deal. Thank you.

(Ends)

DR. CHANDAN MITRA (NOMINATED): Thank you very much. I am now getting up to speak at this hour when we have been here since 11 o' clock. The debate started at 2 o' clock. So, I will not try to tax my hon. colleagues for very long. But I must tell you that staying on has been very educative for me particularly, the speech just made by my very dear friend, the hon. Minister, Shri Kapil Sibal. Now, if we have to believe what he has said, that means, all that has happened in India till today will be offset by the achievement we will have once this nuclear deal is signed. Now, without this deal, we have a space mission, without this deal, we are sending missiles, without this deal, the IT revolution has happened in this country, without this deal, India has been producing nuclear power, and nuclear energy is being used. But by the thrust of his argument, it would appear that if we have this deal, only then would all these great achievements be possible. Now, I do not know how he has come to this conclusion and what we have been doing all these years when we did not have such a deal. How did we manage? It would appear that we must be in an absolutely starving condition, and absolutely low technology country, to have struggled so long, and now this deal is a great panacea and 'open sesame' that is going to happen. Sir, be that as it may, apart from the observations, I do not want to go into it. I would just simply point out that all these years, the Indian scientists, Indian technologies have made rapid strides, without the help of foreign powers. Sir, the hon. External Affairs Minister, the hon. Prime Minister will recall that there was a time when the cryogenic engine was not to be supplied for our missile technology. When Russia said that they would supply it to us, America put pressure on Russia to renege on that commitment. I still remember that the late Prime Minister, Shri Narasimha Rao, on the 15th of August, in his speech from the ramparts of the Red Fort declared that we will make the cryogenic engine on our own, and we have done it. Today, we are talking about the Chandrayaan, the mission to the moon; we are talking about a manned mission to the moon. All these things have happened with the development of our technology. We have faced sanctions after Pokhran-1 and Pokhran-II, and each time, we have been able to counter through our determination, through our resourcefulness, through the sheer talent of the Indian technologies and our determination to move ahead despite all these sanctions and restrictions. Today, it so happens that the NASA in the United States is virtually manned by Indians. Such is our talent that we are not dependent on them. We are dependent on ourselves, and why do we want to reverse this situation where we become dependent on their resources, their technologies, their manpower, and they bind us? I would like to give a very simple answer to this. It is one-sided deal for the simple reason that the way we are being told about the deal, and the way the Americans are being told about the deal, is at complete variance. (contd. by 6k)

-RSS-TMV-ASC/6K/10.40

DR. CHANDAN MITRA (CONTD.): We are being told that this is nuclear bijilee for aam aadmi, although an argument has already been advanced that the cost of nuclear power in India will be such that no aam admi--why aam aadmi--even no khas aadmi will be able to afford it in this country. But forget that. No nuclear bijalee, as has been proved, again and again, by many of my colleagues. What will be the quantum of electricity generated? We know how little it will contribute to our total electricity generation. But how has it been sold by the United States? It has been sold solely as a measure to bring India into the ambit of the non-proliferation regime. This is the single-minded objective of the United States. In the process, they have tried to sugar-coat the pill. I don't dispute that. But it is a bitter pill ultimately, at the end of the day, to swallow. We can't sign the NPT today. If we have a provision, maybe, we could have considered and debated the matter. But there is no provision by which we can say it. So, we have been brought into the NPT regime through the backdoor and this is how this deal has been sold by the United States and this is why it has been pushed. This is why the American desperation to make us sign this deal and this is why so many jet-loads of people are coming here and trying to persuade everybody, businessmen, politicians and everybody across the ideological spectrum because they want India to be part of this nuclear proliferation regime.

Sir, this is the last point. While we do all this, while we sign this, and after this, we lose our autonomy to detonate, whatever the sugar-coating that has been done, we know very well the consequences of having a Pokhran-III. Meanwhile, Pakistan, which is not going to be a signatory, will not be brought into the non-proliferation regime and Pakistan, which has been aided and abetted by North Korea and China in the past, will be outside this entire ambit. I would like to ask the hon. External Affairs Minister, what action is proposed to be taken about that. We know about the instability in Pakistan; we know about the concern of the entire world about Pakistan's nuclear capabilities falling into wrong hands, into the hands of those who want to destabilise the world. When there are no restrictions on Pakistan, what are we supposed to do? Are we then virtually accepting an American nuclear umbrella? It is our biggest threat on the western border. In the event of their nuclear technology, their nuclear resources falling into the hands of very dangerous and unreliable elements, what is our safeguard? In what way do we protect our country and its people? These are very simple questions which, I believe, need to be answered. If we are satisfied, definitely, everybody can rethink. But I have a feeling that it is all done. The deal has been, for all practical purposes, is sealed and it is going to be operationalised very soon. I think, it is a matter of deep regret because we have, in the process, surrendered our nuclear deterrent and our nuclear sovereignty. Thank you. (Ends)

׮ ֵ (׿ִ ֻ) : ֳ֯ן , ָ ֙ ָ ֲ ָ֮ ׸ ִ֕־֤ ֱֻ ֱֻ , ׻֋ , ֲ ֻ ִ և ֟ ֟ -ָ ֟ ߕ ִ֣Ԯ פ, ߕ ־ָ ֋ ֲ ߻ ָ ֟ , ߕ , ֻ ֲ ߕ , ֯ ֻ , ֟ ? ....(־֮֬).. ֟ ִ ? ָ ֟ ֮ פ NPT ָ ֮ , -ױ ָ ׸ ֮ ֟֠ ׸ ֻ ֯ -

(ֿ : 6L/AKG ָ )

AKG-VK/6L/10.45

׮ ֵ (֟) : וִ ֮ ׻֋ ָ , ֯ ָ ָ ֯ ׻֋ ׿ֿ ꅠ - ׯֻ ֲֻ ֋, ׸ ָ ֵօ ֻܵ ׸ ֯ ײֻ֕ , ֯ ׌ֵָ ֕ ו֋, ֯ ꅠ ִ ֵ ׯֻ ֮ ֛ ߻ ־֕ ֟ ֋, ׻ ָ Ϭ֮ ӡ ָ ֮ ָ ߿ פ ׸ ... (־֮֬) ... ִ ֤ ׻֋ , ָ ׻֋ ֮ ָ ָ - ꅠ ֻ ָ ָ ָ ֯ , ֯ ꅠ ׌ֵָ ׸ ָߤ, ׮ִֵ ָߤ, ָߤ, ָߤ, ֋, ױ ֣ ꅠ ֛ ֟ Ù כ ֮ ֻ INC and USC is not the same. INC means Indian National Congress and USC means US Congress. Indian National Congress should think for India itself, Indian National Congress should not say anything about the US Congress. ָ ߬ ֟

ׯֻ ֲֻ , ֯ ָ ߕ ֮ , ֯ ָ-ָ ֟ , ִ ֤ , ֺ ֛ , ֯ ֮ ֛ ָ ֮ ֛ , ִ ... (־֮֬) ...

׾֮ ӡ ֣ 飾 ׾֮ ӡ ( ׯֻ ֲֻ) : ֕ ֯ ׻ֵօ

׮ ֵ : ֲ ֋ , ꅠ ֯ ߕ ֮֯ , כ, ֻ֟ - ֤ ֛ ֟ ״ֻ֮ , ֓ innocent , ָ ֮֯ 104 ׻ 104 () ֮֯ ֜օ ָ 107 ֜ , 104 () ֜, ֤ 107 ֜, ֯ ֜ , ׻ , 107 ֜ "A description and assessment of the specific measures that India has taken to fully and actively participate in the United States and international efforts to dissuade and isolate Iran for its efforts to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction including a nuclear weapon capability and the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction." (i) "A description of the steps that India is taking to work with the United States for the conclusion of Multilateral Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons." , ֮֯ פօ - ֺ , , - ֺ , ָ ָ ֣ ֟ , ߻ ֣ ֛ꅠ ߻ ֲ֕ , ִֻ ֟, , ָ ִֻ ֟օ ֲ ֻ ֋ ֮ ֯ ̸ ֜ Ը֮ ֟ , Ը֮ ָ (6 ָ ֿ:)


6M/HMS-RG/10.50

׮ ֵ (֟) : ָ ׸ ׻ ײֻ ֱ , independent ֮ independent ָ ֵ֤ ֲ ָ ׯֻ ֲֻ , ֮֯ ־ֲ פ 00 כ ָ 00և0 Ը֮ י ӕ օ The term was there in the paper. ָ, 00և0 ָ dictation , 00 , ֟ , Ը֮ օ ָ ֟ Ը֮ ֣ ß֮ ֮ ֻ , ִ ָ ׻ִֵ ״׮Ù ֤ ? ָ ׻ִֵ ״׮Ù ֋, 6 ߮ Ӥ , ? -- ֻ֟ פև Ը֮ ִֻ ָ ֮ Ù , ָ ߕ , ֕ Ը֮ ָ ֯ ֮֟ 2003 00 әߕ ? ֯ ߻ , ߴ 123 , , և ֣ ӲӬ You have clearly stated that there is no relation with the Hyde Act. I think you are hiding some facts from the next generation ָ ֯ ן ֲ ֱ , transparent ֟ ֮ ߅ ָ ֯ ֲ , ֈ , ֟ ֮ ֤֕ ֤ ֵ ָ ֣ ֲ , ָ ߕ ֮֜ , ߕ ֮ ֕ 60 ֻ ֤ ׾֮֬ ׬ָ ߙ ָ ֤ כ , ׸ ױ ߻ consensus ֟ , consensus of the House, -- consensus of the House ֲ ֲ senses Senses consensus ׿ ׻֋ ָ ֮ ָ ֟ ָ transparent , ֲ ֻ ֟ ֓ ? ֮ ָ ֮֟ ִ֮ ? 40 ֻ Ӥ , ֻ , 20 ֻ ֤ ãן 40 ֻ ׻֋ ֲ , ֻ ֯ , ־ֻ ׻֋ ? ֲ Hyde Act ׮ ֋, ֟ ֱ ׻ և ָ ֓ ֋ ׸ ׻ֵօ ׻֋ , in the interest of the nation, do not hide the facts. Please do not hide the facts. ִ ֮֟ ָ, ֕ ִ ֮֟ ײֻ֕ , DESU , ֯ ֟ ...(־֮֬)... ״֛ ֟ , ֤ ָ ײֻ֕ ָ ָ ֋ ߕ ֋ ָ߲ ָ߲ ֋ ָ߲ ֋ ױ ׻֋ ֟- ־ ß ָ, ֮ ֟- , ֤֕ ָ߲ ָ߲ ֋, ָ߲ ֋ ױ ֯ û֮ ֋օ

, ֲ ֣ ױ ߻ ׾ָ (ִ֯)

(6 /֕ ָ )

KS/6N/10.55

SHRI SHARAD ANANTRAO JOSHI (MAHARASHTRA): Mr. Vice-Chairman, Sir, I am glad that I got to rise before midnight because, today, it is exactly 3 years and 5 months that I came into this House. In all these 3 years and 5 months, I often put myself a question whether coming to this House was worthwhile; whether I was not better doing my work with the farmers' organisations. But at the end of 3 years and 5 months, for once, I thought that it was a pleasure being here. The debate was, of course, of a very high level. There were arguments on both sides. We were watching the debate, rather than listening to it, like the spectators of a tennis match, turning our heads from left to right and from right to left. Every time somebody spoke, we thought that his arguments were finally clinching, and there could be no further arguments about it. There was a point where we thought, and it was mentioned by some people, that it was quite obvious that the majority of this House was definitely against this Agreement. And, three hours after that, the atmosphere was as if there was absolutely no opposition to the Agreement. Then, again, Mr. Arun Shourie spoke and the tide turned. He batted like one of the last-wicket batsmen, really working out splendour. The confusion is, and at the end of all this, I must say, that I, not being a law student, am not quite sure about the merit of the case that has been argued by the different people. The Agreement is like an elephant, and we are blind people who have gone to understand what the elephant is like -- one who touches the tail feels it like a rope; one who touches the trunk feels it like a pillar. The basic argument -- as I understood, I may be wrong, somebody will correct me, if not in the House, at least, after the House -- is that, firstly, there is the Indo-US Nuclear Agreement; then, there is an Act, called the Hyde Act. There are number comments; there are number of statements made, generally, by the officials of the United States. There were promises made in this House on behalf of the ruling Government. Hence, depending upon the skill of the advocates and the lawyers, people have been emphasising one particular aspect of it and trying to show they have clinched the argument. While, I am not at all quite sure whether, even today, in the US constitutional system, the paramoutncy belongs to the international agreement, or, to a domestic legislation, like the Hyde Act; and, what exactly is the position of the statements that might have been made by Condoleeza Rice or anybody else, offering explanations; whether there is any kind of legal weightage to those kinds of explanations given. Quite clearly, both, Shri Sitaram Yechury and Shri Yashwant Sinha thought that the Hyde Act had a certain influence. On the other hand, Mr. Singhvi, and even Mr. Sibal, appeared to argue that the Agreement was paramount and the Hyde Act had practically no significance, whatsoever remains. The point remains, if the Hyde Act had no significance, whatsoever remains, then, why we have been arguing about the Hyde Act for months together here, except today. Before today, nobody pointed out that we should not bother about the Hyde Act because the Hyde Act was irrelevant in the whole matter. Nobody had said it until now. (Interruptions) Now, Sir, the law position is not clear. The statistical and economic position is not clear either -- how much electricity will be generated with the material that we get because of this nuclear treaty, the figures are uncertain; what the cost of it would be, the figures are uncertain. And, they vary to a very large extent. I find that there is some kind of a trick that has been played on the BJP. The BJP, which is the father of this Agreement, has been tricked into disowning his own child. (Contd. by 6o -- TDB)

 

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