SHRI ARUN JAITLEY (CONTD): Their literature now tells us that their second strategy is that rural areas around urban centres are to be consolidated and, therefore, the encirclement of these cities have to take place. When it passes through the lifeline of this country, from West to East and North to South, and the centre, the economic lifeline of this country can be stopped. And, experts tell us that in the last three years, the human resource that they have been able to add to their strength, their incremental strength itself has been 30 per cent more. And, if they increase by another 30 per cent, their ability to paralyse these compact revolutionary zones, the encircled cities and the economic lifeline of this country is going to be much higher. They have had trials, and just see the kind of trials -- there are hon. Members from each of the States -- you had Koraput in Orissa, East Champaran in Madhuban. I happened to be, at that time, in Patna when this incident took place during the Bihar elections. About 300 people came, captured the entire city, captured the police stations, captured the treasury, attacked the house of RJD Member of Parliament, Shri Sitaram Singh, looted the banks and then went away. Sir, one police station was captured in Naxalbadi and a movement had begun and we thought that through the 70s, we had been able to finish off the movement. Today, in East Champaran in Madhuban, you had this case. And, then, you had Jehanabad. The entire jail administration was taken over. The prisoners were got released. In Giridi in Jharkhand, the entire take-over took place.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Mr. Jaitley, you should conclude now. (Interruptions). I have allowed him for whatever time he asked for because of important subject.

SHRI ARUN JAITLEY: I will try to confine myself. Sir, the most dangerous aspect of this movement has been one that geographically and in terms of population, it encompasses a very large area. These are compact areas. There is a high level of militarisation of this movement which has taken place. The quality of weapons they have, undoubtedly, can face the best of security forces. In areas where they have been able to establish control, where they levy taxes, where they run parallel Governments, usual security agencies and Government agencies are reluctant to interfere. They intertwine with the people, and therefore, they are able to socially organise a large number of people. Sir, a disturbing aspect has been that when they attempt to kill, when they attempt to destroy commercial establishments, or attempt a take-over, you have a large number of their sympathisers who act as the overground face of this underground movement. They do it in the name of human rights; they do it in various other names and start rationalising this kind of violence. How is the Government going to deal with all this? Sir, Afzal Guru or POTA or the Prime Minister's statements in Havana, the Prime Minister's response by wanting to loosen the Constitutional relationship between India and Kashmir pursuant to the Round Table are only indicators of the facts as to which way the mind of the Government is working. The problem is immense and the Government seems to be working diametrically in the opposite direction. When I mentioned that the illegal migration problem today has created 20 million of illegal migrants, equal to the size of smaller countries in the world, where terrorists can come and intertwine and mix with the population and retaliate, what is the response of this Government? The Supreme Court says that the IMDT Act was really enacted for the purpose of legitimatising infiltration. It created a complicated procedure by which infiltration could be legitimatised and, therefore, it is unconstitutional. What is declared unconstitutional, this Government immediately proclaims a Foreigners Control Order, and what is struck down in the name of IMDT, it brings back in the name of Foreigners Control Order. (continued by 2a)


SHRI ARUN JAITLEY (CONTD.): The response is 'no'. They may be illegal, they may be a security threat but they are useful voters. This appears to be the response of the Government. Let us forget the IMDT for a moment. Sir, I would like to ask today, and, I am sure that the hon. Home Minister will respond, what happened to the multipurpose national identity cards scheme. It had reached an advanced stage. It has many useful purposes to perform. We still don't know what has happened to it. Sir, the biggest mistake that a Government can do is what this Government is doing. And, instead of addressing the problem of terrorism, you deflect the solution.

And, in global strategy against terrorism, this is popularly referred to as the root-cause theory. Well, if somebody says that there was terrorism on 9/11 in New York, the cause of it was such and such action that the American took. When we say 'cross-border terrorism', President Musharraf says, "Well, the root cause is in Kashmir." And, therefore, every person who wants to condone terrorism, instead of addressing it and taking it head on, will deflect to the root-cause theory and the approach of this Government, which I see in this yellow book -- thank God, it is not a red book -- is that you deflect the solution to a root-cause problem. Well, we must try and make development in this region; we must try and find these kinds of solution rather than find a direct solution on how to deal with terrorism. You may require social solutions but, at the same time, the security situations really cannot be ignored. (Time-bell)

Sir, I am grateful to you for having given me the time to speak. I may be allowed to just wind up. I come back to the question, which I had initially asked. Is this country safe in the hands of the UPA Government? From the approach of the Government, it is very clear that we are not. Our boundaries are not safe, our borders are not safe, and, our people are not safe. It is a Government, which consciously wants to live in denial about the existence of the terrorism and the security threats. This Government, Sir, is soft on terror, it is soft on infiltrations, it is soft on a strong anti-terrorist law, it is soft on procuring convictions, it is soft on infiltrations of terrorists, it is soft even in the matter of hanging convicted terrorists. It is clueless on Jammu and Kashmir. On ULFA, the latest round shows that it is like Alice in Wonderland. It does not know how to deal with that situation. Some social groups, authors, well meaning people come in and negotiate and no solutions are there. And, Sir, as far as the threat from Maoists is concerned, before it is too late, the Government needs to wake up. The Government has still not realised the intensity of the knock that the Director (IB) gave on its head when publicly, in the presence of the Prime Minister, when he said, we need to get rid of the old architecture and need a new architecture. And, Sir, if this Government does not find to respond to it, and, it thinks that it is useful 'votes' by being soft on terror, let me just remind this Government, there are many, many patriotic people in this country, many times more patriotic than what this Government feels, before the Government realises that it is too late, the people will be ready to throw it out lock, stock and barrel unless it pulls its socks up and starts acting on this problem of terrorism. Thank you.


DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (RAJASTHAN): Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, at the outset, let me thank the Opposition and the learned Member of the Opposition for giving a useful opportunity to discuss a very important subject of internal security. Sir, the subject of internal security, is by definition, always important, and, if constructive facts, constructive inputs can be given, it is good for the nation. I certainly do not want to play politics on this important thing, and, I hope and trust that no one else does this. This is far too important a subject, and, therefore, the opportunity to discuss it in cold logic, cold facts with cold statistics is an important aspect. (Contd. by sk-2b)


DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD.): But, Sir, let me at the outset, ask myself a question. Internal security, unfortunately, happens to be a much-misunderstood word, a much-misunderstood phrase, indeed, a much-abused phrase. And, it is important before we go ahead to define the exact contours and scope of this phrase, because a lot of answers and a lot of questions will fall into place, if we understand what internal security is. Internal security, Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, is not law and order, as we all know. As we know, the Constitution of India, in the First Item of the Second List says law and order. And, what is that? That is exclusively given to the States to regulate. Equally, internal security is not simple external security or national security. That is for the Government of India under the Defence Ministry, and that is what the First List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution tells us. It is not even simple public order. The apex court has used the phrase 'public order', 'law and order', 'national security', may be ever expanding concentric circles. But, they are not really internal security. Therefore, internal security is a very peculiar species. It is really a hybrid animal. It's an animal which interestingly, and I checked this up the other day and I was surprised to find, does not find a mention in our Constitution anywhere. The closest is 'internal disturbance' in article 355. Internal security is not used anywhere. It does not find a mention in List One; it does not find a mention in List Two; it does not find a mention in List Three. Therefore, once you separate and keep in mind that it is the State Governments which deal with law and order, under exclusive Legislative and Executive competence, once, it is the Central Government which deals with defence preparedness under exclusive List One competence, we come to the real core of internal security, which is frequently a much-abused word. What does it then boil down to and should we really be discussing as the core theme of internal security, so important for our nation? Certainly, yes, interception, infiltration, various aspects of terrorism, but, not merely law and order or even crime. I will come to the details in a moment. But, we have to keep this in mind when we throw concepts like organised crime, rape, murder, which are very serious, which any society must combat, but not necessarily combat under the rubric of the internal security theme. Why? Because, the Central Government, is what we are discussing today. It is the Home Ministry that we are discussing today. The Home Ministry cannot go and prevent murders and loot in States for you, howsoever desirable it is. If we do that, you will accuse us of affecting ...(Interruptions)..

SHRI SHAHID SIDDIQUI: You can do that in Delhi. ...(Interruptions)..

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Let him speak, please. ...(Interruptions)..

DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI: Please, have some patience. ...(Interruptions).. I will be happy to deal with the occasions ...(Interruptions).. The important thing is ...(Interruptions)..

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MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: It is a serious discussion. Please don't interrupt. ...(Interruptions).. No, it is not good. ...(Interruptions)..

SHRI SHAHID SIDDIQUI: I am only adding to what he is saying. I am supporting him. ...(Interruptions)..

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Don't support him. He does not need your support right now.

DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI: The real point I wish to make, Sir, is that frequently a discussion on internal security tends to degenerate into a mere discussion on law and order, or, even external defence preparedness. That is what it is not and should not be, because we then go away from the core of internal security. But, Sir, let us turn to some of the issues the learned Member has raised. Unfortunately, the hon. Member, in raising a very important theme of internal security, has not dealt with any concrete fact, not a single statistic, not a single concrete fact. He has touched on issues and themes at the level of broad generality, and let me show you how. The first issue he dealt with, I will come to POTA in a minute, was Jammu and Kashmir. Yes, we have had a healing touch policy. We proclaim healing touch very openly and in writing. And, what has been the result of that? The result of that has been rather interesting, Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir. And, that is why I would have liked if my friend would have drawn this House's attention to some concrete facts. We are not here to trade charges. We do not consider Jammu and Kashmir to be a political issue. We do not consider even the debate on internal security to be a political issue. (Contd. by 2c-YSR)


DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD.): But we cannot run away from facts. Just take a few of them. Some of you have these published books. The figures are here in the published book circulated by the hon. Minister.

Between 2004 and 2005, the number of civilians killed in Jammu and Kashmir has come down by roughly 25-33 per cent. It does not mean that 557 killings are good or tolerable. But it is certainly a significant decrease, a noticeable and appreciable decrease. Take the number of terrorists killed. There is a decrease.

In 2006, the figures show a 33 per cent decline. Now, there is much to be done. But to generally castigate and give an impression of a fear psychosis that Jammu and Kashmir is falling apart is not correct. And why is that, Sir? There are very interesting reasons for it. You must keep in mind that Jammu and Kashmir has had a reconstruction plan of the degree of Rs.24,000 crore. Now, Rs.24,000 crore is not given as some kind of a donation or some kind of a bheekh or a charity; it is given because this Government believes in the solid reconstruction of Jammu and Kashmir. It is not something you will see tomorrow. I will not be able to count Rs.24,000 crore for you. But you will see it in power plants, in irrigation dams, in roads, in bridges, and you will see it with a gestation lag. It is a gestation lag of 4-5 years which takes time for this plan to come. Who gave this plan? Who sincerely felt that Jammu and Kashmir requires this reconstruction plan? It is this Government, the UPA Government. And that is something which has had a direct impact, and the figures show that.

Within Jammu and Kashmir, there are regional imbalances. In Ladakh, there is general peace. Jammu region is better than other areas, although there are some incidents. It is the Valley which is the cause for concern. In fact, the graphs are more graphic because they show steep decline; and more than a decline, they show a trend of decline, a continuing trend of decline.

Take the figure of 2004 on incidents, on civilians killed, and on terrorists killed. The figures are all for you to see. There is no reference to figures, unfortunately, in my hon. friend's speech. We did not play politics on Jammu and Kashmir. When the previous Government was in power, I think flip-flops had become the policy of the day. How many flip-flops have Jammu and Kashmir seen in the previous Government's regime? Certainly, they are nobody to tell us about how to go about matters in Jammu and Kashmir in a consistent manner. What have we done? The Prime Minister has set up five focussed Working Groups. They are Working Groups dealing with the various measures. Economic development is one, good governance is the other, Centre-State relations is third, and so on and so forth. Deliberations are in progress.

There are, very interestingly, more than 5000 tenements for migrants in Jammu. Most of the construction is complete with about Rs.200 crore. These are figures which are boring. These are not sensationalism. These are not slogans and shibboleths; but they are very important hard facts. And when a House as august as this discusses it, we have to keep to the hard facts. We have two-bedroom flats for migrants with about Rs.25 crore expenditure nearing completion. We have another Rs.159 crore rehabilitation programme for six thousand plus families in Akhnoor. Can I ask, very respectfully and humbly, my friend who talked of migrants and of Jammu region? Was any of these done by them? Well, you can always have crocodile tears but concrete work. What concrete work was done? The answer has to be an eloquent silence. It is these hard facts and not our 'softness on terror' which matters. Your word 'soft' will not make us 'soft.' The hard facts make your allegation of softness wrong.

Let us come to my friend's and his party's favourite theme -- POTA. POTA is a very interesting case study on the complete fallacy and the complete political nature of the argument raised by the Opposition. POTA has two aspects, both in law and in actual practice in politics and society. POTA has a human rights aspect, an arrest aspect, a physical aspect, a torture aspect, or a denial of human rights aspect. Equally, it had another aspect -- an aspect of interception, forfeiture, infiltration, funding, proclamation and pursuing the funds of terrorism. (Contd. by VKK/2D)


DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD.): According to me -- and I may be wrong, but I would like to be corrected -- the preventive aspect of terrorism is really dependent on these aspects, on infiltration, on interception, on catching the funds at source and tracing them right through till the end down the chain, through trans-border transfers. All of these preventive aspects of terrorism have been reincarnated by this Government in the Unlawful Activities Act. All of them, they have been improved, they have been strengthened, but they are all there. Not one of them has been deleted despite the big propaganda of the Opposition that POTA has been repealed, POTA has been repealed, soft on terror. Well, this is the preventive aspect of terror. Yes, we were open about it. We said so in this august House, in the joint session under Rule 184; we said so in our manifesto; we said so in our Common Minimum Programme that the other aspect of POTA -- the human rights aspect, the arrest aspect and the physical abuse aspect -- is something we do not believe will decrease terrorism. And, therefore, we proclaimed to the people before we went to the electorate that we will repeal it; but, we will repeal those aspects, the abusive aspects of POTA. And the people took that manifesto of ours, they took that declaration of ours and they voted us back to power. Now, that is the distinction. You had the same POTA and you had TADA as well. We had TADA. TADA told us that the success rate of TADA is abysmally low. Nobody knows the real facts. Somebody says, it is two per cent; somebody says, it is four per cent. Let us take four per cent. Is it a success rate which will justify the use of TADA against the farmers of Gujarat which is what has happened there in statistical terms? So, we repealed TADA and we repealed POTA after going to the people on an issue on which we were not hypocritical, but were upfront; and the people accepted that this is correct. That is obviously proved. After all, your POTA did not prevent....

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DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI: You had POTA. But, unfortunately, POTA coexisted with an attack on Parliament; POTA coexisted with attacks on Raghunath Mandir and Akshardham. POTA coexisted with so many incidents. So, POTA, by itself, is not a magical wand. I would like to create a law tomorrow here saying, by this law, I hereby abolish terrorism. If it was that easy, we would all be in happier times. This is misleading the public. This is playing politics. This is not going to the depth of the matter. The depth of the matter is that terrorism is controlled by preventive measures, by intelligence and information which we are doing and we shall strengthen ourselves more in doing. The depth of the matter is that you need a climate where abuses do not create more extremists and more terrorists. Yes, we don't subscribe to the root-cause theory. We do not think that terrorism is negotiable, we do not think that terrorism is justifiable for any cause, but equally we do not think that alienation of large sections of people will solve terrorism. We will deal with terrorism with a very firm hand, but equally we will have an inclusive definition of growth where we do not create further terrorists and further enemies. That is the approach of this Government and it's an approach on which this Government is proud and the allies are proud; and of which people have taken note and voted us back to power. That is so far as POTA goes.

The third aspect my friend touched upon was the other favourite theme, Afzal, which has seen mention here earlier. I would like this august House to consider these startling facts. I ask myself a question and I ask this august House: Doesn't Afzal, like hundreds of people before him for the last 60 years in free independent India, have a right to make an appeal under article 72? Now, I am one of those who believe and we have said so and the Congress Party believes this that to seek compulsory acquittal or pardon is as bad as seeking compulsory hanging. Aristotle once said, Sir, virtue is the golden mean between two vices, each of which is an extreme. The extreme is always a vice. The golden mean lies in between. If you ask for a compulsory hanging, are you not repealing article 72 for one man? Afzal Guru shall not have article 72. You and I shall have it only to apply. (Contd. by MKS/2e)


DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD.): You and I shall have it only to apply. But, equally, if you say 'instantaneously pardon him now', we do not stand for that. Who has said that? Have we ever said so? More importantly, Sir, I said I would not like to play politics on a sensitive issue like that, but, I am compelled to point out that there is hypocrisy in the Opposition's stand; there is double facedness; there are double standards. Let me remind you, Sir, and let me also remind this august House, that a few years ago, in a crime like dropping weapons by a foreign national, from an aircraft, over the territory of India, a man was convicted. That is a crime which is equal to treason, if done by a citizen of India. Treason is a crime which is no less important than the Parliament attack or the former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's assassination. He was convicted. His name was Peter Bleach. He was kept in incarceration. He was not pardoned, Sir. He was not commuted. He was not reprieved. He was physically left free and escorted out of the country! And who did that, Sir? That was done by the previous Government which is today shedding crocodile tears and raising a hue and cry. And till today, I would challenge anybody there to give us one good reason why this was done. Is there any accountability to the nation? No reason. Not even a reason why Peter Bleach, how Peter Bleach, when Peter Bleach and how come Peter Bleach was released, was given. That is the duplicity; that is where the argument breaks down. That is why politics comes into it.

The third aspect of Afzal Guru, Sir, is, I have here with me--and some of you may have seen it--a chart showing, illustrating that hypocrisy in graphic terms. This is a chart of 22 cases. I will minus three or four. About 18-19 cases, here, have a time period of an average of five years for exercise of the mercy power. And those four years-four years have expired during the term of the previous Government. The dates are here. They raised from 1990 to 2004, from 1990 to 2003 or from 2002 to 2005. My learned friends there, my hon. friends there, know very well that it is a process, it is a constitutional process; it takes time. It should not take five years, as it took you. And item 5 of my chart, Sir, is very interesting. Item 5 of my chart, reads: File No.14/1/99JC. Name of condemned prisoner : Murugan, Santhan and Arivu, Tamil Nadu. Brief details of case: Rajiv Gandhi's assassination case. Date of death awarded by courts: January 1998, and Supreme Court, May 1999. Date of rejection by the Governor: October 1999. Date of Receipt from State Government: May 2000. Date of submission to the President : 2005. For five long years, this Government which wants instantaneous non-consideration of Afzal's application has kept an assassination attempt convict pending. This is, I am sure, my hon. Member would not say that the former Prime Minister's assassination is any less important than an attack on Parliament. Both are reprehensible. And there are 19 other cases, Sir, which range from four to five years. Now, the point of the matter is that we do not stand for compulsory acquittal; we do not stand for compulsory mercy; we do not stand for compulsory reprieve. But equally, we do not stand for not giving him a right for the application to be considered. And you know--most of you are eminent people who know this already--that it is a long process. The application has to come either from the family or from the accused or the convict. It has to go to the Home Ministry; the Home Ministry has to refer it to the prosecuting State. In this case, it would be Delhi. The prosecuting State, Delhi, would have to refer it to the Police of Delhi. The Police of Delhi would give a report; it will come back to the NCT of Delhi; it will then come back to the Home Ministry. The President may raise two questions. It will come back to the Home Ministry. Now, this may take six months or nine months. But, today, my friends there are taking out rallies, disrupting Parliament and raising questions that instantaneously here and now, as I speak, you must put him on the nearest pole and hang him and not consider his application. Sir, we are proud that we are not for a tinpot dictatorship; we are proud that we are a functioning vibrant democracy. In a vibrant democracy, we give an equal chance, an equal bite at the apple, both to you, to me and to Azal. ...(Interruptions)... That does not mean......(Interruptions)... That does not mean.....(Interruptions)...

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DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI: That does not mean that Afzal should be let off or that he should be hanged. Let the President decide. In fact, I must say with utmost respectability that we are not supposed to discuss the conduct of the President here in this august House; we are not supposed to comment on the President's acts or omissions, alleged or otherwise. But, apparently, the entire Rule Book, the Constitution, the precedents, conventions and practices, good behaviour are forgotten by my hon. friends on the other side. (Contd. by TMV/2F)


DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD.): Lastly, Sir, on Afzal Guru, the Supreme Court, two weeks ago, has reiterated its power of judicial review again on mercy power to be exercised. There is a judgement now from Andhra Pradesh and there are other judgements earlier which say that even if the mercy is exercised good or bad, the court has the last word to review it. So, why is the Opposition worried? If they find that there is arbitrariness in the exercise of the power, the apex court is still there because the apex court has asserted the judicial review over such power. But then, to build an argument that he should be hanged immediately without further ado does not behove either of a responsible Opposition, which I am sure they are, or of a vibrant functioning democracy, which I am convinced we are.

Sir, the third aspect is that my friend talked about the North-East and he only mentioned Guwahati and sadly again without figures and facts. Let me draw your attention back to those boring facts; but they are somewhat inconvenient facts. The North-East has had, I would say, almost a good improvement just as Jammu and Kashmir. The figures of Jammu and Kashmir, I have just given you. The North-East figures are a little less than Jammu and Kashmir, but still significant not only in improvement but also the trend is in one direction. Now, in the North-East there is one problem. There is a regional disparity in terms of the internal security situation. In fact, as the figure shows, Mizoram, by God's grade, is, by and large, peaceful. Arunachal Pradesh is, by and large, peaceful. Tripura has earlier, during the previous Government, witnessed some problem, but in the recent past has seen a dramatic improvement of almost 30-40 per cent. We have the figures here and you have the figures in that chart. Unfortunately, the total gets a little dimmed and undermined by the fact that Manipur has experienced some bad events and statistically larger events. Nagaland also contributes, but for a curious reason or for a peculiar reason. In Nagaland, the two main groups, or rather the main group of extremists or terrorists, whatever you may call them, has been into two sub-groups. They are known, I am told, as "M" and "K". Unfortunately, the "M" and "K" are killing each other which is contributing to the explosions and to the statistics. Assam has had a rather good figure except in the recent past. In Assam, there is another very curious trend. The number of incidents is high, but the number of deaths is low. I asked myself this question and we discussed it, and I found a very interesting conclusion that, perhaps, the ULFA did not want to create unpopularity by creating explosions which caused deaths. They want to create explosions but to make a point, and not to cause deaths because that causes unpopularity. This is the reality. We are certainly very concerned about it. I am not suggesting that the decline from "X" to 33 per cent means that the balance is a tolerable figure. Please don't misunderstand me. That is not my intention at all. Even one death is serious. But these are matters to be dealt with in a great way. We have, like Kashmir, a Rs.24,000 crores reconstruction plan. We have Rs.20,000 crores for the North-East. The figure is Rs.20,000 crores. It is provided by this Government which believes not in talks, not in use of adjectives like "soft" and "hard" but in hard bold facts and hard bold steps.

Sir, the other aspect is Naxalite. Yes, really speaking, internal security in its definition and concept, as I started off in the beginning, boils down to, as I said, Jammu and Kashmir, North-East and Naxalites. The hon. Home Minister, I am sure, will deal with it in great deal later. But it is very interesting that when we go into the details, we tend to over-react and we tend to paint ourselves and this country into a black picture, thereby generating a kind of fear and alarm because you and I, and all responsible citizens, when we hear that 40 per cent of the country is in the hands of the Naxalites and 35 per cent of the population is in the hands of the Naxalites, are rightly alarmed--I mean I would expect you to be and I would be--because this is a democratic country. But these figures can be misleading. There are very simple reasons for it. There are large parts of India, in Jharkhand, in Orissa, in Bihar and down south, going further down from Orissa, where there may be a village or two in a district, where Naxalite (Maoist) activity is there. The whole district in our method of counting is designated as a Naxalite area. If you ask a question as to how many villages or village posts are affected by this scourge, the figure will be considerably less. But what happens is that you make a red corridor to our own detriment and to our own fear psychosis from Nepal to Tamil Nadu because you tend to generalise and aggregate districts as a whole, whereas the problem--it is, of course, a serious problem--is till happily more localised. The figures are very interesting. (Contd. by RG/2G)


DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (contd.): Sir, the figures are very interesting. It is seen in that book at page 40 that Andhra Pradesh has experienced a dramatic decrease in Naxal activities; there is a dramatic decline of 40-50 per cent, for which we don't have to be self-congratulatory, but we should receive some encomiums. Sir, in respect of States like Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand, the main Naxal areas, overall, there has been a huge decline. But the decline has been less than it should be because of one State which stands out, where the Naxal activity is, unfortunately, very, very high, and the average becomes bad because of one State. That State -- I don't want to play politics, but I am duty-bound to give you hard, cold facts -- is Chhattisgarh. This State has experienced a dramatic increase in Naxal activities. Yes; what does the Central Government do? The Central Government cannot go and police the State. It is not a Police Authority or a law and order authority, that falls under List II. To Chhattisgarh, the Home Ministry offers helicopters; they offer armoured vehicles, where if you fire from big guns, the vehicle does not break. I was interested to learn that they even offer reimbursement of monies. If you run out of defence or BSF or other Home Ministerial helicopters; they say, "You hire private ones, but we will reimburse you." But Chattisgarh has still a very high figure. I am not blaming Chattisgarh, but I am pointing out a fact. I think the hon. Member should have looked into his own backyard before making an allegation about the presence of Naxalities in various States. Just to say that it is 35-40 per cent is not true; in villages, it is far fewer. And, in terms of the internal breakup of the Naxal-affected States, Chhattisgarh, by leaps and bounds, is ahead. It is a matter of concern to us, but it should be a matter of greater concern to my friend and his party.

Sir, I would conclude shortly by pointing out that the Central Government is always very keen to do whatever it can to hold out a helping hand. That is why I started with the constitutional scheme. We can hold out a helping hand only if the States ask us to. As you know, you and I would be the first ones to shout if we pushed ourselves in there because only article 356 can permit us to do so. But wherever we were asked, we have given 37 battalions, that is, 37,000 persons of paramilitary nature, to these States. It is a mini army. I think the States have a mini army with these 37,000 persons. They ask for it, and we give it. We have given armoured vehicles, helicopters, aeroplanes and large volumes of money. There are various schemes; if you are a Naxalite and you surrender, then, a bank account is opened with some money in it; there is immediately an employment, and there is a withdrawal of cases. But you are pursued and monitored for six months to see that you don't fall back into his bad ways. So, if you are genuine, it works. It is a carrot-and-stick policy. We are not hesitant to have the carrot as much as the stick because it is both which work together.

Sir, there are issues about other targets like the Railways. These are jurisdictional issues, and I have no doubt that the hon. Home Ministry and the Railway Ministry will be able to work this out. The Railways is a very peculiar thing; the railways pass through at fast speed through several States. The people, who take care of railway property, are the railway police. The people who take care of the place or passengers could only be the State. But the State keeps changing every 10 or 15 minutes. So you need to work out a system how the Railways are protected in a greater measure. I found from the website that the BJP's National Executive meeting of 7th to 9th September said some of the things which the hon. Member also has mentioned here. In particular, it tended to say that the UPA did nothing and said nothing about the national security in its Common Minimum Programme or in its manifesto except saying that they would repeal the POTA. That is totally incorrect. That is painting a wrong picture. I read to you our Common Minimum Programme. There are two parts; Page 15 says, "New initiatives will be launched to bring investments in areas like power, tourism, handicraft and sericulture." Then, it says at page 16, which the 8th September, 2006 meeting of the National Executive meeting of the BJP forgot to mention and thereby it misinforms its own members. At page 16, it is said, "The UPA Government is determined to tackle terrorism, militancy and insurgency in the North-East as a matter of urgent national priority." That is a declaration. It is also there in our manifesto, "All the North-Eastern States will be given special assistance to upgrade and expand infrastructure in this regard. The North-Eastern Council will be strengthened to give adequate professional support..."

(Continued by 2H)


DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD.): "The territorial integrity of existing States will be maintained". We are not unconcerned about important issues like this. But we do not like to play politics.

Sir, may I end by quoting to you some words of a stirring speech given by Kennedy when he was installed as President? I think those words are important for countries concerned about their internal security and about security in general. Of course, it is the same speech where he also said, "Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country". In the same speech elsewhere, he said, "Every nation knows whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend and oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty". And the Government of India is committed to that. The UPA is committed to that. He also said, and that is our approach and that is our philosophy, "If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich", and that approach also animates our overall approach. But civility is not a sign of weakness. Sincerity is always subject to proof. When we talk to Pakistan, we do not talk with our guard down; we do not negotiate out of fear. But, Sir, we do not fear to negotiate because it is important not to negotiate out of fear, but it is equally important not to fear to negotiate.

Ultimately, Sir, on such matters, there has to be across-the-board support in the Houses of Parliament, in the message to the nation, that we are all together. These are matters where the unity of Parliament is more symbolic and more important as a message than even the content of what we speak here. Let me assure you, as I started by saying that we thank you for this opportunity to give you facts and figures, we thank you in particular because, through you, we are able to convey to the nation what we have done, what we are doing and what we are committed to doing. And the facts and figures, in conclusion, I may say, which are available in that book, are striking. They tell you the core, scope and focus of the concept of internal security, not mere law and order, not murders, not policing, not defence preparedness. It tells you also how much we have done and how happily in this country there has been an improvement on concrete facts and figures with, of course, focussed areas requiring more attention.

I thank you, Sir, very much. (Ends)

ק (ָ Ϥ) : ֳ֯ן , ֲ ï , ֬և ִ ֮֟ ֌׸ ֬և ו ָ ֮ ֙ ׻י ָ ֯ ֱֻ̟֟ ָ , ׯ֔ ֻ ֤֟ ֲֻ , ִ֟ ׮ֵ ָ ״ֻ ״ֻ֟ ֻ ָ פ ֣ ֵ ֟פ ֵ֟ ׻֋ ׿ֿ Դָ֤֮ ֟ ֻ ֌׸ ֤ ܟ ֮֮ ׻֋ ֺ ָ ִ ֕ ִ ֻ֮ ֤ , ׻ ֤ ֲ ׻֋ ֤֟ ֲֻ ֣, ֣ ָ, ֲ ֟ ֲ ֌׸ ֟ ֱ ֛ , ִ߮ , ֛ ֟ ֲ ֌׸ ֟ ָ ִ֮ ֌׸ ־ֻ ָ, ֌׸ ֻ , ֕ ֌׸ ֻ , ֻ ֌׸ ֛ ֯ ֻ , ֻ ֌׸ ֛ ֻ , כㆻ ֌׸, ֛ ֻ ֲ ™ ֌׸ ֮ ֯  , և֮ ™ ֌׸ ֌׸, ֕ ֌׸ ֲ ֣ ָ ִֵ , ָ ߕ ָ ֤ Ӥ ָ ֕ ֻ ֌׸ , ϳ־ ֛ , ָ ֌׸ , ָ ֌ֻ־֤ ֜ ϳ־ ֛ , ϳ־ ֛ , ֌ֻ־֤ ָ ״ּ ֮ , ֌ֻ־֤ ָ ָָ ָ ִ ֮ ׻ֵ

(2J/NB ָ ֿ:)


ק (֟) : ֳ֯ן , ֌ֻ־֤ ָ ֮ ׻ֵ , ָ ָ ִ֕ ־ֻ ֻןֵ , ֮ ׯ֔ 60 ֻ ֻןֵ , ִ , ָ ֟ ֲ national consensus , national understanding ָ ֤֟ ֲֻ , ֲ ֤֟ ֲֻ ֱ ֌׸ , ֱ ףֵָ , ֱ , ֱ arms , ֤֟ ֲֻ ָ , ָ ߟ֮ , feeling of belonging օ alienation , alienation և׸ߕ , ߕֻ֮ , ָ ߸ כ , sense of alienation ׻֋ ֲ ֛ ָ֟ ߕ sense of alienation ׻֋ political leadership ִ֮ ֮ ֣ ָ political leadership ׯ֔ 20-25 ֻ ָ political leadership , ֤֟ ֛ ֋, ֙ ׻י ָ , ֮ - ָ ™ߵ ׻ ָ consensus ֮ ֋ ֲ ָ issues ָ consensus - foreign policy , internal security , ֲ ֲ ָ ߓ ־ , ֵ֤ ָ ׾ָ ֟ - Ӥ , ׻֋ ׻ ֮֮ , וִ blame game ׮֮ օ

ֳ֯ן , ׻י , ָ , ֕ օ ֺ , כ ֮ , ̻ ִֻ , ָ֟ ִֻ , 1993 Ӳև , ִֻ , ָ-ָ ׻י , ׻֋ ִ ׻י ߛ׿֯ ָ י ֛ և׸ߕ grievances - ethical, religious and social, ָ ֤ י ֛, ֯

ֳ֯ן , ֟ ָ intelligence agencies , Ɵ ֲָ֟ , פ ֟ ֵ֤ ֟ , ִ֮ ֛ intelligence agencies - , RAW ָ , IB ָ ָ ߕ ָ , ߕ - ָ ֻ ֟ , ָ ֮ , ָ ָ֮ ֟ , ָ Ӥ ֻ֟ ׸ڙ , ֮֕ן ָ ָ ִ ֲ intelligence agencies ֮֕ן ָ ָ ִ - , , , , ױ intelligence agencies political tool ֮ ֟ , ָ political tool ֮ ֟ ֤֕, Դָ֤֮ ֟ ֟ ֵ ָ ִ ו ֮ ֮ ֱ ִֵ

ֳ֯ן , Ӥ ֟ Դָ֤֮ ֣ ֣ ָ ֛ , ֛֮ ׻֋ , ֲָ , ֕ , ֲ ׸ և ָ֓ ߿֮ intelligence agencies և׸ߕ , ָ ִֻ֮ ֵ ֕ intelligence agencies פ ֮ ֟ , ß֮ ֲָ ֮ , ׮ß֮ ֲָ ֮ , ָ ֲָ ֮ , ָ , ָ Դָ֤֮ ֣ ׯ֔ 60 ֻ ß-ß פ ֵ ֕ ֻ Ӥ , ָ ִ ִֻ֮ ֟ߕ intelligence agencies ָ ֋ ׮֙ ָ ֵ , ֮֯ ֟ פ ߕ ֻ פ ߕ Դָ֤֮ ׮֙ ֋ 2K/AKG ָ ֿ:


ק (֟) : ָ, ׮֙ , ו ״ֻ ״ֻ , ߤ ֻ ֲ ָֻ֤ ƴߤ ֟ , ֟ , ֕ ָֻ ֟ ָֻ ָ 500 ָ ־֮ ߤ , ֟ ָ ָ ־֮ , ֟ ָ ß֮ ִֻ֮ ָ 48 ־֮ , ו֮ ֤ ֻ ֮ 8.5 ןֿ֟օ 2 ןֿ֟ , ֲ ָ ֻ 8.5 ןֿ֟ ֲ-ֲ ֮֯ פ , ֲ-ֲ פ , ֮ ײ֟ ־ֻ ָ , ֲ ׻֋ ״׮Ù , әߕ ֵ bias alienation bias ֱֻ ִ ֟פ ֵ֤ ״ֻ֟օ 㴲և ֕ , 㴲և , ָ ׻ ָ ־ ֻ--ֻ solve ׻ ־ , ו֮ ִ , , ô ׯֵ ֟ , כ ִ֮ ֤ ֲ ״ֻ ״ֻ, ֤ ֟ ׻֋ ֺ ֛ , ׻֋ ֛ ֺ ֛ ׻֋ ֛, , , ֲ fail ֟ conviction rate 4 ָ , ׻֋ ָ ֟ ִ ֛֛ ? ֲ ֟ , ֻ ָ ׮ ֟ ֟ , ה֮ ׻֋ 10 ֮ ֛ ֲ 10 ֟ , ֤֟ , ֮ , ֮ ֻ , ׮ ֟ , ֮ ֮ ֮ ߮ ָ ִ Ӆ ߲ ֟ ָ ֋ ָ ֮ ָ , ױ ֮և פֵ ֮ ֮ ֻ ֟פ , פ ָ פօ ֮ ֻ-ֻ פֵ , ֺ ֻ ָ ֱ כ ֵ ָ פ֟ , ֤֟ ָ , ֤֟ , Ѿ ֛ ָ ־ ָ, ׻ ׻ ִ ׻֋ ߕ ָ ֛օ ֕ 㴲և ֻѾ , ֮ Ϭִ֮ӡ ֟ , ָ ֯ߕ ִ ״׮Ù ֋, ָ™ ߱ ״׮Ù ֋, ֱ ״ֻօ alienation , ָ֟ ָ ֮ alienation ֵ֤ ֮ ֵ֤ ֮ , ֟  ׾ ָ ִ ׿ ֋օ ָ ִ ׿ ֮ ֕ ״׮Ùי , ֕ әߕ ֮ - ֵ֤ ׻֋ ִ ׿ ֮

ָ, ꬵ ֕ ָ ֤֟ ֻ , ָ ָ ֤֟ ֻ , 㴲և ָ ֤֟ ֻ օ ֮ ß֮ ֯ ֣ , ָ ֲ ֲ ׯ֔ פ ß֮ ֋ ֟֓ߟ , ֮ ? 㴲և , ׻ ִ֮ ָ , ֮ solve ׻ֵ օ ֮ ꬵ ֮ solve ֟פ , ״֙ ֲ ߕ ִ֮ ߅ ׻֋ ֮֕ן ָ ָ Ϥ ֙ߋ ֬և ߅ ָ ֯ ָ ֮֕ן , ֱ ׻֋ ֙ߋ ָ Ϥ , ָ Ϥ ֯ ֯ ָָ , ֻ֟ , ׻ ֣ ֵ , ֣ ֵ , Դָ֤֮ ִ ָ , 㴲և ִ , ֯ ß֮ ִ֮ ֟, ָ ֛ , ֮֯ - ָ , ָ Ϥ ׻ ָ ָ֤֮ ָ solve ׻֋ ֬և ֮֕ן ֮֕ן , ֮֕ן ֲ ָ, ֛ ֕ , ו ׮֮ ֮ ָ ֮֕ן (2 ָ ֿ:)


ק (֟) : ֌ֻև ִ ָ ֵ ֌ֻ ִ ָ әֻ ꌵ׸ ׻֋ ֛ ָ֟ ׯ֔ פ ֜ , ״׮Ù ָ ֌ֻ ִ ֻ ֈ ߛ ֮

ӡ ( ׿־ָ֕ 0 י) : ֯ ו ָ ָ ֟ ֻ , ֻ֟ ֯ ״ֻ ߛ ֟ ֯ ָ ֟ ֟

ק : ׯ֔ ֻ ֲָ ֯ ֵ֮ ֌ֻև ָ ֵ օ

SHRI SHIVRAJ VISHWANATH PATIL: I have never said that. ...(Interruptions)

ק : , ֻ֟ , ֓և ֌ֻ ߛ ֮ ״׮Ù օ ָ ֛ ֟ ? ߛ , , כ , ָ ֯ ֓և ָ ֯ ֓և ֟ ׸ ֌ֻ ִ ß֮ , ݻ֤ , ָ ֮ ָ ֕׸ ו ָ ևֻ ߙ , ו ָ ֕ ևֻ ߙ , ֻ ֻ ߙ , פֵ ߙ , alienation ֜ , ֟ߕ , ָָ ֬և -- ֮ ֌ֻ ִ ߻ ֱ -ӛ- ָ ׻ ׿ֵ-״ ָ ֻ ֌ֻ ִ ֛ ֋ ׿ֵ-״ և ו֮ ִ ָָ ׻ߕ ֵ֮ ֯ ֣ օ

, ֟ ֤ ֮֜ , ֟ ִִ ߕ ־֕ ׌ ֻ֮ ꌵ׸ ִ ָ֕ ֵօ ֻ֟ , ꌵ׸ ִ Ù әֻ ÙԻ ꌵ׸ ߓ ֵ֮״֌ ָ ָ֕ ָ Ù ֲ , әֻ ꌵ׸ ִֻ , ָ ֲ , әֻ ꌵ׸ ִֻ ָ әߕ ߕ ֮ٛ ֺ , Ù ׻ ׻ ߓ ֮ٛ ֺ ׻֋ ꌵ׸ ִ ׌ Ù

, ָ ֟ ֻ ־ֻ әֻ ꌵ׸ , - ׻ כߕ ָ ָ ֻ֟ ׸ 11 ֟Ӳָ ֤ ָ ֟ , ϳ־ ָ әֻ ꌵ׸ ָ ֛ ׾֤ , ֤ , ָ ֮ - ß֮ , -ֵ֤ ָ , ֵ֤ ֮ ׿ֿ , ß֮ ׮ֿ֮ ֮֮ ׿ֿ ָָ ָ ָ ֈә ֯ ֈә ֱ ׮֙ ׮ֿ֮ ֮ ָ ֤֟ ֻ ָ ָ ֣ Although all Muslims are not terrorists, why all terrorists are Muslims. ִ ֟ ־ֲ և ָ , ־ֲ ־ֲ ֌ֻև ִֻ֮ , ִֻ֮ , ֕߾ Ӭ ֻ ִֻ֮ , פ ֻ ִֻ֮ , -Ù ָ ׸ ֻ , ִֻ֮ , ֆÙ ִֻ֮ 0000 ִֻ֮ ? ׻֋ ֻ֟ , ֓ , ß֮ ָ ֓ ֿ߸ ֕ ֛և ֛ , ֤ ֤֤ ִֻ֮ , ֓ ֿ߸ 20 ֻ ׸ ־֕ ß֮ ִֻ֮, ݻֻ ׸ և, -ֵ֤ և, ֿ߸ ֤֟ ֣ ֿ׸ ָ ֕֟ , ß֮ ֮ ֆ, ß֮ ָ ֟ , ß֮ ָ ßײֻ ß֮ ִֻ֮ ָ ׻֋ ֮ , ß֮ ֮ ֟ ֟ ֮օ (2 /ߋ־ ָ ֿ:)