The House re-assembled after lunch at two of the clock,





THE MINISTER OF SOCIAL JUSTICE AND EMPOWERMENT (SHRIMATI MEIRA KUMAR): Sir, I am glad to inform this august House that the Government of India has decided to institute National Awards to be given to Non-Governmental Organisations or Human Rights' activists who have done outstanding fieldwork in the area of eradicating untouchability and in combating offences of atrocities under the Prevention of Civil Rights Act, 1995 and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Terrorists) Act of 1989. There shall be totally four awards every year covering both the categories. Awards to individual activists shall carry an amount of Rs.2 lakhs and to an institution shall carry an amount of Rs.5 lakhs. The award will be given to outstanding NGOs or Human Rights' activists in each of the four regions of the country, namely, North, South, East and West for rendering yeoman service in the said fields. More than one recipient or organisation may share the award. The award will be instituted in 2007, and would be given annually thereafter. The award is open to all Indian NGOs and Human Rights' activists without any distinction or discrimination on ground of race, sex, caste or creed. The Screening Committee and finally, the Selection Committee constituted for the purpose would consider the achievements of the NGOs or individual Human Rights' activists nominated/recommended for Award by the prescribed authority. For the 2007 Award, the Screening Committee and the Selection Committee would consider nominations received up to 31st January, 2007.

׿֤ : ָ, ״֮֙ It is a very important matter. ...(־֮֬)...

SHRI C. RAMACHANDRAIAH: Sir, I was permitted to raise the issue pertaining to beedi workers...(Interruptions) : Since yesterday I have been trying to raise this issue...

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Now, there is a Bill for introduction...(Interruptions) Let us go by the procedure...(Interruptions)




THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS (SHRI SHRIPRAKASH JAISWAL): Sir, I move for leave to introduce a Bill to repeal the Indian Rifles Act, 1920.

The question was put and the motion was adopted.

SHRI SHRIPRAKASH JAISWAL: Sir, I introduce the Bill.


׿֤ : ָ, ֈ ֮֟ ...(־֮֬)...

SHRI C. RAMACHANDRAIAH: Sir, yesterday, I was permitted to raise an issue and today again, I could not raise it...(Interruptions)

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: We will take it up tomorrow...(Interruptions) This is not Zero Hour...(Interruptions) I cannot allow you now...(Interruptions)

SHRI C. RAMACHANDRAIAH: It pertains to human rights; two persons have already committed suicide. That is why it was admitted yesterday, and it was to be taken up during Zero Hour. But, unfortunately, we could not take it up...

׿֤ : ָ, ״֮֙ ֈ ֮֟ ...(־֮֬)...

ֳ֯ : No, no. ...(interruptions)..., ...(־֮֬)...

׿֤ : ָ Ϥ ֮։ ָ , ָָ ֱֻ...(־֮֬)...

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: This is not Zero Hour...(Interruptions) , ֯ ֻ֟ ָָ ֟ ׻֋ ...(־֮֬)... ֻ֟ ָָ ֟ ׻֋ ...(־֮֬)... I am not allowing ...(interruptions)...

ֳ֯ : Nothing will go on record. ...(interruptions)...

׿֤ : *

ֳ֯ : ֯ י פ ׾ֵ ...(־֮֬)...

(1 ָ ָ )


ֳ֯ן (֟) : ֯ י ו י .. (־֮֬) .. ֯ י ו ..(־֮֬).. ך, ִֵָ Please sit down. ..(־֮֬).. ֯ ך, ק ... (־֮֬) .. ? ֯ ך ..(־֮֬).. ִֵָ , י ..(־֮֬) .. ק , Please sit down. (־֮֬) .. , , ׿֤ , ֯ י ו Please give the notice. .. (־֮֬) .. ߕ, ִֵָ ..(־֮֬).. ֯ י ו Please give the notice. ..(־֮֬) .. כ , ֯ ײֻ , ֯ ׻֋ ..(־֮֬)

Mr. Kyndiah, please move the Bill. (Interruptions)

Let us take up the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order Amendment Bill, 2006.





That the Bill further to amend the Constitution

(Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 to modify the list of

Scheduled Tribes in the State of Bihar, be taken

into consideration.


The question was put and the motion was adopted.


* Not recorded.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: We shall now take up clause-by-clause consideration of the Bill.

Clause 2 was added to the Bill.

Clause 1, the Enacting Formula and the Title were added to the Bill.

SHRI P.R. KYNDIAH: Sir, I move:-

That the Bill be passed.

The motion was adopted.


MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Let us take up the Short Duration Discussion. (interruptions) What is this? Without giving notice you want to raise it.. (Interruptions) You are from the ruling group. This is not good. (Interruptions) Without giving notice, you cannot raise the matter. (Interruptions) Why are you not giving notice? (Interruptions) Mr. Narayanasamy, please. (Interruptions)

Let us take up the Short Duration Discussion. Shri Arun Jaitley. (Interruptions).... (Followed by 2o/tdb)


MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Mr. Narayanasamy, please take your seat. ...(Interruptions)... Now, we take up the Short Duration Discussion. Shri Arun Jaitley is to raise the Short Duration Discussion.

SHRI RAVI SHANKAR PRASAD: Are they the UPA partners? The Samajwadi Party is helping the Congress Party! ...(Interruptions)...

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Why? ...(Interruptions)...

SHRI RAVI SHANKAR PRASAD: I am just asking this question, Sir.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Let us discuss the internal security. ...(Interruptions)... Mr. Siddiqui, please maintain the decorum of this House. ...(Interruptions)...



SHRI ARUN JAITLEY (GUJARAT): Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, my gratitude to you for permitting us to raise the important issue for discussion on the internal security situation of the country. Sir, the UPA Government now has been in power for almost two-and-a-half years, and during its tenure in power, we, in the opposition, have several reasons to be disappointed with the performance of this Government. There are several fronts in which the Government has certainly not lived up to the popular expectations. We have had virtually, because of the ideological struggle between the Congress Party and the Left, a paralysis in the economic decision-making process of the country. We have seen in the last two-and-a-half years gross constitutional improprieties committed for partisan reasons in Jharkhand, in Goa, in Bihar; we have seen the dilution of the Prime Ministerial authority; we have seen the criminalisation of the Council of Ministers. We have seen pronouncements by members of the Council of Ministers, not in the direction of any higher standards of governance, but intended really to harden caste and religious identities of this country. We have also seen the abrogation of an effort to pursue an independent foreign policy. Now, if we look at the overall performance of the UPA Government, these are the broad heads which have disappointed the whole country. But, if there is the largest single failure of this Government, it is certainly the management of the country's internal security. After two-and-a-half years of the UPA being in power, an average citizen is asking himself a question, not merely in areas which were traditionally infested with terrorism, but even in other parts of the country, that are we really sitting on a mine field, with the helpless Government, unable to have any action or response to the developing situation? The question, Sir, is, is India safe in the hands of the UPA? And, if we see the performance of this Government, we go back disappointed with a great sense of insecurity that with instances of terrorism and disturbance to internal security increasing by the day, the Government is merely a helpless spectator. Every time any major incident of sabotage or attack or terrorist violence takes place, we see the leaders of this Government, the hon. Prime Minister, the hon. Home Minister with the usual kind of cliches and templates that this is condemnable; the Government and the country will have zero-tolerance to terrorism. But, after these usual templates in terrorism, this Government then sits back and waits for the next attack to take place. This has been the history of the last two-and-a-half years. Today, we have the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, the situation in Assam again erupting its fall out in various other parts of the country, and now you have a complete zone of violence emerging from the left wing extremism. (Contd. by 1p-kgg)


SHRI ARUN JAITLEY (contd.): If you look at the pronouncements of the Government and even the latest document that they have circulated, you will find that there is nothing which inspires the real confidence among the people.

Sir, two-and-a-half years have seen internal security crumbling under this Government, if not collapsing. We are disappointed but not surprised. I went back to see what is often quoted -- National Common Minimum Programme -- as to what the UPA had to say on the subject; because, there, when you refer to the National Common Minimum Programme, they ask for a strict enforcement.

As I said, we are disappointed with the internal security situation but we are not surprised because the 24-page document virtually made no reference to the management of the country's internal security! The management of the internal security in this country is not a UPA priority! There is no mention of what the national strategy has to be to deal with terrorism, what the way forward has to be in order to ease the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, on how the Left Wing extremism has to be combated, what is the long-term strategy as far as Jammu and Kashmir is concerned. The National Common Minimum Programme of the UPA did not spare much time or attention to all this. It is, therefore, understandable that the UPA's approach of inaction to this situation does not bring in turmoil within the UPA or its supporting parties in the Left. Because, as we said, we are disappointed but not surprised because this is certainly not an area of the UPA priority. Are the UPA, the hon. Prime Minister, the hon. Home Minister, Sir, living in denial about what exactly the situation of the country is? We do not think that they are really unaware of what is happening. When I say they are not unaware, all security and intelligence agencies have a close approach to the eyes and ears of the Prime Minister and the Home Minister. And professional as they are, I have no doubt that our agencies have been keeping the highest functionaries of the Government informed as to what the ground-level situation today in the country is. We have a situation where the Prime Minister and the Home Minister and the entire Government pretend to be in denial of this. They are in denial of the existence of this problem because virtually it now appears that the crux of the problem is not that there is any lack of advisers in the intelligence or security agencies to professionally advise the Government on how the situation has to be tackled, but the real problem is the own approach of the UPA. If hard decisions are not to be taken, if terrorism and the deteriorating internal security situation is to be dealt with by kid gloves and the punch to be delivered must only have a velvet coating, then I am afraid, a Government of this time will never be able to effectively tackle the internal security of the country.

The point for the Government and the UPA is, Sir, that internal security has to be tackled on security considerations. But the approach of the UPA is: Can I make political capital out of it and in fighting terrorism, can I use that fight against terrorism also into an instrument of vote bank politics? So, security is not to be tackled on security considerations but security is to be tackled on vote bank considerations. And, if this is the approach of the UPA, then you will have the kind of shameful incidents which took place last week repeated by the day.

(Contd. by kls/1q)


SHRI ARUN JAITLEY (CONTD): Has it ever happened, Sir, in the 59 years of Indian history after Independence that an exasperated head of an intelligence agency chooses a public platform to deliver his views? These are all agencies, which very quietly advise the Government on the steps to be taken. But then even those heads of the intelligence agencies, -- and I refer to the speech made by the Director of IB -- realise that it is a case where the Government is not merely to be rapped on its knuckles but it is to be knocked on its head. Before the entire country, and television and media the Government is to be advised that all your existing traditional legal architectures for dealing with terrorism have failed and, therefore, think of a solution, which is commensurate WITH the problem that we are seeking to tackle. But then this would have no effect on a Government whose priority is not national security; whose priority is vote bank politics. Within 48 hours came the response from the hon. Prime Minister that the Government has no such intention of enacting any tough law to deal with terrorism. It is a shameful incident, as I said, which has taken place.

THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS (SHRI SHIVRAJ VISHWANATH PATIL): May I say something, Sir? The information, which is being given to this House, is incorrect. The hon. Member is quoting from the newspapers and speaking here. He has not read the speeches made either by the Prime Minister or the Director General. This kind of misleading will not help the country in controlling the security situation.

SHRI ARUN JAITLEY: Sir, I am extremely grateful to the hon. Home Minister for his intervention. In fact, the intervention just proves the point we are making. The intervention proves that not what some newspapers tried to interpret as, what camera showed, the exact phraseology from the mouth of the author and the orator that the existing legal architectures have not delivered, to deal with this situation we require a radical solution, we require a radical law, but then a Government, as I said, whose priority is not national security, whose priority merely is how to use a soft-on-terror approach as an instrument of vote bank politics, will not even understand this loud and clear message that came from the head of an intelligence agency. So, what is being interpreted in the intervention of the hon. Home Minister, I am sure he will elaborate it when he responds to this debate, is exactly the difficulty that we find with this Government. Sir, what is the magnitude of the problem? Sir, we had a situation 17 or 18 years ago where Pakistan realised very clearly that in conventional warfare it had not succeeded, and, therefore, it resorted to an alternative tactic. It saw the emergence of sabotage and terrorist attacks in India through cross border terrorism. Today you find that these are not attacks, which are merely confined to Jammu and Kashmir. You have a situation where the attacks and the networks are not merely limited to the State on which Pakistan has its eyes but today you have ISI modules, which have been expanding along the length and breadth of this country. The network exists if he sees some of the attacks, in Maharashtra, for instance, in different towns, the kind of recoveries which are being made and the kind of recoveries and explosives which are not being made by our security agencies and the State security agencies. How many recoveries have been made from Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Gujarat, Goa, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal?

(Contd by 2R)


SHRI ARUN JAITLEY (CONTD.): The network has expanded all across the country. The targets, today, are clearly chosen. And, let us be very clear how the targets are chosen. The targets of principal terrorist attacks are chosen very carefully so as to destroy the economic, religious and social fabric of the Indian society. So, let us just take the major attacks which have taken place in the last one year or one-and-a-half years. Sir, 5th July, 2005, the chosen target was Ayodhya. They felt that it represented an important religious symbol as far as India was concerned. On the eve of Diwali last year -- 29th October, 2005 -- it was Delhi, the political capital of India. On the eve of Diwali, when security forces are on a high alert, they have proved that they can attack our political capital. Then, they have chosen Bangalore, the technological hub of India, on 28th December, 2005. Each of these targets is carefully chosen. Then, 7th March, 2006, Varanasi, attack against a religious and cultural hub of India. Next one is, Nagpur, an attempted attack on the headquarters of the RSS. Then, Sir, on 1st June, 2006, it is Mumbai. On 11th July, 2006, again, the effort was to attack the commercial hub of India. Thereafter, Malegaon -- a town in which minority community is in majority. And, therefore, the target of attack was the minority itself so that some kind of upheaval could be created in the country itself. Each one of these major attacks, which are believed to be attacks inspired and planned across the border, are not in the traditional areas -- Jammu and Kashmir -- where terrorist attacks took place. The network and the art of violence are now spreading. They can almost choose targets at will. And, when they choose targets at will, they attack. And what has been our response? First, let us see the strength behind these attacks. Traditionally, we have said that it is done entirely from across the border. Most of these are even, today, planned across the border. Our police agencies have been trying to collect evidence. But, then, you find reports coming in that there is also an indigenisation of terror taking place. From what was initially a support only for logistics by local groups, you have to face an unfortunate reality and the reality being that these cross border attacks are also being supported at places by home-grown terrorists. Let us not forget that the centre of activities has also shifted. The fencing across the Western border has made it a little difficult to have infiltration. And, therefore, a large amount of infiltration is taking place from these open borders of Nepal and Bangladesh. And, from Nepal, it is of both kinds -- not only the ISI but also the Leftwing Extremists. In Bangladesh you have an open border. My party, for the last two to three decades has been speaking in terms of illegal immigration that is taking place. Now, you find these attacks taking place by that route. If you have 20 million illegal migrant population, it is possible for these miscreants, these terrorists, to come and mix with the local population, since they look like Indians. So, detection becomes extremely difficult. Therefore, with this illegal migration taking place along Bangladesh borer, it has almost become very easy for them to shift their hubs as the fencing has created a little difficulty in crossing the border as far as the Western borders are concerned. But, what is disappointing and a disillusionment for the country is not the fact that these attacks are taking place. These targets are clearly chosen. How much prior information do our intelligence agencies have with regard to these attacks. There are hundreds of these attacks and these ISI modules which our intelligence agencies in the past have cracked.

(CONTD. BY "1S")


SHRI ARUN JAITLEY (CONTD.): But if you can have an attack like the one on 11th July, 2006 in Mumbai, where at seven different places, almost by a minute, explosions were made, dozens of people must have been involved in this operation of sabotage. They had picked up different stations, different trains, different people who must have transported them, who must have funded them, who must have placed the material in various local trains. And, despite the fact that the involvement is of such a large number of people, did we have advance intelligence information that these attacks are taking place at any of these places? The security response has been poor. In 1993, when Mumbai was attacked, within days, if I remember correctly, at that time, the whole case was cracked up. When our former Prime Minister, hon. Shri Rajiv Gandhi, was assassinated, within less than 24 hours our intelligence agencies, I remember, had drawn out the sketch and given to the newspapers that it was a lady, with a belt around her waist, who had done it. Our security experts created that incident which eventually proved to be true within less than 24 hours. When the Akshardham Temple was attacked, within hours, a whole night operation liquidated and the people who were virtually behind the logistical support were arrested. When this Parliament was attacked, the investigation response was that within 24 to 48 hours the response started coming out who were the possible and what was the manner in which the attack had been planned. But when the political executive of the day treats this as a non-priority item, it does inflict upon our intelligence agencies and our security responses also. Today, if you were to categorically ask us who was behind the Malegon attack, who was behind Mumbai attack of 11th July, information are trickling in, but the response has been completely inadequate even months after the incidents had taken place. What is the plight of those, as far as liquidations of some of these people are concerned, who face our security forces in these encounters? Are they increasing or decreasing? What is the response with regard to their prosecution and their convictions, and to the quality of evidence that has to be collected against them? There are several questions which will arise, where the Government by its inadequate response, by its negative response has lowered the national morale as far as the fight against terror is concerned. When I said that the CMP of the UPA did not give any details on how to fight terrorism, they can say that, probably, one of the only items that were there in the CMP was that 'the anti-terrorism law, the POTA, will be repealed'. That was the only real response that the UPA had in its CMP in its fight against terrorism. You repealed the POTA. It was a law that was intended against terrorists. But you campaigned that it was not against terrorists, it was against a particular community. Thereafter, you repealed the POTA. Now, what has happened thereafter? It is even now not too late to realise your mistake. Obviously, the agencies must have advised the Government, and the Home Ministry said that there were several aspects in the POTA, such as, interception of communications, ban on organizations, confiscation of terrorist properties, defining terrorism. All these are areas which, from the POTA, we will lift bodily and put in another law, called the Unlawful Activities Act. So, a large number of these provisions were bodily lifted from the POTA and put in the Unlawful Activities Act. But, there were two important provisions. I make an important point here, and if the Government does not have the honesty to accept that even today, then, perhaps, even when it is already too late, the Government is not willing to see the reality. (Contd. by 1t -- VP)


SHRI ARUN JAITLEY (CONTD.): The two significant points in POTA were: one, it had special bail provisions, which made bail extremely difficult, if not impossible. Unless the court was satisfied that the accused is virtually innocent, bail was not to be granted. The second aspect was that confessions made to a police officer of high seniority were admissible as evidence. And when they were admissible as evidence, they could be treated as evidence. But after the judgement of the Supreme Court in the TADA case, safeguards were introduced in the POTA that within 24 hours of the confession, the accused is to be produced before the Magistrate, and he can always deny to the Magistrate that he never made the confession. Then, the Magistrate can then direct the medical examination of the accused. These are the various safeguards in the law itself. Now, when POTA was enacted, Sir, these two special provisions along with others, were not merely in POTA. Several State Governments said that POTA deals with terrorism, and we want the same power to deal with organised crime. So, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, they all asked for the same permission. The Governments successively started giving them permission. So, you had the same law not for terrorists, but for organised mafias. For terrorists we must make effort to see that their civil liberties are safeguarded, but for organised mafia no such consideration is required. This was an illogical approach of this Government. But let us see what happened thereafter. The Rajasthan Government and the Gujarat Government asked for the same law, verbatim. Their assemblies passed the same law as MCOCA, and the Karnataka law and Andhra law. For over two years this Government says, 'no such permission will be granted, we are still examining it.' These two States have not been permitted even to enact these laws against organised crimes. The Centre is sitting on it. Sir, ultimately, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. This entire argument is to try them under ordinary law. We all know that if the assassins of Late Shri Rajiv Gandhi had been tried under an ordinary law, without the benefits of those admissible confessions under TADA, what the judgement would have been? We now have a series of pronouncements from a Mumbai court in relation to the 1993 blasts. Let the Home Minister do an independent exercise in this Ministry that without the benefit of the evidence provisions in TADA, how many of these accused would have been convicted, and how many would have gone scot-free. Most of them would have gone scot-free. If under the Parliament attack case, and the Akshardham case, quick convictions were possible, this was one of the legal instruments for fighting terrorism. But, then, as I said, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Today, you have a Congress-NCP Government in Maharashtra. You don't have POTA because you thought POTA violates civil liberties. You had the incident of 11th July. You arrested some people. Why have you not tried them under the ordinary law? If your political argument was so correct, why were those arrested for 11th July 2006 incident in Maharashtra, a State ruled by the Congress and the NCP, not tried under the ordinary law? They know that under the ordinary law these two advantages that the investigation has against terrorists will not be available. So, they have now formed a new device. We opposed POTA for political reasons, so we cannot bring POTA back. Ordinary law will be insufficient to deal with them. So, now, there is a localised law of POTA called MCOCA, which is not meant against terrorists, but which is meant to be used against organised mafia. So, all the terrorists who have so far been arrested in the 11th July incident, try them under MCOCA, so that the benefit of a hard law is available to the prosecution. And the reasons why you have done this is very clear. You know that soft law will not work, and ordinary law will not work. But, yet, because the policy of the UPA is, "my vote bank should not be affected, I will, ostensibly, keep misleading the minorities of this country by repeatedly telling them that POTA was against you." (Cont. by PK/1U)


SHRI ARUN JAITLEY (CONTD.): Therefore, I repealed it and I am not bringing it back. But, then, how do I handle terrorism when I know that ordinary law cannot handle it? Well, in Maharashtra, we are doing it under MCOCA. But, what will you do in the other States, God forbid, if such an incident takes place? This, Sir, is the real dichotomy in the approach as far as this Government is concerned, that as a Government it does not want to have all the powers on as to how to fight terrorism itself. Post-Kargil, Sir, there was an expert committee which was set up, which had given a detailed report on various issues. And, you had a very high-powered GoM of the Government of India which went into all those issues. The Leader of the Opposition was an important Member of the GoM and on the advice of the GoM you had various kinds of institutions within the Government which had been set up, where intelligence coordination, processing of that intelligence, thinking in terms of steps as to how to deal with each emerging situation, each one of them was planned and Governmental systems within agencies were created. You had the Intelligence Coordination Group, you had the technological committees, because of the technologies used by these militants, you had the National Technology Research Organisation, and you had joined Task Forces on processing this intelligence. We are disappointed, Sir, that though not abolished, most of these agencies have really become non-functional. They have really become defunct. Good work was done by that Committee which went into all the entire issue post-Kargil and gave a detailed report on the management of various issues including internal security, and, thereafter, a high-powered Group of Ministers spent months and months together in recommendations and in creating institutions which were required for this country. You have a Government to respond where each one of these institutions created has become defunct! What is the political approach of the Government? Let us look at the political approach as far as each of the issues is concerned. You wanted a healing touch in Jammu and Kashmir. The PDP-Congress coalition was formed, then, as a result of a democratic process, a popular Government has come in; power must go to the people and let us have a healing touch as far as the State is concerned. Today, you have within the State uncertainty because the two coalition partners are virtually at a cold war with each other, if not a real war. The Central Government appears to be virtually clueless on how to deal with the situation, except for making formal announcements from time to time; and announcements of the kind that let us have a round-table conference. You had a first round-table conference, which gave you some security inputs, and then, you had a second round-table conference. Even groups like Hurriyat did not have command. I don't expect Hurriyat and the Government to agree, but, at least, they could discuss. When the NDA was in power, they came and discussed and said, "we have disagreed", but we at least have a confidence that this Government is honestly dealing with us. The Hurriyat said, "no useful purpose is going to be served in even discussing with you." The round-table conference, I am not so sure, was called after necessary security inputs from the intelligence agencies or the different security agencies. Had proper homework and the build up to the round-table conference been done? It remained a square-table conference where the corners needed a lot more bending before the conference could be held, but nothing of the kind was done. And you finally had only some friendly groups coming and discussing, giving suggestions, and going away, and nothing came out of it. And, then, because you had to show that there was some input coming out of the round-table conference, you made an announcement of setting up different groups. The people, who have taken training in Pakistan and have come back, how is their rehabilitation possible? (Contd. by 1W/PB)


SHRI ARUN JAITLEY (CONTD.): Well, we would have been very happy if, at least, one group had an explicit item on its agenda that 'you have almost had an ethnic cleansing for the last fifteen years, the Kashmiri Pandits who have been driven away from the Valley, their problem will also be discussed.' But that was not a priority item. Let us look at the honesty of this Government. I have read in the newspapers today that you are going to give seven lakh rupees in Gujarat to some people who were affected. Are you willing to follow the same yardstick with regard to those three-and-a-half lakh to four lakh people who, as a result of the ethnic cleansing, have been moved out of the Valley? Well, that doesn't suit your politics. And, therefore, when you had the round-table conference, you started announcing groups, and, let me tell you, Sir, we are now moving towards one of the more dangerous areas. One of the groups is, 'to deal with the Centre-State constitutional relationship.' The group, which is to deal with the Centre-State constitutional relationship, is not going to resolve the problem. Before you go and give gestures or statements of this kind, let us effectively argue today, what part of the Kashmir problem is attributable to the fact that within the Valley, the Assembly has inadequate powers. Compared to the rest of the country which is more peaceful, if there is one State where the Assembly and the Government have disproportionately higher powers in the distribution of power in a federal politics, it is Jammu & Kashmir. The problem is terrorism, the problem is cross-border terrorism; the problem is economic. Instead of addressing that problem, you set up a group, how to reconsider and review the constitutional relationship between Jammu & Kashmir and India. And, even before the group has started functioning, you already have a problem at hand. Your alliance partner is saying, 'self-rule' and our stand in that group is going to be self-rule.' The other important political party in the State, the National Conference, is saying, 'pre-1953 status'. Sir, I repeat the question that I had asked myself, is any part of the Kashmir problem attributable to the fact that the Kashmir Government or the Kashmir Assembly has lesser, inadequate powers? Instead of addressing that problem in a frontal manner, you want to give some contrary political signals, and, therefore, just as we are repenting over our mistake of the 1950s, you now want to create a second round of mistakes that Indian generations over the next hundred, two hundred years would start repenting and say, whatever is the present constitutional relationship, let us further loosen it. This is your approach as far as Jammu & Kashmir is concerned.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: How much more time would be required by you? Why I am asking this is because the time allotted to you is over.

SHRI ARUN JAITLEY: Sir, another ten minutes. I am sorry, Sir.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Please conclude. I have to remind you because the time allotted to you is over.

SHIR ARUN JAITLEY: You come out with ad hoc kind of solutions. The Pakistani Foreign Minister is on a personal visit to India. The same hon. gentleman, some two months ago, on Pakistani television gave an interview saying, 'The Government of India has given us "a non-paper", not a formal document, but a "non-paper". And, a 'non-paper' really speaks in terms of the pre-1953 situation. Now, whether this has been given by some bad channel diplomacy or not, we do not know. But are these the kind of solutions that you are trying to find from this? And, coupled with this, Sir, kindly see when we are on Kashmir, the entire drift in the country's foreign policy which has taken place. The obvious effort of Pakistan over the past few decades was that the centrality of the foreign policy issue should be Kashmir. Pakistan always said 'it is a disputed territory and, therefore, this should be the centrality of the issue.' President Musharraf, when he came for the Agra Summit, said, 'this is the core issue.' What happened during the six years of the NDA Government? Globally and bilaterally, the centrality was acquired by cross-border terrorism. (Contd. by 1x/SKC)


SHRI ARUN JAITLEY (CONTD.): Indian diplomacy was at its peak when it said that globally, if there was one issue of internationalisation between India and Pakistan, it was cross-border terrorism. Pakistan wanted to internationalise Kashmir while we wanted to internationalise cross-border terrorism; and the world started listening to us during those six years. And today, when at Havana, and on the way back, our distinguished Prime Minister says that Pakistan is also a victim of terror and that all terrorist groups in Pakistan are, in fact, autonomous of the Pakistani Government, then, this is exactly the kind of argument that Pakistan has been using all these years -- 'if somebody uses or misuses my soil it is without my consent; we are also honestly trying'. President Musharraff says, 'there have been attempts on my life also'. Where was the occasion for us to abandon our declared foreign policy of internationalising cross-border terrorism, placing voluminous evidence of cross-border terrorism? Instead of saying that today, instead of cross-border terrorism, the internationalised issue is again Kashmir, because on terrorism now, the difference between the Government of India's policy and Pakistan's declared policy has almost been obliterated.

Sir, the issue is not only Kashmir. The second difficult area is Assam, which is emerging once again. Since the attacks and blasts which took place in the Fancy Bazaar of Guwahati and the repeated attacks thereafter, what kind of serious inputs are we having when we say that we will call a People's Consultation Group which would start mediating, that the People's Consultation Group would have talks and in those talks not even the lowest rung of ULFA would participate? In the talks with the People's Consultation Group, through the group with the Government of India, not even the lowest rung of Ulfa leadership has participated. We suddenly say there would be a ceasefire and, in the face of that ceasefire we declare there, we find violence erupting again and Assam going back to a situation from which we decided to rescue it back.

Sir, let us look at the approach of the Government. When we speak in terms of internal security, my entire emphasis in the debate is not merely on one case of Afzal Guru; it is only an illustration as to what the attitude of the Government is going to be. Somebody tries to attack this most vital institution of Indian democracy, the Indian Parliament; he conspires in that and after he conspires in that, the courts of law uphold his conviction -- three courts, one after the other, find there is adequate evidence. He tries to virtually annihilate the entire political leadership of India. This attack, if it had succeeded, if our security guards had not laid down their lives, if these 12 doors had not been closed, even if one door had remained open, a very large number of us present here today may not have been there, with the kinds of weapons those people had. We don't have armed security inside Parliament.... (Interruptions)... Is that why you are rewarding the gentleman concerned?

Sir, today, in such a situation, can there be any scope for a debate whether in these kinds of cases the power of clemency has to be exercised? There have been cases which the Government may go on considering indefinitely but there are cases where the Governments in the past disposed of such cases within hours. In the case of the assassins of Gen. Vaidya the clemency application was disposed of within hours. (interruption) Sir, if these are the issues, the issue is not... (interruptions)

SHRI SHIVRAJ VISHWANATH PATIL: Rajiv Gandhi's case was kept with the Government continuously for five years.

SHRI ARUN JAITLEY: Sir, let this be a lesson that there has to be some time-bound system within the Government, within the highest Constitutional functionaries of the Government, to dispose this off. Otherwise, it is reflective of the kind of national intent that we have. The issues are not merely of this kind. When I speak of Kashmir or the North-East, what is emerging now as an even more serious problem?

(Contd. by 1y/hk)


SHRI ARUN JAITLEY (CONTD.): We normally speak of North-East or Kashmir. Where do we stand as far as Left-Wing extremism in India is concerned? ..(Interruptions)..

SHRI V. NARAYANASAMY: We are not escorting terrorists. ..(Interruptions)..

SHRI ARUN JAITLEY: Sir, as far as the acts of ..(Interruptions).. Those who are accused of killing your leader, you inducted them in the Cabinet. ..(Interruptions).. If you want a discussion at that level, you will get a response back. ..(Interruptions).. One of the accused in the killing of late Shri Rajiv Gandhi is a part of your Council of Ministers. ..(Interruptions).. If you want a debate at this level, you will get it back. ..(Interruptions)..

SHRI V. NARAYANASAMY: We are prepared for discussion. ..(Interruptions).. If it is a challenge, we are ready for discussion. ..(Interruptions)..

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: When your turn comes, you can answer. ..(Interruptions).. Please sit down. ..(Interruptions).. Please sit down. ..(Interruptions).. Please don't interrupt. ..(Interruptions).. Mr. Jaitley, please conclude. ..(Interruptions).. ֯ ך, , ׸ ֋ ..(Interruptions)..

SHRI ARUN JAITELY: Sir, it is a very important subject. I, therefore, do not want to bring it down to the level of these kinds of attacks for comments. Let us now just consider where do we stand as far as Left-Wing extremism or Maoism, that we call it, is concerned. Punjab was a troubled State; Jammu & Kashmir is a troubled State and some areas of North-East are troubled. Together between them, they occupy about 12 per cent of the geographical area of this country. The population that they involve is almost 5 per cent of this country, maybe a little less than that. I am mentioning this to just give you an idea of the spread of Left-Wing extremism that has taken place. Today, right from the border of Assam till down deep south, you have 40 per cent of India's geographical area, 35 per cent of population, whose habitable areas are directly or indirectly affected by Naxalism. You have thick forests in these areas, occupying 19 per cent of our total forest area or mineral resources, the economic life-line. The width or size of this area is two-and-a-half times of the size of entire Bangladesh. These are the areas in which parallel Governments are running or their primacies are being established. Sir, if we read some of the Maoist literature, it tells us the effort where they claim to have succeeded, and they use the phrase "Creation of a Compact Revolutionary Zone." It is called CRZ. I don't know whether your SEZs may see the light of day or not, but the CRZ is already there. These Compact Revolutionary Zones from the border of Nepal cover Jharkhand, Bihar, parts of Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, parts of Karnataka and a lot of Andhra Pradesh. These are all areas which are parts of the Compact Revolutionary Zones.

(Contd. by 1z/KSK)