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kgg-sc/6.00/4h

(MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN in the Chair)

SHRI SHAHID SIDDIQUI: That has no relevance. (Interruptions) What I had told was, today it may be in the interest of India to align with the U.S., but, tomorrow, it may not be. You cannot bind our foreign policy, which has come about for generations, because of this Act. That is what I am worried about. I am not putting up a case for Iran or against Iran. (Interruptions)

SHRI RAM JETHMALANI: Thank you for enlightening me. (Interruptions)

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: No, no. We do not have time for all these things. Please sit down, Mr. Shahid. (Interruptions) Let us not go into all these, please. (Interruptions) Mr. Ram Jethmalani, please conclude. You said you are taking RJD's time. Your time was just two minutes and the time of RJD's was five minutes. Totally, it was only seven minutes.

SHRI RAM JETHMALANI: Sir, five more minutes. (Interruptions) Kindly see this.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Please conclude, we have time constraint.

SHRI RAM JETHMALANI: Sir, this is the reference in this Act and kindly see this. This is in the Expectation Clause of the American Congress. This is clause (d) on page 3 of this Act which says, "Such cooperation between America and India will induce the country", that is, India, "to give greater political and material support to the achievement of the U.S.' global and regional non-proliferation objectives, especially with regard to dissuading, isolating and, if necessary, sanctioning and containing states that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups that are seeking to acquire nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass destruction capability and means to deliver such weapons." And, Sir, this has to be read with 15(g) and 8(iv). It is in this context that so long as Iran continues to pursue these policies, we will cooperate with them but if and when Iran becomes the real Iran....(Interruptions) This is one of the points ... (Interruptions)

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Mr. Shahid is not in the Chair. ... (Interruptions)

ק : ָ..(־֮֬)..

ֳ֯ : ֯ ך ֯ ֟ , ֯ ֟ ֮֯ , ֯ ך..(־֮֬)..Nothing will go on record. Please sit down. Nothing will go on record. (Interruptions)

ִ ̴֕ : *

ֳ֯ : ֯ ך Please sit down. ֯ ֟ ? ֯ ך ׸ ֋ ..(־֮֬).. ֯ ך ߅

߸ י : *

SHRI RAM JETHMALANI: Sir, two-three principles. (Interruptions)

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Please conclude, we have to conclude the debate.

SHRI RAM JETHMALANI: I thought you gave me five minutes, ut of which I have used only one minute! I have four more.

Sir, another principle which we must bear in mind, and which is a fundamental principle of international law, is, treaties cease to be binding under vital change of circumstances. If, for example, tomorrow, North Korea, China, Pakistan, all plan an aggressive war against India, we are entitled to say that all our obligations under this treaty come to an end. This is a fundamental principle of international law which underlies all treaties.

Third, under American Constitutional law, America is unique in this respect, any treaty overrides domestic law. This is not the position in any other country of the world except America. Once the 123 agreement, which is a treaty between the U.S. and India, is entered into, with an open eye, after negotiations and after getting rid of our objections and so on, that treaty under the American law, overrides all domestic laws. (Contd. by kls/4j)

MP/KLS/4J-6.05

SHRI RAM JETHMALANI (CONTD): Now this is something about which my friend Arun Shourie will do research. ...(Interruptions)...

-------------------------

* Not recorded.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: No please, because there is no time for all this. ...(Interruptions)...

SHRI RAM JETHMALANI: Lastly, Sir, I want to say this that particularly this article of 14th July attacks my Prime Minister and his Government of not trying to do good to the country. But it says that you are interested in raising the revenues of some Indian and American companies, to add to their earnings and their incomes. Sir, this is the most malicious attack that a scientist could mount upon my Government, upon my Prime Minister. At least, he is one person who should not ever be consulted again even if you want to consult all the scientists of the world. This is what self-respect requires. ...(Interruptions)...

SHRI SHAHID SIDDIQUI: We should respect our scientists. ...(Interruptions)... Do not add motives to it. ...(Interruptions)...

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Mr. Siddiqui, please do not interfere into every thing. ...(Interruptions)... Please do not interrupt in every thing. ...(Interruptions)... He will put his point of view. ֯ ֟ ! Please sit down. ...(Interruptions)...

SHRI RAM JETHMALANI: Sir, I will take one more minute and I will finish. ...(Interruptions)... Let me just enumerate in one minute and I will finish. Let me just enumerate in one minute the catalogue of advantages. First, I have said that the two democracies have now come together. Second, our pitiable record of energy production -- 3 per cent and France 75 per cent nuclear energy, and look at other counties, that will come to an end. (Time-bell) Our current weapons performance and programme is totally free from any external inspection or obstruction. Fourth, there will be economic cooperation in other fields between the two countries. Five, the Americans have pledged that they will go on pressurising Pakistan and China, and India, at the same time, to abandon their nuclear weapons and convert the Indian Ocean into a nuclear free zone. These are the advantages of which we must be proud and we must pay our respectful homage to the Prime Minister and his Government. Thank you. (Ends)

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: I request all the speakers to be brief because at 6.20, we have to start the reply. Shri Pasha. Please be brief.

SHRI SYED AZEEZ PASHA (ANDHRA PRADESH): Sir, I am always brief.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: I am reminding the next speakers.

SHRI SYED AZEEZ PASHA: Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, an independent foreign policy is the cornerstone of our nationally accepted foreign policy. Last time, when we were discussing the Indo-US nuclear deal, our hon. Prime Minister sat patiently for seven hours and heard the discussion. While concluding, he gave a very spirited 70-minute speech. While speaking, he assured this House and the entire nation that the basic interests of the nation would not be compromised. But we are sorry to say that after seeing the developments since then, are we going to compromise on certain issues? The Hyde Act, the US law, has come into being. They discussed thoroughly and threadbare before enacting this legislation and they fixed up certain boundaries. But the predictors say that all those conditionalties, which are stipulated by them, are not acceptable. We are now bound further. But we are coming to a fait accompli and unfortunately, the Parliament is not being taken into confidence. I forcefully urge upon all that when important international treaties and agreements have to be finalised, the ratification by the Parliament should be indispensable. Therefore, we have to amend the Constitution accordingly. Secondly, last time the Prime Minister assured after seeing the statement of several prominent nuclear scientists, "I am going to call them and I will clarify the doubts." But we do not know after the meeting what were the apprehensions and what were the replies given to them. (Contd by 4K)

-KLS-SSS-ASC/4K/6.10

SHRI SYED AZEEZ PASHA (CONTD.): Because they are the persons who are very closely associated with the nuclear science. Thirdly, we are having very huge reserves of thorium and whether we are going to continue with the research or not, we are still unaware because it is one of the cheap sources of energy we are having at our disposal. Then, on the Iranian issue, last time while I was speaking I said that we have to have the other options of energy resources like hydraulic, gas or solar energy and here we are having a friend who are ready to supply gas at a very cheaper rate. But after that, I don't know whether the entire gas pipeline project is shelved or still we are continuing with or not, we don't know. Then, with regard to the Security Council, we were very much reluctant and vacillating to support the Membership of Venezuela. Only at the last minute we supported that country. That country is having a very huge oil reserve and Venezuela has supplied crude oil to its own friendly countries at cheaper rates. So, we should have an option to have such a good friend. Lastly, there is one glaring example of how our foreign policy is getting deviated. Al Jazeera, which is a very prominent channel, I think, we are putting restrictions upon it, that is giving a lot of news and it is going to the entire Arab world. So, is it at the behest of Israel or America? We do not know. So, that is why we say that we should have an independent Foreign Policy, which should be acceptable to all, and I once again request the Government and particularly, the hon. Prime Minister to take the entire Parliament into confidence. Thank you. (Ends)

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Shri Abani Roy.

SHRI ABANI ROY: I thank you, Sir; probably I would be the last speaker.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: No, last but one, so you must leave some time for the last speaker also.

׮ ֵ (׿ִ ֻ): ָ, ֕ ו ׾ֵ ָ ֤ ֓ , ֻ ָ ß֟ ׮ֵ ֟ ָ ָ ֲ ֛ ֮־֤ ־ã ֲ ֛ ֮־֤ ־ã ־֕, ָ ֓ ׻֋ ִֵ פ ֟ ׾ֵ , ו ָ ָ ־Գ״, ָ ֟, ֟, ֵ פև ָ ָ ֮ ׌ ָ û֮ ֮ ', - ֻ ׸ ֮ ׻֋ ָ ֵ ָ ֮֜ ׻֋ ׾ ׻֋ ָ ֵ ֲ ֟ ָ ֤ Ӥ ֓ , WTO ִֻ ָ ִֻ , ֟ ݮָ ֟ ױ ֤ ָ ֓ , ױ ֮ ß ״ֻ֟ , ֟ ִ ֟ ֲ ֳ , ֣ ֤ ָ ֲ ָ-ָ ֤ Ӥ ָ Ϭ֮ ӡ ֮ פ ֋, ֕ ָ ֣ ֟ ֵ և ֵ ֵ֟ - ָ ֟ ә ֋ , ־֕ ָ ß֟ ߬ ֛ ָ ֮֟ ָ ֤ ֓ ֤ ӕ ָ ß֟ ֟ ָ Ϭ֮ ӡ ָ ֟ ֵ֮ ָ (4L/NB ָ ֿ:)

-SSS/NB-NBR/4L/6.15

׮ ֵ (֟) : ֮֟ ָ firmly ֛ , ֮ ֛ ֮ܵ , ֮ ֛ ֮־֤ ־ã , ֟ , ו֮ û֮ פ - "ָ ֮", ֮ ָ ֮ Ϭִ֮ӡ , ָ ָ

ֳ֯ן , ָ ֟ ֮֟ ߕ ָ ֻ ֮֕ן ߕ , ָ ָ ׮ ֵ ֮ ֕ atomic energy ָ-ָ ֵ֮ , ֕ ׮ ֟ ֮ ָ ָ ֣ ׾ָ֓ ָ ׾ ׻֋ , ָ , ָ ׮ ֟ , ֮ political decision deal ֤ ֮ , ߕ , ָ ׻֋ , ׿ ֟ ãן ֲ ָ ׾ ׻֋ ־ֿ , ִֵ ָ ? ָ ׮ , , ׸ִ , ֣ ֜ ? ߕ ָ ִ֮

֮ ß ו ָָ ִ֣Ԯ , UPA ָָ ֲ ֛ , ֛և ֣ ֟ ֤֕ ֋ ָ ֤֕ ֯ ֋, ֟ ֯ ֮ , ָ ֯ ָָ follow , ֯ ִ֕־֤ ִ֮ ־ֿ , ֯ ֮ ֻ ָ ֛ , ֮ ָ ֛ , ֮ ֮և, ֳ ִ , ֤֕ ִ ָ ֯ ֋ , ָ֤ ױ ָ ִ ֋օ ׻֋ ß ֯ ױ ֯ ָ ִ֮ ָ ֮ ֮ֆ ֟ ֯ ܾß פ deal ֮־֤

(ִ֯)

SHRI ARJUN KUMAR SENGUPTA (WEST BENGAL): Sir, at this fag end of the discussion, today, I just want to summarise the points to which the hon. External Affairs Minister finally respond. Everybody's is eagerly waiting for this. I thought that the hon. Prime Minister would also be here. But, let me just try to summarise the main concerns that this House has expressed which, I think, also summarises the main concerns of the people in general.

The first point is this. It is not quite relevant for us what the American Legislatures have felt or are motivated and what they are going to do. Mr. Shourie is very worried about them. I am glad that at this stage of his life he has been very critical about the American attitude to the global situation. But, on this particular issue, what is relevant is whether, and this is what we would like to hear from the hon. External Affairs Minister, it prevents the 123 Agreement to be reached by us, because this particular law has been enacted. We want some kind of a clear enunciation of this point. If it does, we shall not agree, which is very clear and that has been mentioned by the hon. Prime Minister.

(CONTD. BY USY "4M")

-NBR-USY/4M/6.20

SHRI ARJUN KUMAR SENGUPTA (CONTD.): And, if this agreement fails, and if we do not agree with it, then, both India and the US will suffer. For India, we go back to where we are, and that would be quite a loss. I agree with Shobhanaji, not entirely but in terms of the total benefit that was to be got. But for the United States, there can be a very substantial loss, whether there are motives of hundred million dollars investment coming from there or not, I do not know because I am told that the American nuclear technology is far behind the French and other technologies. So, there is no reason to believe that we are going to buy all the equipments from the Americans. But whatever that may be, there would be a loss for the Americans. And, this is the reason why there would be prima facie for having optimism that probably they will not oppose 123. But the point here is that if we do not agree, we don't lose much. We stand where we are. We are not going to get into any worst position.

Sir, my second point is this. Under the 'separation programme' eight reactors are for defence. The country would like to know whether in all these discussions of the American Senate, anything is there which will prevent us from carrying our activities in those eight reactors. I do not see any clauses there. I think, the Minister may like to consider this that we can still do whatever we are doing in these eight reactors. We can add to those reactors. In fact, we can use all the uranium, we have, in those reactors to produce more bombs. In fact, Arun Shourieji has given a number, which is very interesting He talks about, we all know the number of 78,000 tonnes of local uranium, which we have, is correct. But he says that it will be possible for India to make 2,000 bombs from that. I was quite huddled. (Interruptions)

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: With a very small proportion.

SHRI ARJUN KUMAR SENGUPTA: Well! If we can make 2,000 bombs, then, it is more than enough. More than enough. I do not want any more. I would like the Minister to say that if this is the case, if we can maintain our eight reactors, we can do whatever we have been doing up till now. Then, there is no problem. The country would like to have some kind of assurance on that.

On 'energy security' -- my friend Sitaramji, is not here -- there is a point here that the nuclear power is not going to be the only source of energy. That's true. There are many other sources of energy. Arunji was very right that there are plenty of possibilities of using hydel energy. In fact, yesterday's newspaper says that we have discovered gas fields. There are many other positions on that. But that does not prevent us from looking for other sources of energy, particularly because, and this is the point I would like to stress here, there was a number that was given here, quoting about the cost of electricity. Arun Shourieji is an economist, he would appreciate this thing. The argument is not whether we can make electricity out of that or not, but the argument is whether we can make electricity cost-effective. The arithmetic that we have got, this is not my arithmetic, Shri Gopalakrishnan, whom Shri Ram Jethmalani does not like, but Shri Srinivasan and others have been in these numbers that the cost of Indian uranium is eight times more than the internationally imported uranium. And, there is also another point that if we use that uranium in absolutely the first-ranking technology and equipment -- Rahul Bajajji has left -- then, there are numbers saying that electricity can be generated by the nuclear power. The new nuclear power is imported uranium at a cost almost equal, if not less, to the hydel power. This is a point on which I can go on discussing deliberately. But this has been established. If this is the case, then, the question is whether the security is different. We have many different sources of energy security. But this is one security if we can have without, of course, at the cost of our sovereignty and at the cost of other things, which I am quite sure, the hon. Minister will assure.

(Contd. by 4n -- VP)

VP/6.25/4N

SHRI ARJUN KUMAR SENGUPTA (CONTD.): There is no doubt that we will need more energy. And I agree that this is not the only reason and one should not make this the only reason why we should go for that. But, this is the major reason which if we can do, it would be very good for us.

Then, Sir, there are three points on which the House was very agitated, and I am quite sure, the hon. Minister will be able to assure us, namely, no right to reprocess the U.S. fuel. I think, Shri Abhishekji correctly pointed out that with U.S. fuel we would not be able to do it. But does it prevent us from reprocessing any other source of fuel? As a matter of fact, -- and, I think, Shri Jaswant Singhji knows it very well -- the agreements that we have signed with the Russians in South India are for thousand mega watt reactors. Russians have allowed us. They told us that you can reprocess it whichever way you like. We are not getting into this. Only Tarapore created problem for us. We understand that. But will it mean that if we sign this treaty, we will not be able to reprocess any other fuel? There is, absolutely, no reason why we should get fuel only from the U.S. Actually, we should not. We should import fuel from Africa. We can import fuel from other countries.

Then, there is the point regarding no transfer of equipment for reprocessing and enrichment. This is true. The U.S. would not allow us to do that. But, I have read Shri Srinivasan saying, again and again, that we do not need any reprocessing technology. We have enough reprocessing technology. We can do it. What they have worded is there should be no prevention imposed on us for doing any kind of reprocessing. We would like to hear if this is reiterated.

The third point is regarding stockpiling. Now, this is a point which is, sufficiently, clear from the Prime Minister's statement. But it would be useful if it is, categorically, stated again that, on stockpiling, if we stockpile fuel from other sources, there would be nothing against that. If it has not been agreed to, this is some point on which we may have to do some negotiation.

The final point is about nuke testing. Sir, I would like to submit that I am very much against testing. It is the same reason why we do not want to be a competitive nuclear power. If we have enough resources to have 2000 bombs, this is more than enough. In fact, there is, absolutely, no reason for us to add to the stockpile of this nuclear weapons. We have the ability to do some testing at sub-critical level. That has been allowed. That can be continued. We can do that. But, Sir, what I want to point out to the whole House, again and again, is that even if we do not want to test, whether it is because Shri Vajpayeeji saying that I personally feel we should not do it -- Shri Sitaram Yechuryji would agree with me -- but, we would not like to surrender our sovereignty to test it if we feel it necessary.

My only point, Sir, here is, if certain extraordinary circumstances arise, like China doing some special activities in this or some kind of a new situation emerging, I do not think, the United States will be very much against it, if we can show that some testing is really necessary for ascertaining our nuclear capability. But this is a point which is a touching point and, I think, some answer to that would be coming forward.

Finally, and this is my last point. I want to put it because this has been mentioned again and again, but I have no doubt about it. Some kind of a categorical statement should be made that issues like Iran will not deflect us from our point of view and our foreign policy position. This has been mentioned, again and again, by the Prime Minister. The House keeps on talking about it again and again. So, I think, a clear statement on that would go a long way to settle this problem. Sir, I felt, on the basis of all these discussions, these are the main issues that are bothering the House and also the country at large. I think, all these can be very well responded to by both the Prime Minister and the External Affairs Minister. (ENDS) (Followed by 4O)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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* Pp 635 Onwards will be issued as Supplement.


PK/4O/6.30

SHORT DURATION DISCUSSION ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN

INDO-US CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION - (CONTD.)

THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE): Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, before I start my observations, I would like to inform the House that the Prime Minister had the intention of intervening, but because of his tooth problem, he cannot speak. That is why what he wanted to assure the House, convey to the House, on his behalf, I will do so. But he has taken the trouble, despite physical illness, to spend large part of his time to listen to the debate in the House.

Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, at the very outset, I would like to express my gratitude to all the Members who have participated in this discussion and made very valuable contributions. I have been associated with this House for so long that I became almost a fixture of this House, from the late 60's till the last Lok Sabha elections. According to my experiences, any Parliamentary debate, and, especially, in this House, and also, today's debate, despite some interruptions, speak of the high tradition of the House. Members, while making their contributions, demonstrated their knowledge, their appreciation of the situation, and their information; I congratulate them. It is not necessary for me or for anybody to agree with every view which is expressed on the floor of the House because divergence and dissension is the essence of democracy which we have followed, which we have cherished. I think this would be the fifth discussion which we have had. Some hon. Members, perhaps, in over-enthusiasm, stated that Parliament is not taken into confidence. It is not correct, because the whole process began with the joint statement of Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh and President Bush on 18th July, 2005. After that, there have been four occasions -- in July, 2005, February 27, 2006, March 7, 2006, and August 17, 2006, and before the end of the year 2006, on 19th of December, 2006, we are having discussions for the fifth time. If anybody can correct me, I will appreciate him that on any piece of subject, or, title, so much debate and discussions have taken place and in every one of it, Prime Minister himself has participated. It is true. It is the constitutional provision and neither you nor me have the mandate to change the Constitution. If I remember correctly, one election in this country was fought on the basis of a mandate to change the Constitution. That was in 1971 when the executive came into confrontation with the judiciary and one important judicial pronouncement put restrictions on the amending procedures of Parliament in Golaknath's case. Before that, the Lok Sabha was dissolved. In that election, one of the major issues was that the then Prime Minister sought the mandate of the people that "I would like to amend the Constitution for a social legislation, for a social purpose. I do not have the majority. Two-thirds majority is required." And, on that basis, she got a massive mandate. The Twenty-fourth amendment of the Constitution took place for the first time in article 368. The constituent power of the Parliament was institutionalised. (Contd. by 4P/SKC)

4p/6.35/skc

SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE (CONTD.): Therefore, it cannot be just on the desire of somebody that you amend the Constitution. But short of that, short of having ratification by the Parliament at all important stages, the Executive takes the matter to the Houses and seeks the advice and guidance from the Houses. That has been the practice in the past and this practice is followed even now.

Sir, let me start by saying that I was listening to the entire debate since 1 o'clock and sometimes, I thought that I was not in the Upper House of the Indian Parliament, but in one of the chambers of United States of America, because we were discussing the Hyde Act. While making a suo motu statement, I had mentioned that this has some relevance but not all. Now, what is the relevance of the Act? To my mind, this is a matter between the US Executive and the US Legislature. When the Executive decided upon having cooperation with India on civil nuclear deal, they knew it very well that the 1954 Act stands in the way, and unless the Executive gets some waiver from the Legislation, that cannot extend civilian nuclear cooperation to India, because India had tested nuclear devices. In India, all the nuclear installations are not fully under the safeguard of IAEA, and India has nuclear weapons. Therefore, in these three areas, waivers were required for the Administration to negotiate with India in respect of the civilian nuclear cooperation. This is an enabling legislation, to enable the US Administration to have negotiation with us, and that negotiation will, of course, take place.

I am not going into the details of the US procedures and US systems. There are Constitutional experts here; they know about it much better than me. But one clarification was sought, I think by Dr. Bimal Jalan, and he had raised an issue pertaining to Section 203 of the US law. He asked whether there was any precedent where the US President, despite the intention of the Legislature, the sense of the House, and the US Policy, enacted a law, entered into an agreement, but it was not complied with. And this was in the case of China -- Normal Trade Relations with People's Republic of China, Public Order 106-286/October 10, 2000. This is one precedent; there are other precedents also. And if you look, at it, exactly in the identical language, 'human rights have been violated by China in Tibet'. The manufactured goods have been produced with the help of bonded and imprisoned labour. Therefore, US Congress advised the Administration to ensure that these things did not happen. But the US Administration had no way of administering and, therefore, it remained as a desire. (Contd. by 4q)

HK/4q/6.40

SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE (CONTD.): Section 103 of the Act, Section 104 of the Act, sense of the House, formulation of the policies of the US Administration are being articulated every year. Dr. Alexander has very clearly explained the constitutional position and the relation vis-a-vis the US Administration and the US Congress. I would not like to go into the details of it. But, surely, Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, I would like to make a general observation. The question comes: Who is to interpret the US legislation, its effectiveness and its binding? Me; the Indian Parliament, or the person who is directly concerned, the US President? I would just like to quote a few lines from the statement of President Bush after signing this Agreement with reference to some of the provisions of the Hyde Act. I quote, "Today I have signed into H.R. 5682 and Act containing the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Energy Cooperation Act, 2006. That will strengthen the strategic relationship between the United States and India and deliver valuable benefits to both nations. Section 103 of the Act proposes to establish US policy with respect to various international affairs methods. My approval of the Act does not constitute my adoption of the Statements of Policy as United States foreign policy. Given the Constitution's commitment to the Presidency of the authority to conduct the nation's foreign affairs, the Executive Branch self-construe such policy statements as advised. Also, if Section 104 (d) (ii) of the Act was construed to prohibit the Executive Branch from transferring or approving the transfer of an item to India contrary to Nuclear Suppliers Group Transfer Guidelines that they may be in F.A. at the time of such future transfer, a serious question would exist as to whether the provision on constitutionally delegated legislative power to an international body.' That is the interpretation of the person who is instructed by the law to implement the Act. That is the rationality in which the Prime Minister assured the House yesterday despite knowing the extraneous and prescriptive provisions, not all but some, of the Hyde. What Prime Minister said yesterday? I can just quote a few lines as he is unable to speak. I quote, "We appreciate the efforts made by the US Administration and the bipartisan support to the US Congress which has led to the passage of this legislation. This law has several positive features which take into account our concerns. However, there are areas which continue to be a cause for concern and we will need to discuss them with the US Administration before the bilateral Cooperation Agreement can be finalised. (Contd. by 4r/SK)

SK/4R/6.45

SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE (CONTD.): "The House can rest assure that in these negotiations, the commitments and assurances I gave -- I mean the Prime Minister gave -- to the Parliament on August 17, 2006, will constitute our guidelines. The passage of the legislation enables the US administration to follow up another commitment made by the US in July 18 Joint Statement, that is, approaching its international partners, particularly, in the industry to lift restrictions, to allow full civil nuclear cooperation with India. We will seek to ensure that the NSG takes action to permit full civil nuclear cooperation with India in terms acceptable to us". Many other paragraphs are there. The total contention, the moot contention, of the assurance is that the Prime Minister's stand committed, the Government of India's stand committed to the Joint Statement of 18 July 2005, to the Separation Plan of the 2nd March, 2006 and to the assurances which the Prime Minister gave to this very House on 17th August, 2006, which is being repeated and reiterated by me right now.

Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, a number of issues have been raised. I will try to address some of these issues, because quite a number of other issues that have been made here are extraneous. I am not going into the issues which, to my mind, are extraneous to this debate, like, some American businessmen or some Indian businessmen entered into an arrangement among themselves and to do business. Keeping that in view, this whole arrangement is being done. Now, let us come to the tests and non-proliferation. I have no hesitation to say, yes, I belong to the party which does not believe in Non-proliferation Treaty. Yes, we do believe that nuclear non-proliferation is absolutely necessary for the very existence of civilisation. Because of this very fact, Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, from 1974, after the first explosion in Pokharan, repeatedly we refused to sign the NPT. Why? When the whole world signed--Ram Jethmalani has correctly pointed out, except three or four countries, the whole world signed--we refused. Because always we considered that NPT is a fraud treaty. It is discriminated. It is creating a class where the nuclear weapon states would have the right of stockpiling, of making experiments, horizontally and vertically, while the Non Proliferation Treaty-bound States will not have that right. So, we refused to accept this discriminatory treatment. What was the message which--Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, and my colleague, Mr. Natwar Singh, who is present here, was the Minister at that time--we conveyed to the International Community in the Disarmament Conference of the United Nations? In plain, simple language it was that we are on the threshold, we are screwdrivers away from the manufacturing of weapons. But still, I would desire to continue to be at the threshold level. I would keep my option open. All along you use the phrase that India will keep its option open. We will not foreclose the option. I would not graduate myself to a nuclear weapon states, provided you, the nuclear weapon States, agree to a definitive timeframe for nuclear disarmament. (Contd. By 4s)

YSR/6.50/4S

SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE (CONTD.): That was the stand; good, bad, or indifferent too. Even this year, we have presented a paper to the United Nations. But I am really, Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, at a loss to understand the logic of the spokesman of the party who indulged in closing the option, going for the test in the month of May. You came to power in March, 1998. Surely, in two months, you were not competent enough to start from zero. Everything was ready. That is why you could take the advantage of going for explosion in May, 1998. Then what had prompted you to declare a unilateral moratorium? What had prompted you not only to declare a unilateral moratorium here but also to reiterate it? Mr. Jaswant Singh wanted to have the documents. Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, I have some documents. This is the text of the speech of Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee delivered in the United Nations General Assembly on 24th September 1998. And there too you did not say that you would not go for disarmament; you would not go for non-proliferation. What did you say? "These tests do not signal a dilution of India's commitment to the pursuit of global nuclear disarmament." You retained that policy. And what did you say? Thereafter, you went one step ahead and said, "I am ready to sign." Instead of reading the paragraph, I am quoting the paragraph. The Sl. No. of paragraph is 60. Your speech on 22nd September 1999 where you also quoted the Prime Minister's speech and stated:

"Last year, my Prime Minister declared in this Assembly that India was engaged in discussions on a range of issues including the CTBT. These discussions are in process and will be resumed by the newly elected Government. Our position remains consistent. We remain ready to bring -- thereafter you came to power -- these discussions to a successful conclusion. Naturally, this requires the creation of a positive environment as we work towards creating the widest possible consensus domestically."

Fine. There is no problem with it. Therefore, the short question, which comes to my mind, is this. Truly, you were talking that you would not have the opportunity of testing. What did we say? What did the Prime Minister say? What is in the Separation Plan? We are not accepting any additional commitment. We are just sticking to the voluntary moratorium which we declared. We are not going to accept any Treaty-bound commitment. We are not going to accept a part of the Treaty which we will sign, because we would like to keep our options open. If situation demands, if the national priority demands, if the superior national interests require, we may have to do that. That will be left to the wisdom of the decision-making authority at that point of time. But we would not like to foreclose the option. We have just exactly retained that commitment which you agreed to, which you did. But we are ensuring that it will not be a Treaty-bound commitment. The Prime Minister stated that it was a hard negotiation. No denial of the fact. The real task to my mind, Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, is that the real negotiations will start now, because we shall have to enter into the 123 Agreement. Of course, the 123 Agreement is under the overall Act of 1954. (Contd. by 4T)

VKK/4t/6.55

SHRI PRANAB MUKHERJEE (CONTD.): But, that will be between India and the USA. What has happened right now is between the US legislation and the US Administration, to enable the US Administration to enter into negotiations with us. We cannot place the cart before the horse. Now, the issue which had been raised was that what would happen if the USA, suppose for certain reasons, refuses to supply fuel to us. Would it foreclose the option for us to go to any other NSG countries? Nothing prevents us, in this treaty, to go to others and have it. Nothing compels us. That is why, you will have to have an amendment in the NSG guidelines. The agreement which you will have to enter into with IAEA would be India-specific because these are the few important points that all the nuclear installations are not under total safeguard.

(MR. CHAIRMAN in the Chair)

Although India is a nuclear weapon State and India has tested earlier before we entered into this agreement, these provisions, these situations, cannot be undone. This is very much there. Therefore, I will just like to quote a few lines from the conference paper. It has been stated many a time that why they have not accepted India as a nuclear weapon State. We did not seek for a nuclear weapon State status nor can it be conferred by anybody. It is the ground reality that India has tested twice and India has nuclear weapons. In the second paragraph on page 2 of the conference report, it is stated that section 123 (a) (2) of the Atomic Energy Act requires that a non-nuclear weapon State should have IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities in that State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere, commonly referred to as full-scope safeguards, as a condition of US nuclear supply and approval for new nuclear cooperation agreements, a requirement that India does not meet and, as a State with nuclear weapons, would be unlikely to meet for the foreseeable future.

This is not my comment. This is the comment in the conference paper that we are not going to meet this requirement in the foreseeable future. On page 12 of the conference paper, the conferees understand that the US peaceful nuclear cooperation with India will not be intended to inhibit India's nuclear weapon programme. There is no intention. Neither we nor anybody else has the intention that somebody will declare us as a nuclear weapon State. Five States are nuclear weapon States. They are not going to expand. They are not going to open the door. It is as simple as that. But the ground reality is that they had to recognise that India has nuclear weapons and India is not going to give up that programme which even the conference paper has admitted.

Mr. Chairman, Sir, the question is that, what would be sequence of the safeguards. The Government has assured the House that before voluntarily placing our nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, we would ensure that all nuclear restrictions on India had been lifted. The legislation provides for finalisation of the text of the India-specific safeguard agreement with IAEA, but not its "entry into force." This point is to be appreciated. (Contd. by TMV/4u)

 

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