ק (֟) : ָ ֟, ָ, Ù ׮ױ ֮ օ ߴ ֵ֤ ֻ, ֵ֤ ֻ , but at what cost? ֕ ֌׸ ֟ ֕ ֌׸ ָ ״ֻ֮ ֻ ? 2020 , 2030 8% ׌ֆ ֕ ָ , , כ ֮ , ֯ ֟ ִ֟ ָ ֕ ֌׸ և Ù ׌ֆ ֕ ֻ , ֛ ֱ ֓ ֮ ׻֋ ֟ , ִָ֤ ֤ ֟ ֮֟ ׌ֆ ֕ ֌׸ ׌ֆ ֕ ֻ ױ ֯ ߴ ? ֯ ֮ ׸֕ ָ , ֲ ï™ ָ פ ֵ ֯ ׸ ִ֮ ֱ ׸ ֯ ״֙ ָ ֻ , ׻ ׸ ß֮ ֮ ֻ , ֮ ֻ ִֵ ׮ִֵ ָ ׮ֻ ֋, ׮ִֵ ϵ օ ָ ֟ և an estimate of (i) the amount of uranium mined and milled in India during the previous year; this is to be reported to the American Congress ֮ ֮ ׮ִֵ ׮ֻ߅.(ii) the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices; and (iii) the rate of production in India of- (I) fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; and ( II ) nuclear, explosive devices; ֤ ֮֟ ֛ an estimate of the amount of electricity India's nuclear reactors produced for civil purposes during the previous year. ֟֋? ׸ ֮ ײֻ֕ ֮֯ ֮և , and the proportion of such production that can be attributed to India's declared civil reactors. ָ, ֱ ׸ , ֻ ָ , ׻ ֲ ׸ ״׮Ù֮ ָ ָ ׿ֵ֟ ָ ׿ֵ֟ ָ ֮ Ը֮ , ׸ ֮ ָ֮֯ פ ׌ ָ֮֯ Was it to the satisfaction of American Administration? Was it to the satisfaction of the American Congress? ָ , Կ ֵ֮ ֟ ׻֋ ֮ ָ֯ , ֮ ߴ , և כև ֮ ߴ abrogate ׻֋ ֟ ָ ï™ և ֤ ֯ ߴ ֮ ? ֯ ֟և ֯ ֮ ? ֯ ׻֋ ֮ Ù ֋? ̸֕ ֟օ Ù ָ ֺ , ֺ ֕ ׸ ִ 3 ָ ָ ֮ ֮֋ ֮ , ֮ ӛÙߕ ֻ ֮ ß֮ ֮ ֛, ß֮ Ù ֛, ß֮ ßֻ ֛ ָ ֯ ִ֟ ߴ Ù , ֯ ָ ֲ֕ ֮ , ו֮֟ ֲ֕ , They will come anyway. So, whether we have this agreement or not, ׻֋ ߴ ׮ֵ֤ ֵ֮ ֋, ָ כ ׿ֿ ß֮ Ù ׸ ֋, ָ ָ ָ Ù ֋, ָ ׸ ָ Ù ֋, ӿ  ֋օ ׻֋ ׮ֵ֤ ֯ ֟ ֮և

ָ ֟ ֟ ָ ևיÙ ֮ ֻ ִֵ ָ ׸ִ ׸̾ ֮ ֛ פ ϵ ߕ ־ֿ ֋, ָ ֟ ֱ ָ Ù և , ߙ ֋, և ָ ֋ as a result, "reprocessing of spent fuel to separate....." 0ָ0 ׮־֮ , ָ ָ פ ֕ ߿֮ , .... ('2j/sch' ָ ָ)


ק (֟): , "Reprocessing of spent fuel to separate plutonium is extremely important in the Indian context. The Indian nuclear fuel cycle is crucially dependent on the use of Fast Breeder Reactors in the second stage and of thorium-based systems in the third stage. Separation of plutonium is essential for the eventual use of thorium as a nuclear fuel. India therefore expects that reprocessing will be an important activity of its nuclear energy programme."

׻֋, ָ, ֮ ֻ ִֵ , ָ ׸ִ ׸̾ ֕ , ә ״ֻ֮ ֻ , ә , ָ , ׸ ֮ , ׸ כև ָ ߯ , ֮ ָ ï , ָ ֋, ֋, ֋, ֲ ߕ ֮ ׸ ֣ ֟ ִ

60 ָ ֮ ָ כ , ֮ ֻ ָ ևיÙ ָ , וִ ֮ ״ֻ , ו֮ ָ ֤֮ , כ ־ ֻ , ߴ֟ פ Ӭ, ֕߾ Ӭ, ֤ ֕ ״ֻ֮ ֻ , Ϭ֮ ӡ ֟֋? ֻ , Why are we ready to pay such a high price for something which is not going to provide us energy security or anything else?

ָ, ָ ֟ ָ ָ ׌ֵָ Ù ָ ֵ ָ ֟ ׮ֻ ֮ ֮ ֯ ָ, ָ ֮ ׻֋ ֌׸ ֟ ֮ ֛, ֵ - և ֕ ׸ֲֵֻ ׸ִ ֮ ָ ִ ߲ ֮ և ֣ ֮ ֻ , ָ ֵ֮ ִ ֮ ֻ ִֵ ß֮ ߕ ֮ ֮ ֣- Ӭ פ , ߕ ָ ֕ ֮ ߿֮ ֻ , ֕ ֮ ֮ ֌׸ ֻ ָ ӓֵ , Ԯ , ָ Ϭ֮ ӡ ֮֮ פ ֵ֮ ֮ , ו ָ ָ פ ß֮ ׻֋ ֮ , ֋? ָ ß֮ ׌ֵָ Ù և ֻ ׿ֿ , ־ֲ ָ ? ָ, ֯ ֮֮ ָ ־ֲ ? ...(־֮֬)

ֳ֯ן: ֯ և ִ֯

ק: ָ, ֯ ׸Ù ָ ֯ ֮ ו֋ ָ ָ-ָ ֟ ꅠ ִ֟ ֲ ևֻ ֋ ֲ ָ ֈ ָ -߮ ߅ ֮֮ Ϭ֮ ӡ ִ֟ , ׻֋ ָ-ָ ׾ֵ ׻֋ ֈ

ָ, Ը֮ ־ֻ , ֯ ־ֻ ֣ ָ ׻ Ը֮ ׌ֵָ ־ָ ֮֮ ֮֮ ևԋԋ Ը֮ ׌ֵָ ־ָ ֮ ? ִ ׌ ֮ , ևԋԋ ָ ׻֋ ׌ ֮ ָ ֣ ֕ Ը֮ Ը ֣ և ꌙ ָ Ը֮ ֟ ߋև ֵ , ָ-ָ ֵ ֵ ׸ ״׮Ù֮ , ׸ ֮֟ Ը֮ ָ

֮ ו֋ ֕ Ը֮ ׾ָ ָ , ֮֮ ֮ ֻ , ֻ ָ Ը֮ ׾ָ ? ֮ ֻ ׻ for perpetuity ֯ ִ ֮ ׸ ׻ ֣ ? ֻ ߮ ֣ ָ ׸֮ , , Ը֮ ֣ ֮ , ָ ֣ ֮ ־ օ

2K/MCM ָ ָ


ק (֟) : ָ ֲ ׻ Ӭ ֟ ֮ ֯ ׸ օ ֕ כ , ݻֻև֮ ߓ , ָ, ß ָ ֻ֮ ִ־ ֮ ־ֻ ָ ָ ֯ ָ Ӭ, ֕ ׸ ֟ , ׸ ָ ֯ ׌ֻ , ֯ ׸ և ׻֋, ׻֋, ׸ әׯϙ֮ , ָ ? ֤ ו ֤ ָ ֻ ֋ ָ ׻֋ ׯ ֮ օ Even with the best of intentions, we cannot come out of it. It is the time that we decide that we need to get out of this, here and now. And, I wish the Prime Minister to have the courage to do that; I wish this House to have the courage to do, that and I wish the Members of the Treasury to rise above their party and political interests and to say it to the Government. As in the United States, bilateral , 80 ָ ֣ ֋, ֋ ? ߮ Republicans Democrats ֣ ֋? ֮ ָ և ߙ և , כ ֮ ׸ꌙ Ϭ֮ ӡ ֮ ׸ꌙ ֯ և Ù ֠ ִ ֯ ֵ ׻֋ ߲ ֋, ״ֻ ״׮Ù֮ օ The Republicans and Democrats have worked together to force their Government to act in the interests of the United States. I want the Congressmen, the BJP, the Samajwadi Party and the Left to come together in the interests of this country, and the future of this country, and force this Government to withdraw itself from this suicidal act, from this suicidal agreement. We don't wish to commit suicide after all the sacrifices that we have made in the last 50 years. Thank you, Sir. (Ends)

DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (RAJASTHAN): Sir, I rise to speak on a subject of great importance on the crossroads, on the intersecting crossroads, of politics, technology and law. I respect the sincerity with which learned Members have spoken earlier. Surely, they have strong beliefs in what they have spoken. Sir, I venture to speak with equal sincerity, to support, what I think, is a grand and unique initiative, which will, in no manner, and will not be allowed in any manner, to compromise India's sovereignty and security on the one hand, and yet, lead to the engines of growth, including, in particular, energy security, on the other.

Sir, the debate is, and the debate should be, a debate about power, but not about the power of hegemony, the power of exploding a bomb here or there, but truly, of some power which comes from being a juggernaut of economic growth, of technological growth and of military growth. Real deterrence, I submit, comes from that power and at the root of that power lies energy security.

Sir, I have heard my friend, Mr. Shourie, with rapt attention. He has raised several important issues, the right to reprocess, the moratorium or ban on testing, the lack of transfer power, the applicability of the mandatory or so-called mandatory provisions of the US laws, etc. I shall deal with each one of them. But let me start with where he ended. He had ended with energy security, and I start with that by saying that this is a debate, and should be a debate, about energy security. But we shall come to the other issues shortly.

Sir, what is the energy situation here today? We are proud that India is one of the few countries of the world which, in the last 25 years, has experienced over six per cent economic growth, year after year. In the last few years, we have experienced eight, and sometimes nine, per cent growth, but we are aspiring for higher growth rates. Now, is it possible, in the future, to sustain even a fraction of that growth rate without the basic source of that power, namely, energy? We don't have to aspire for the French equivalent of 79 per cent of power by nuclear sources; I am not saying that. We don't have to go to the Belgian figure of 60 per cent; we don't have to go to the Swedish figure of 42 per cent; I am not suggesting that. We don't have to go for the Swiss figure of 39 per cent or the Spanish figure of 31 per cent. (Contd. by 2l)


DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD.): But, Sir, the United Kingdom gets 21 per cent of its energy from nuclear sources; Japan gets about 30 odd per cent and the US gets about 20 per cent. Is it too much to ask for a country which aspires for high growth rates like India that we aspire for a 20 percentage of our total energy needs from nuclear sources? Today we stand at 3 per cent. Sir, we have coal reserves. Fifty per cent of our energy sources come from coal and other 33 per cent from oil. Most of our oil is imported. A lot of our coal is of poor quality. But apart from that, it is a less efficient, more unclean and more environmentally messy method of producing power. Did you know that one tonne of uranium produces far more energy than produced by several million tonnes of coal or several million barrels of oil? That is the equation. We are today the fifth largest energy consumer. We are not anywhere near the highest producer, but we are still the fifth largest consumer in the world. Within 20 years, we are estimated to become the third largest, behind the USA and China, and ahead of Japan and Russia. For this gigantic consumption of power, where are we going to get it? By importing more oil, by mining more coal, by setting up beneficiation plants, which are environmentally messy? If we increase from 3 to 5 to 10 per cent, as is projected over the next 25 or 30 years to somewhere near the 20 per cent, the projection is actually beyond 25 per cent. Is that an ambition or an aspiration which is so unfair, so motivated, so blinkered or so one-sided? Sir, it is in this context that in April 2005 a Indo-US Energy Dialogue started. And that has what led ultimately to the 18th of July Declaration. It is this energy security, which is the impulse behind the Prime Minister's statements. It is the bedrock of the second paragraph of the hon. External Affairs Minister's statement a few days ago in each House. Sir, this energy security initiative for India will never be at the cost of our sovereignty and security. Our security and sovereignty concerns are precisely what have taken this already year and a half. It is precisely those concerns which have taken this issue to so much of scrutiny and so much of discussion, and that shall be, Sir, our watch-word in all the negotiations in the future. We will remember, Sir, the earlier American precedent a theme that we will never negotiate out of fear, but we will not fear to negotiate. It is in that spirit that you must see the basic desirability. If we can have a win-win situation of energy security along with our concerns reasonably legitimately met, then I think, Sir, it is something to be commended, something which is clearly win-win. Sir, let me turn first to the broad contours, the larger issues, the huge advantages and the pluses of this deal. This deal, of course -- when I use the word 'deal' -- is not yet made; it is not even born; it is not signed, sealed or delivered. It is, therefore, particularly unfortunate that an agreement, not yet born, is subject to so much criticism. But when I say 'deal', I think of the proposed one, two, three agreements, yet to be born in its nitty-gritty. But, Sir, let us just look at the broad advantages and then I will deal with each of the specific issues raised by my very learned friends. Sir, it is truly historic initiative and something for which carping criticism should give way to a certain amount of a congratulatory mood. It opens up, Sir, for the first time, in forty years of isolation, barriers of distrust and suspicion of nuclear and technological ostracism for India. It provides us with a reasonable plan to come somewhere near 20 per cent for our entire energy needs.

(Contd. by 2m)


DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD.): It provides an unprecedented, a unique, only India specific waiver. India is going to be the only country, Sir, which, having exploded a bomb, possessing bombs and being a de facto declared nuclear power, a country which has an ongoing strategic programme, a country which has insisted on not signing the NPT, a country which is not going to subject all its installations to safeguards, with all this, India is going to be the only country to join that club of countries which can receive nuclear energy, nuclear fuel and nuclear equipment. That is the heart of this agreement. But, Sir, with that, what has in practice this 40 years of isolation meant? It has meant, to give a simple example, that so-called dual use technologies are available to us. Many years ago, Sir, for our meteorological purposes, we wanted the super computer called Crays computer. It has done a huge amount of good to our weather forecasting purposes, totally peaceful, totally beneficial, totally progressive. It was denied, Sir, on the ground that it is capable of being misused for nuclear purposes because obviously such computers have a small dual use as well. Similarly, something less sophisticated than that, something simpler than that, something called a three axes lathe machine, was also denied to us because of a fear that it may be used for nuclear warheads. These are only examples. A huge gamut of dual use technology will now be available to us, or riding on the back of the main nuclear equipment and a fuel which you will get. Sir, I will give you a very interesting recent example. China, as you know, is a declared nuclear power, one of the original Five, somebody who belongs to the unique club, does not subject itself to the usual safeguards. We are much later. A country like China signed two pacts recently, one with the USA and another with Australia--with Australia for getting uranium and with the USA for getting nuclear equipment. It signed those two pacts on terms much, much more stringent, much, much more intrusive than the 123 Agreement, proposed in the near future between India and the USA. China did it despite being a declared nuclear power. It did it happily and willingly because it saw that nuclear energy, the facility and the engine of economic growth which it provides is a very desirable objective and the intrusive safeguards are on a cost benefit basis not so bad. Sir, we are allowed in this Agreement to separate our strategic programme, the euphemism to the military programme, on the one hand, and our civilian programme. It is we who decide how many reactors in future we will build. Theoretically, we can build all reactors and allocate them to our strategic programme and not give one to the civilian side. If, however, we choose to designate any reactor, present or future, as civilian, then, of course, we will willingly subject it to safeguard. Sir, the military, the strategic concerns, are completely divorced by the Chinese Wall. There is an absolute separation and that is the so-called Separation Plan.

Sir, the sequencing of this Pact is important. We could have been asked to sign the 123 Agreement first and we could have been asked then to wait for the US legislation. We could have been asked to sign the 123 Agreement first and the IAEA Safeguards Agreement also first and then wait for the US legislation. We had specified and negotiated hard, and today what do we have? We have a US legislation first. We will take steps but not sign the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. We will first negotiate fully rather than 123 Agreement without signing the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. And, it is only after we negotiate and sign a 123 Agreement to our satisfaction that we will be obliged to sign the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. And, of course, it is important that our 123 Agreement will follow after and not recede the US legislation.

(Contd. by vkk-2n)


DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD.): Therefore, when we sign something after the US legislation and we sign a treaty with the US, it is obvious that the concerns which deviate from that Act which the US has passed will be as governed in the Agreement and not in the Act. I will deal with that issue a little later because it has a lot of legal overdose. So, Sir, what we will sign is what we will accept and what we will accept is what we will sign. And that is an international treaty under 123 Agreement. Sir, my friend talked about uranium. As far as I know -- I don't know about the study he quotes -- if wishes were horses all of us could fly. Perhaps, there is a wishful thinking in that study. I hope it comes true in the future. But, let us talk of the facts today. Sir, I would rather rely on our Planning Commission and our technological scientists than on a person who says that there are huge uranium reserves in the bed of the earth in India and you should throw out the tribals and take them out of the bowels of the earth. Our total uranium reserves on the official account estimated, published and known to the Government of India are 78,000 tonnes. And 78,000 tonnes are all that we have to go by today. I don't see the reason for the great sanguine approach, the very highly optimism approach of my friend. The Planning Commission has said that our uranium reserves are very low. Scientists, eminent scientists, including a former head of the Atomic Energy Commission -- and I can name him -- have said that our uranium reserves are low. But more than that, a constant dependency and looking over our back on such fuel means that our plants run inefficiently. They overshoot deadlines and targets and we always make the excuse of lack of fuel.

So, Sir, in this scenario, let us turn now to a very important aspect which I think is a crucial aspect. As I said, this is a technical, political and legal issue. Mr. Shourie has rightly referred to the various sections. He referred to section 103, in particular, when he started his speech. He referred to section 109. There are also sections 101 and 102. Now, Sir, since we are all Members of Parliament, here, I must share with you a great peculiarity about the US legislative process. We both have as our mother country, England -- the colonial masters were the same. But the colonial masters carried a parliamentary democratic system into its own country and replicated it in many Commonwealth countries including India. We have a parliamentary democracy. In a parliamentary democracy, normally, on the English model, the Executive is broadly a subset of the Legislature. A famous author described the Executive as the committee of the Legislature. Perhaps because the Americans were more revolutionary and, perhaps, because they had a more bloody battle with the British, they decided to do very different. They got into the separation of powers and today, more than France, more than other countries, the last greatest bastion of separation of powers in the world, is the US. What does it mean in practice? What does it mean for our 123 Agreement? It means this. What we call in the usual analogy, what we do on Fridays here, Private Member's Bills, is how legislation frequently starts in the US, in both the Senate and the Congress because the Executive is not part of the Legislature. The Government of the day, the Executive of the day, does not create, pilot, move or carry legislation, as the Government here does. The administration is outside of the legislation. What is the result? And a very direct result for our case and that is where, I submit, with utmost respect to my friend, he has erred gravely and it is very misleading to refer to those sections. The result of this is, as an Act comes out of the Houses of Congress and Senate, it contains two totally radically different parts. It contains an explicitly stated non-binding part, an advisory and recommendatory part. Take, for example, he did not mention sections 101 and 102. I will come to section 103 in a moment. Let me complete Mr. Shourie.

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: I said that section 106 is mandatory.

DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI: Exactly. You are absolutely right. You may notice that I did not mention section 106. I mentioned sections 101, 102...(Interruptions)... Give me a moment, Mr. Shourie. I mentioned sections 101, 102, 103 and 109. I was going to say, before you interrupted, that section 106 is, in fact, mandatory and that is what the Government of India is going to negotiate shortly. But, allow me to complete. You mentioned four other sections. All of them, I submit, with utmost respect to you, are non-mandatory and non-binding. Let me explain. Section 101 has a provision called 'sense of the House'.

(Contd. by 2o)


DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD.): Have you ever seen a provision like that in the Indian Statute referring to the sense of the House? Section 102 says, statement of policy. That is why before the US President, whom you quoted, the US Ambassador to India, many days ago, when this was being discussed said this, and I quote the US Ambassador to India on this subject. He said: "The Bill that you referred to, has a sort of legislative segment in it." I am quoting Ambassador Mulford, what he said on 13th or 16th of June, 2006. Surely, Sir, you will give greater weight to the American's own understanding of their law than yours and mine. The President of U.S.A. thinks 'allow' means this; the Ambassador thinks it means this. Surely, with all the learning we both have, I think, we must differ with their understanding of their own law. Sir, Ambassador Mulford said: "The Bill that you referred to, has a sort of legislative segment in it, which are the provisions that are to become law. There is also often a declaratory preamble to legislation in the US, and those declaratory provisions and positions are not binding..." And after a few lines, he says again: "So, what is significant in my view is that the issues that were potentially troublesome in terms"--that is very important; there comes your Iran, there comes your reporting requirement, there comes a lot of other things. I will deal with them in a moment-- and I quote: "The issues that were potentially troublesome in terms of legislative process, were all moved and incorporated into the declaratory, non-binding area of the Bill, and not in the enforceable part of the Bill. That was a huge victory, he said." Why? It is important to have those declaratory parts because it allows them to let off steam, it allows the legislature of USA to express a pious hope and intent. But, that is not a mandatory legislation, and that is why, Sir, the U.S. President has said, as you rightly quoted, and I quote him. You referred to Section 103. The U.S. President said not long ago, very recently. "Section 103 of the Act purports to establish US policy with respect to various international affair matters. My approval, that is, the US President's approval of the Act, does not constitute my adoption of the state of policy as US Foreign Policy." So, Sir, the direct answer to your basic fundamental question, the question you asked, is this. Does this bind USA? The answer is an emphatic no. It does not bind USA. That is where the fallacy of your argument lies. Yes, one section does, and that is the bone of contention. That section is going to be the bone of contention between us and the USA when we negotiate the 123 Agreement, that is, the nuclear testing issue, to which I will come later. But each and every other section, which you have referred to, Sir, perhaps, by oversight or deliberation, is the non-binding, advisory and recommendatory part. That will create an impression that they were bound by intrusive provisions.

Now, Sir, having allowed the steam to let off in the US legislation, let us turn to the legitimate concern of the House. It is a concern which I share with you as an Indian, as a Member of Parliament. It is a concern which is important, and there are three or four legitimate areas of concern. Sir, remember, if there is any provision which we do not like, we have firstly, the right to walk away. Who has told us that we will sign the agreement? The Prime Minister has not said so. The House has not said so. India has not said so. We have a right to walk away. But, more than that, Sir, we have also a right to persuade USA to change its policy, and Sir, that change in policy can include a change in the US law that was passed a few days ago. Laws are not sacrosanct. If they do not suit us, we will walk away. Let me take your three major legitimate concerns one by one. The first is, no right to reprocess the spent US fuel. Sir, it is very important. Tarapore today has growing stockpiles of spent US fuel because it is US fuel which is used, which U.S.A. neither accepts back nor allows us to reprocess. Now, we cannot live with growing stockpiles like that. There are hazards. Now, it is interesting to note one thing. If you look carefully, the legislation nowhere stops, prohibits or inhibits us in any manner from reprocessing. That is an important point to note. (contd. by 2p)


DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD.): The Act does not prohibit us. We can use the US fuel and reprocess it. But the US policy prohibits it. The US non-statutory policy does not allow us to reprocess it. The USA has given a permanent waiver for reprocessing purpose of this kind only to three entities in the world, Japan, Switzerland and the European Union where they have got what they call "URATOM". Only these three countries have got permanent waiver and they can reprocess. India is going to ask only for a similar waiver. We are going to ask for the inclusion of that waiver in our 123 Agreement. We are going to do so because we believe that it is not acceptable to have stockpiles growing up at Tarapore which we can neither reprocess nor return to the US. That is totally valid. That is the whole meaning of waiving. That is why this criticism, with utmost respect, Sir, is premature. We are going to negotiate and if we have negotiated thus far with the skills of the hon. Prime Minister and with the skills of the hon. Minister of External Affairs, then, we must have trust and faith in their abilities and their confidence to negotiate further. We have negotiated much closer to an agreement which you were trying to negotiate. Perhaps, you were farther away from its conclusion. But that is not the point. Why should we wait for the negotiation to complete? This will be a major negotiating block.

Sir, there is a certain issue which is a very important issue--no testing in future. You are absolutely right. It is an important issue. Of all the issues which you have mentioned, this is the only one issue which is part of the binding part of the Statute 106. But I would like to just point out some interesting things here. India exploded a device way back in 1974. From 1974 till 1998, neither Mrs. Indira Gandhi, whom you fondly remember, nor any successor Government declared any kind of moratorium, voluntary or involuntary, on nuclear testing. I am going back and I am just reminding you because when we remember Mrs. Indira Gandhi, you remember Mr. Vajpayee. In 1998, the then Government, whose former Foreign Minister is sitting in the House, made a statement suo motu, unilaterally and voluntarily putting itself a moratorium on India against nuclear testing in perpetuity. It was in perpetuity. Let us face facts. (Interruptions)... Now, since we are a responsible country, we abide by all such commitments. But, nevertheless, this Government is committed to pointing out to the US in the 123 Agreement negotiations that, "Yes, as a matter of our own Indian policy, we shall adhere to the moratorium on testing, but not as a matter of binding, as per the law in your statute. We are not going to agree to a ban in terms of the 123 Agreement, although you have, in fact, made a unilateral declaration".

Now, just a small aside. I have here with me the photocopies of Mr. Vajpyee's statement of 24th September 1998 in the General Assembly, where he categorically stated that "India is prepared to sign the CTBT". I have right here a photocopy of the written statement of Mr. Jaswant Singh, the then Foreign Minister, made on 22nd September, 1999 in the General Assembly, repeating almost verbatim Mr. Vajpayee's assurance to sign the CTBT. But that is not the point. As you know, a CTBT means absolutely no testing by a formal treaty. But even before that, you had announced a voluntary moratorium on testing. So, we are saying now, we will negotiate with the US to follow the 123 Agreement. We will insist that we will bide by our own policy decisions; but, of course, as you know, a policy decision like that may be revoked for supreme national interest for some time. But we will not accept as for an international agreement, namely, the treaty, the 123 Agreement, if they write down that there shall be a ban on nuclear testing. That is the reality of testing issue. That again is a major negotiating issue. That is issue No.2 which will, Mr. Chairman, Sir, engage the attention of the hon. Foreign Minister and the hon. Prime Minister in the negotiations. The third issue of concern is no transfer of equipment for reprocessing and enrichment. (Contd. by VK/2Q)


DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD): Yes, you are right. The US does not permit as part of binding mandatory obligations, the transfer of equipments for reprocessing or enrichment purposes. As you know there are two cycles of the nuclear cycle, the first is, raw uranium used for nuclear reactors and the second is, reprocess it, convert to plutonium and reuse it. Now equipment transfer of that is not permitted by the US. That is the reality. The US does not permit it for any country in the world. It does not permit it even for the five original nuclear powers. So, there is no likelihood that the USA would, in the one, two, three negotiation stages itself permit it for India. The point of the matter is different. We have to compare realties with realities. What do we have? In any event, today, we do not have any reprocessing equipment being exported to us. In any event, today, we are under isolation. So, this is the third issue on which, I am sure, the hon. Foreign Minister, who is sitting here, will negotiate to try, to attempt to change the US policy. But I must frankly concede and confess that since the American policy is universal on this issue, no country, not even the original five, are allowed this under any condition, no waiver. It is not fair to expect India to get one, two, three waiver on this.

Sir, there are some other aspects which we tend to forget. We are a proud country and we negotiate proudly. We do so with quite confidence, with justifiable pride and of course, with the strength of conviction and we do not look for praise from elsewhere. But the fulsome praise which has been heaped upon India in the US legislation, I am not talking of the US administration or the US President or individuals, but the fulsome praise about India is something we should be proud about. It is not that we depend on praise, but then it is a recognition that India is a world power to reckon with. As you have mentioned, the Joint Congressional Explanatory Note of 50 pages, since times of praise, it calls India to meet the challenges of globalisation. It talks of India being the pivot for stability, security in South Asia. It talks of a global partnership because it says that India is a vibrant democracy; it has a well educated middleclass; it has a rapidly growing economy. It has pluralism, tolerance, democratic traditions and is a multi-religious and multicultural country. That is an achievement, a recognition which we richly deserve. Sir, Mohammed Baradei, the Head of the IAEA, said this some time ago again in recognition of us. You got strength to negotiate this treaty. As you know, he is a Director-General of the IAEA. He said, "This is a corrective break from the past. It would be illogical

-- this the Head of the IAEA saying so -- to deny civil nuclear technology to India, a country that has never violated any legal commitment and never encouraged nuclear weapons proliferation and a valued partner and a trusted contributor to international peace and security. Sir, with this we tend to forget India's established non-proliferation policy. The learned Member, perhaps, unintentionally pooh-poohed it as our civilizational abhorrence to violence and destruction. We should be proud that we have a civilizational abhorrence to violence and destruction. If you see the history of foreign affairs in this country, if there has been one stand as consistent as, for example, Non-Alignment, it has been the non-proliferation theme. Whether it is Mrs. Indira Gandhi, whether it is Rajiv Gandhi in the General Assembly, whether it is some other Government or this Government, whether it is the General Assembly, right from 1946, when the UN made the basic declaration of disarmament and non-proliferation, we have repeatedly said that we are peace loving country and it is from that it flows that we have to have the strength of nuclear power. But that strength goes with doctrines like -- how did these doctrines born; they were born because of our basic outlook on life -- 'no first use', the use of minimum credible force as a deterrent. These are the strengths of a power which knows that it is strong but equally shares the civilizational abhorrence of violence and destruction. It is from that angle that you must also see the entire process of entering into an agreement. (Contd. by 2R)


DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (contd.): Sir, let us address some of the other issues that the hon. Member has pointed out. He took up the question of reporting. He should know that the earlier version of the Act strongly called for a certification by the U.S. President. The certification by the U.S. President would be binding; it would be impossible to give it in some cases. It has changed largely to a reporting requirement, and most of the reporting requirements come under Section 104 from Page 26 onwards in that long Hyde Act. Most of it is in the informational segment, non-binding, advisory, and more than that, it is between the U.S. Congress and the President. It is not, in any manner, addressed to India. India is not obliged to disclose chapter and verse in the order and the manner in which they share even the information. So, that reporting requirement is very different from the way you have seen it and presented it. I would submit, let us not play politics with an issue as important as this. Let us rise above the narrow confines of partisanship. Iran is an example. Since I have already explained it, it comes completely in the non-binding part. Do you think that there can be any doubt about it? We have had strong links and friendship with both Iran and Iraq, even when the two were at war, even when the two had complete differences. We were not dictated to considerations extraneous to our own policy. Where is the question of Indian policy on Iran being dictated to by other countries, like, the U.S.? We decide our own foreign policy. Of course, the U.S. has a Declaration of Intent which it has repeated at 20 fora, officially and openly, that they do not want any cooperation with Iran. They have said so everywhere. Does it mean that we are bound to follow it? Does it mean that we have ever followed it unless we have wanted to go towards a particular way? Therefore, these are issues which are digressive. Let us not criticise out of habit. Let us not criticise an agreement, as I said, not yet born, sealed, signed or delivered. As Tagore has said, "Let us not allow the clear stream of reason to loose its way into the dreary desert sand of dead habit." To my friends on that side of the House, I would only report Palmerston's famous words. "There are no eternal friends. And likewise, there are no eternal enemies. There are only eternal interests." I might add that the national interest must be eternal. Let this House and every Member of this House have implicit confidence in the patriotism of this Prime Minister. Let us all have implicit confidence in the competence and ability of our Foreign Minister. And let us, therefore, try to get the best bargain on our own terms but not by carping criticisms in advance. (Ends)

THE LEADER OF OPPOSITION (SHRI JASWANT SINGH): Sir, I would like to say something, even though I never had any intention to interrupt, nor did I have any intention to participate in the discussion. And, I see the hon. Minister for Commerce and Industry is actively interrupting here. My young colleague, a promising and an established legal personality, had chosen to use my name, and my colleague, Sushmaji, mentioned to me that the hon. Prime Minister also chose to make a certain reference to me in his intervention yesterday in the other House, I found it necessary to very quickly, in the shortest possible time, once and for all, correct the situation. Firstly, a reference was made that the former Prime Minister, hon. Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, made a certain commitment. What the Prime Minister said in his speech in the General Assembly, to the best of my recollection, -- I don't have the text here -- was that India, because of voluntary moratorium, -- moratorium has no permanency; it was only a voluntary moratorium -- de facto, the principal obligation of the Test and Treaty has to be met..... (Contd. by 2S)


SHRI JASWANT SINGH (CONTD.): And, " India will not stand in the way", if I remember correctly, "of its coming into force in a de jure fashion provided all the other 48 countries who were to sign will also do so. That is so far as Prime Minister Vajpayee is concerned. (Interruptions) It would be good hon. Ministers recognised the status that they have achieved and restrained from interrupting. Secondly, Sir, reference has been made to what I said. I am disappointed, Sir, that the Prime Minister, in his reference yesterday -- I ordinarily would not do it; I sought out the reference in the other place and I tried to pay attention closely to what my distinguished friend was saying -- has urged that in some fashion. (a) They did not know what discussion was taking place with my US interlocutor, Mr. Strobe Talbot; and (b) whatever they have had to find out, is from his book. Now, both cannot be correct, Sir. If you had to rely on that book and, therefore, if he has found out anything, may I submit, Sir, that in Government, with every round of meeting that we had, there was a Press Conference and all information was given. Secondly, Sir, the hon. the Minister of External Affairs -- the Prime Minister was himself the Minister of External Affairs, earlier a very active and a very able diplomat, honourable Shri Natwar Singhji, who was also the Minister of External Affairs, before which when we were in Government, a very distinguished Member of Parliament who now holds Ministerial rank like Mr. Sibal or Mr. Natwar Singh, almost on a daily basis, we in Government, particularly on such issues, were being questioned and to the best of our ability we were answering. If our worthy Prime Minister who was then the Leader of Opposition still felt a deficiency of discussion, of course, he was always free to ask for it. I do not recollect when a discussion was asked and not given. One or two other things.

It was charged that we agreed to sign. The Treaty itself was killed by the US Senate. And what could we have signed if the US Senate had killed it. Further, if we had agreed to sign the Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which was the principal purpose of the discussions that were taking place, why then did the United States of America not go in and conclude the Treaty then? If we had agreed to sign, then what was stopping them from signing it?

I will make two more submissions, Sir. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty effectively died when the US Senate refused its permission. First, that was a multilateral treaty in which there were clauses which permitted a country to claim national emergency, national right and walk out. What we are now doing with the United States of America is not a multilateral treaty; it is a bilateral bondage that we are entering into and once you move out of it, you cannot, thereafter, continue to have the benefit, Sir. Sir, this I submit, is the position.

I do not want to take any more time. I will make one final sentence. All documents, all papers, have been in the possession of this Government, as they would be in the possession of any Government, since the May of 2004. Please, either stop making these insinuations and charges or, if there are any documents that prove what I have said as wrong, please bring them and share them with the House. Thank you.

SHRI ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI: I am very sorry to interrupt, Sir. Since Shri Jaswant Singhji said he does not have the papers, I just want to read one paragraph of what Shri Vajpayee said -- a document which I did not read earlier. He said in the General Assembly, "Accordingly, after concluding this limited test ban programme, India announced a voluntary moratorium on further underground nuclear test explosions.

(Contd. by 2t/tdb)


DR. ABHISHEK MANU SINGHVI (CONTD): "We conveyed our willingness to move towards a de jure formalisation of this obligation. In announcing a moratorium, India has already accepted the basic obligation of the CTBT. In 1996, India could not have accepted the obligation as such a restraint would have eroded our capability and compromised our national security." Also, I have Mr. Jaswant Singh's statement, in virtually identical terms. This is the statement. ...(Interruptions)... ߙ߲ߙ , , ? ..(־֮֬)..

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DR. BIMAL JALAN (NOMINATED): Sir, before we proceed further, we need a definitive clarification...(Interruptions)... Sir, in view of the importance of this debate, we need a very definitive clarification on one issue.

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the difference between a legal, a statutory obligation and what is put as policy or sense of the House. Have there been cases in the United States where the President of the United States has deviated from the sense of the House, as expressed in a legislative document in any important matter, or, to the policy, as laid down in that document even if it is not statutory? This is a very important issue, Sir. ...(Interruptions)... Because my understanding is, I may be wrong because I am a lay person, if it is a statutory thing, you cannot deviate from it without being impeached. But the general convention in the United States is that they also do not deviate from policy or the sense of the House, by and large, unless there is a very predominant national reason. So, I would like a clarification, a legal clarification on this point. ...(Interruptions)... (Ends)

MR. CHAIRMAN: Now, Shri Sitaram Yechury.

SHRI SITARAM YECHURY (WEST BENGAL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Sir, I am very happy that we are once again discussing this issue. I would only compliment the Government for agreeing to a discussion on this issue once again, and I hope, we will have yet another discussion on this issue before the 123 Agreement is signed and is finalised. I think this is setting a very good practice, a tradition and a precedent that we are actually debating these issues, I mean, not to mention anything to our Leader of the Opposition now, I mean, no insinuation meant. But, it is a new practice that is happening, which it is good, that we should continue with this.

Sir, last time, when we had this discussion, I had risen to express our anguish and concern at many of the provisions that this forthcoming Bill would have. We were very happy at that point of time and satisfied at the assurances that the hon. Prime Minister had given us, saying that India will not go below the minimum denominator on various issues, and if there is anything that is done contrary to what is stated here, and I quote from hon. Prime Minister's reply, Sir, to the House, when he said, "In the final form, if the US legislation or the NSG guidelines impose extraneous conditions on India, the Government, as I stated earlier, will draw the necessary conclusions consistent with my commitments to the Parliament." At that time, Sir, the hon. Prime Minister was asking us to wait for this legislation. Now, this legislation has come, and it is ironic that it is called the Hyde Act, which has very little to hide in it. I mean, it actually reveals what the United States wishes to extract from India.

DR. MURLI MANOHAR JOSHI: It hides more than what it reveals.

SHRI SITARAM YECHURY: It actually reflects what the United States of America wants to extract from India. Now, the point is, it is very good that we have heard these assertions; we have heard the Congress Spokesman here, the hon. Member defending the Government's position and stating that the integrity of this Government or the Prime Minister cannot be questioned. By far, I will be the last one to question that, at all, Sir. What is being questioned is not the integrity of the Government. I believe and firmly believe that each one of us is doing our best to further our national interest. But, what we are questioning is the infallibility. Every one of us can make mistakes. We can fall into traps, not with good intentions, or, wanting to fall into the traps. (Contd by 2U)