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RSS/PSV/1U/1.00

The House reassembled at one of the clock,

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN in the CHAIR.

 

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(At this stage the Hon. Member left the Chamber)

 

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SHRI V. NARAYANASAMY: The External Affairs Minister is here...(Interruptions)....

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THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS (SHRI SURESH PACHOURI): Sir, he was the External Affairs Minister at that time and he replied to this debate. Now, the hon. External Affairs Minister is present when they are initiating the debate.

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SHRI SURESH PACHOURI: You wait.

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SHORT DURATION DISCUSSION ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

IN INDO-US CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (UTTAR PRADESH): Sir, as Members just now were mentioning, the last discussion on this matter took place on the 17th August, 2006 and as Mr. Digvijay Singh was just reminding us, the Prime Minister made a very specific statement at that time. He drew the lines beyond which India would not go. He specifically said that we have concerns about the Bill as it has been passed by the House, and as the draft that had been proposed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Dr. P.C. Alexander, Shri Sitaram Yechury, and many other Members had drawn attention to many of the clauses. Sir, since then, the major development which has taken place is that the Act has been finally passed, and President Bush, a few hours ago has signed that Act.

(contd. by 1w)


-RSS-TMV-AKA/1W/1.05

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (CONTD.): Now, for us, the kasauti, the touchstone remains the Prime Minister's statement of 17th August and how that statement is to be reconciled with the Act which has been passed. I will deal with this particular matter because actually there is a fast forward mechanism which is going on.

Sir, I want to first draw the attention of the House to what Mr. Nicholas Burns, the American Under Secretary of State, who is negotiating with the Government, has stated upon his return to Washington. He said, "The way the Congress -- the US Congress -- ended up in the Conference Report -- that is, in the final Act -- is a deal that is acceptable to the United States". This is the first point. So, anybody can say "No, no, there are clauses in this which the US administration will take care of will deal with this matter". Secondly, he says, "and I understand it is acceptable to India. That is what the Indian Government told me in the private meetings" and that is essentially what I understood from the Foreign Minister Mukherjee's statements in the Parliament as well. Next he says, "The United States has left with the Indian Government a Draft Agreement and we are waiting for the Indian Government to respond and, I am sure, it will do so quickly". This House does not know. He has disclosed that a Draft 123 Agreement has already been given. Apart from that, he says, "Once we get the response to our proposal, we will make sure that our team is available immediately for meetings". Now, the next sentence is very vital for this House. It concerns this House directly. He says, "I agree with Ambassador Saran and Foreign Secretary Menon that all of us want to push these negotiations forward at a very rapid pace in January and February and I am optimistic we will be able to complete this". That means when this House meets again in February for the Budget Session, it will all already be done. This is the scheme. For us, therefore, it is very important to go back to the touchstone of 17th August statement. I will do that.

Sir, you may be aware, just now, just a few hours ago, the Indian correspondents in Washington had immediately sent and delivered a statement from President Bush and they will just now rely on it. It was sent three our four hours ago. I will come to that. But there are two arguments which are going to be repeated, again and again, in this House, and I will deal with them because the spokesmen, including the hon. Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, had been using those arguments outside. I would also suggest a way out from this quicksand into which we have been taken.

The first point is that there is absolutely no way whatsoever in which the US Act can be made to conform to the Prime Minister's assurances to this august House. I will take up these points one by one and I will just give you some illustrations. One of the charges, which Mr. Sitaram Yechury made, I made and several people made, is that there is an attempt, a clear stated objective, to get India embroiled in cartels which have been run by others. One of the impetus mentioned by name was Proliferation Security Initiative. You have mentioned the Wassener Agreement and other things. I want to read out to you what the Prime Minister had said at that time. The Prime Minister said, "The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an extraneous issue as it is outside the framework of 18th July Joint Statement. Therefore, we can't accept it as a condition for implementing the July statement. Separately the Government has examined the PSI. We have certain concerns regarding the legal implications and its linkages with the NPT. We also have concerns with amendments to the Suppression of Unlawful Activities at the Sea Treaty under the International Maritime Organisation". This is about that interdiction. Now, let us see what section 103(B)(3) of the final Act says. It requires the US administration to ensure India's (a) full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative; .... (Contd. by VK/1X)

VK/1X/1.10

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (CONTD): B) formal commitment to the statement of Interdiction Principles of such Initiative, about which the Prime Minister said that their concerns and legal implications are linked to NPT. C) public announcement of its decision -- India is being told, "Oh, we don't believe you; make a public announcement" -- to conform its export control laws, regulations and policies with the Australia Group -- does this House know what the Australia Group is doing? -- and with the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria and Control Lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement. D) demonstration of satisfactory progress -- just see the words which are being used about the country; we must demonstrate to their satisfaction that we have made satisfactory progress towards implementing the decisions described in subparagraph (c). Members of this House would recall and there was a lot of thumping on the Prime Minister's assurance in this House, he said, "We have the right to build up strategic reserves to these new reactors which will come up." He placed great emphasis on this. I will read it out to you. He told the House that the Americans had actually given an assurance that we will be allowed to build strategic reserves. At the time when he was saying this, the two Under Secretaries of State who were testifying before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee said, "Our negotiators were very clear that while the US would be willing to provide reasonable fuel assurances designed to counter market imperfections, fuel assurances are not a condition to any of India's commitments under the plan, including, in particular, safeguards in perpetuity." Whether the fuel is stopped or not stopped, you are bound in perpetuity. Now a formal section has been introduced, that is section 103 (b) (10) . It says, "Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements." No strategic reserves or anything like that.

The Prime Minister placed great emphasis on the fact that we have been given assurances of uninterrupted fuel supply to the reactors. The Prime Minister told Parliament that India would be placing its reactors under safeguards -- I am quoting -- "with assurances of uninterrupted fuel to reactors, together with India's right to take all corrective measure in the event fuel supplies are interrupted." He told this, I counted it, four times, not once. Even as he was doing this, the American officials were saying there that no, no, there is no condition of uninterrupted fuel supply and secondly, the safeguards will be in perpetuity. Now this section 104 (b) (2) says, "Yes, safeguards shall be in perpetuity and there are no conditions." Now I wanted to see how the Prime Minister of India has been dealt with, with what peremptoriness because with the Act, as the Members of the House know, there is a Joint Explanatory statement that has been submitted to the Congress. It says -- just see how the Prime Minister of this country is being dealt with and brushed aside -- "On March 6, 2006, the Indian Prime Minister told the Indian Parliament that the US Government had said that if a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the US would, with India, jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries, such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom, to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India. The conferees understand and expect that such assurance of supply arrangements that the US is party to will be concerned only with the disruption of supply of fuel due to market failures or similar reasons, and not due to Indian actions that are inconsistent with the 18 July commitments, such as nuclear explosive test." (Contd. by 1Y)

RG/1.15/1Y

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (contd.): That was the entire purpose of the strategic reserve; that is, if we take some steps, they will not interrupt our supplies and render our reactors hopeless. Then, they say that India's March, 2006, nuclear facilities Separation Plan stated, -- just see whether we were correct in stating that or not, whether the Government was correct or not in stating it when it came to the House -- "The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supplies over the lifetime of India's reactors." This is a solemn assurance of the Separation Plan to our House. And, they say, "The Congress has not been able to determine precisely what was said in this matter in high level U.S.-India discussion. The U.S. officials testified, however, that the United States does not intend to help India build a stockpile of nuclear fuel for the purpose of riding out any sanctions that might be imposed in response to Indian actions such as conducting another nuclear test. They endorse the Senate proposal, however, that there will be a clear U.S. policy, that any fuel reserve provided to India should be commensurate with normal operating requirements of India's safeguarded reactors." So much for the Prime Minister's strategic reserves; so much for his corrective steps; so much for his solemn assurance to our Parliament. Thirdly, we were told again and again, my dear friend, Shri Anand Sharma, was at great pains on this, "No; no; we have been assured of parity". The 18th July Statement has told us that we will have the same rights, as any other State, with advanced nuclear technology like the United States. I pointed it out then, and Dr. Alexander had emphasised, "No; no, there are two Information Circulars under which those Additional Protocols are done; namely, 153, which is for Nuclear Weapon States, and 540, which is for Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Now, this Act says specifically in Section 110 (1) that the Additional Protocol can be only under the Information Circular 540, which is applicable to Non-Nuclear Weapon States". Again, so much for assurances of parity! Not only that, there is another very important matter, and I would like the House to take this into account. I had pointed out that you are getting us into a problem in which we will not only be bound by the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, but also the additional safeguards imposed by the U.S. itself. The Prime Minister said that there is no question of India signing either a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA or an Additional Protocol of a type concluded by Non-Nuclear Weapon States which have signed the NPT -- that is finished already because we have to do it under the Information Circular 540 -- and the next aspect is that we will not accept any verification measures regarding our safeguarded nuclear facilities beyond those contained in India's Specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Therefore, there is no question of allowing the American inspectors to roam around our nuclear facilities. There was much of a thumping at that time that we had put them in place. Now, look at what they say. Section 104 B (5) (a) (iii) says, "In the event, the IAEA is unable to implement the safeguards,..." Now, this is to whose satisfaction? It is to the satisfaction of the U.S. (Continued by 1Z)

1z/1.20/ks

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (CONTD.): ...regarding the maintenance of safeguards as set forth in the Agreement regardless of whether the Agreement is terminated or suspended for any reason. That means, firstly, there will have to be something in addition to, and, secondly, those safeguards that we will have to agree to will continue to operate even if our Agreement with the IAEA is terminated or suspended for any reason whatsoever. On this, please look at what they say in their Joint Explanatory Statement. They repeat the Section, that this is what it mandates. It says that 'the assurances that there will be such fall back safeguards, if needed, are an important feature for nuclear cooperation.' They enable such safeguards to exist, more clearly, in perpetuity. Not only must you sign in perpetuity with the IAEA, but if, for some reason, you walk out of that, then, you are bound here in perpetuity, even more clearly. Then, the Prime Minister had graciously come here; he was very, very forthright; and I complimented him in the Gallery and I have complimented him in writing, for that statement. It was a very clear enunciation of where India stands. He had emphasised, I shall read it to you; he emphasised that afternoon that 'we are going to have full nuclear cooperation, full civil nuclear cooperation'. And he went on further and was specific to me about what he understood fully, and what he conveyed to the Americans. He said, "This shall be full civil nuclear cooperation", in particular, "that we would get access to", all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, ranging from "nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, to re-processing of spent fuel. "We will not agree to any dilution that would prevent us from securing the benefits of full civil nuclear cooperation, as amplified above. Only such cooperation would be in keeping with the July Joint Statement." He said this thrice. Even as he was saying this, I am very sorry to report to this House, that one of the two co-sponsors of the Bill with whom our negotiators had been briefing a lot, Senator Biden, said, "This is just a matter of pride, not of substance, and I am sure Indians will take care of that."

So, what is the result? In Section 103 B2(e) they say that far from processing spent fuel, India will not be allowed even to ship back the fuel to the US for being reprocessed, without specific Congressional approval. About our wanting that full Civil Cooperation, which the Prime Minister was so kind to spell out in this House in such specific terms, they say 'yes, we will allow it, provided the facility for which it is allowed is a multi-national facility'. That means it is not in your control. And the intent of this is clear from what is stated in the Joint Explanatory Statement. As you know, in the Statement of Objects and Reasons and in the explanatory clauses they say 'the conferees note that the Administration has already stipulated' -- to whom? -- 'to Indian negotiators that the term 'Full Civilian Nuclear Cooperation', the term used in the 18th July statement of 2005 between President Bush and the Indian Prime Minister, Singh, 'will not include enrichment or reprocessing technology'. This is consistent with what President Bush had said. President Bush had made a very important statement to the National Defence University -- I had quoted it elsewhere -- on 11th February, 2004, in which he had said that 'enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for a nation seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes', and that the only exception they had made was to Australia; they are not going to make any exception on this full business to India. So, 'full' is much less than full, contrary to what the Prime Minister had assured this House that we would accept. He had said that this was a dilution which we shall not accept. They have enacted it into law.

(Contd. by 2A)

TDB-SC/2A/1.25

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (CONTD.): So, the Prime Minister was very emphatic, and all of us applauded him, I personally applauded him for this right outside in the Gallery. He said that we have the right to conduct tests in the future and he expressed his determination to fully shield the autonomy of our nuclear programme both in research, in weapons and in civil power production. He declared, I am quoting, Sir, "There is a provision in the proposed US law," please see, "There is a provision in the proposed US law that were India to detonate a nuclear explosive device, the US will have the right to cease further cooperation". Then, he said, "Our position on this is unambiguous. The US has been intimated that reference to nuclear detonation in the India-US Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as a condition for future cooperation is not acceptable to us. We are not prepared to go beyond a unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing as indicated in the July Statement. The same is true of other intrusive non-proliferation benchmarks." It goes on. Now, Sir, just see in section 106, that is also not mandatory -- I will come to what is binding and non-binding. Section 106 of the Act says, "A determination and any waiver under 104 shall cease to be effective, if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this Act." The Joint Explanatory Statement says to this clause, it refers it and says, "The conferees intend this section to make absolutely clear a point that already follows from section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act. This title affords no waiver from Section 129 for an Indian nuclear detonation." We often take in this House the name of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Sir, you remember that in 1974, when the tests were done, she said, "It is for peaceful purposes." Now, just see what they say about these peaceful purposes? "As further clarified in the section-by-section analysis included in this report, the conferees believe that there should be no ambiguity regarding the legal and policy consequences of any future Indian tests of a nuclear explosive device. In that event, the President must terminate all export and re-export of US-origin nuclear materials, nuclear equipment and sensitive nuclear technology to India." That is the word they use always for the full cooperation of the items the Prime Minister has spelt out. "The conferees expect the President to make full and immediate use of US rights to demand," not just stop further cooperation, "to demand the return of all nuclear-related items, materials and sensitive nuclear technology that have been exported or re-exported to India, if India were to test or detonate, or otherwise cause the test or detonation of a nuclear explosive device for any reason, including such instances in which India describes its actions as being for peaceful purposes." ״ Ӭ ֤ ֟?

Sir, I want to make one thing very clear. Please make no mistake. China has come close to third-generation weapons only because of repeated testing. The US is today conducting sub-critical tests. There is absolutely no doubt that we will need tests from a few years from now for the next generation of atomic weapons. When the Prime Minister had said and we believed him, I want to believe him, I am sure, he is sincere in this matter. He told the scientists also, when he met them after the Statement here that 'I will make sure that the autonomy of Indian nuclear programme is never compromised'. Even Dr. Anil Kakodkar, the only scientist by invoking whose name this Agreement is sought to be justified, says that Section 109, which now says that India will be doing cooperative research -- with whom, with the National Nuclear Security Agency... (Contd. by 2b-kgg)

kgg/2b/1.30

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (contd.): ...this is the agency which is the overall in-charge of de-nuclearisation of Russia and all the other former Soviet Republics for this purpose---he himself says in a statement, "This is a surprise to us. We have never asked for this cooperation. We do not need it." And he said that this will be "a most dangerous intrusion." That was section 115 earlier and that is now section 109 of the Act, signed by President Bush.

I do not want to take the time of the House because I read these things last time and all of them are here in stronger words. There are nine provisions in the Act which declare that the object of the U.S. policy is to halt, roll back, and eventually eliminate India's nuclear capability in this regard.

There are provisions for reporting on every aspect of India's nuclear programme not only on what is done in the safeguarded reactors but also in the non-safeguarded reactors; they can gather whatever information they can; and they must do this about the uranium mining, how much we have taken, what use we have put to, every ounce must be accounted for. What is this? To enable people like me to write articles? Are they gathering information to enable us to write articles? It is to enforce their objectives. And when it is to be done? I was ashamed to learn that many of my own colleagues in the media swallowed this rationalisation, "No, no. India's concerns have been taken into account and annual reporting is not there."

Sir, actually the law says that the reporting shall begin within 180 days of the agreement coming into force and it will be done every year. Not only that, it now adds a new phrase, "The U.S. Administration shall not wait for the year to come. They will report fully and currently." They say, 'currently' means as soon as information becomes available you come and tell us.

Then, there are several provisions, Sir. I remember the Prime Minister's emphatic statement that we will not compromise on foreign policy. The example of Iran was taken. We all have views on whether Iran should have an atomic bomb or not; I feel it should not have, from our point of view. The Prime Minister is right on that. But to make it a part of their Act! They say, "We are giving this agreement to India this cooperation because of a congruent foreign policy."

Taking this reference to Iran, we were told that our concerns have been taken into account. Sir, there are four separate provisions saying India will fully cooperate with the U.S. objectives to ensure... (Interruptions)

Sir, even worse, there are five separate provisions to ensure that India does not go from one place to the other saying "if we ban something, if we terminate fuel supplies, then India could go elsewhere, to other Nuclear Suppliers Group; five provisions bind the U.S. Administration--'that you will tighten the working of the Nuclear Suppliers Group so that if fuel supplies are terminated to India by the U.S., no other country will give fuel, sensitive nuclear technology or materials or spares or equipment or anything'."

You say we need energy security because oil sellers have a cartel. This is a much stronger cartel.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: How much time will you take? Because the time allotted to your Party is over. I am just reminding you.

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Sir, this is one of the most vital issues.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: I know, it is important. But all the parties would like to participate.

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: I know the Prime Minister for almost 30 years. I want to propose, I assure Mr. Pranab Mukherjee also, a constructive way out of this also. I will come to that. Firstly, let me deal with the two things that have been said by the Government spokesmen; the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs is also here. They say, "You must wait for the 123 agreement." ִ clauses This is a very peculiar thing. At each step we have been told, "No, no, no, wait for the next one."

(Contd. by kls/2c)

KLS-ASC/2C/1.35

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (CONTD): At each subsequent step, we have seen that further conditions have been added. What was a three-page Bill became a 23 page Bill, has become a 41 page Bill with conditions. As I mentioned to you, by February this will be over, as Burns has disclosed. But the point is that 123 is an agreement under this Act. It cannot go against this Act. It is an agreement to operationalise that particular Act, and mind you, another Act which is a much more stringent Act, which is the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. There is absolutely no way. It an agreement consequential to this Act and the point is because the clauses are in the parent Act, it need not include them. This is the trick. If that agreement is brought here, we will see ! ִ Ù No ban on testing because it is already included in the parent Act. We do not have to include it there. If under the 123 Agreement, an export licence is given to General Electric, vesting out, their representatives are all along have met many people to educate us. Those people, all of them -- ֯ և , Ù ָ ֯ և that you will declare a date by which you will stop fissile material production ִ You will make a public declaration about PSI ֯ ֟ because it does not help, that is not the place to include it as long as those things are under the Act. They are instruments for implementing the provisions of the Act and attaining the objectives of the Act itself. And, Sir, as you have indicated I should not take more time. But I tell you that we have had experience, bitter experience about 123 Agreement. I do not know how many Members of the House remember that we have had the 123 Agreement -- Dr. Alexander remembers -- has been in operation since 1963 with the US. They had themselves stated in 2005 before this very Congressional Committee -- Joseph stated -- that we are not clear that India violated the 1963 Agreement. But absolutely, as Mr. Siddiqui says, they stopped fuel supplies to Tarapore. ߙ , ֯ ָ ִֻ֮ ֋, ׾ֻևֻ֮֠ , till agreement terminated in 1993 US ֟ פ 74 ֤ 1993 ϴ ֟ ֵ, 30 ֻ ϴ , ָ ׮ 㻴 ֮ ִԋ ֟ Sir, the next point is -- I can give you several points. There are 23 such agreements in existence with different countries. Now of them will have those clauses. But all of them are instruments of implementing a particular legislation. The legislation is absolutely clear. ֵ և؛ , an Act of a foreign legislature, how can sovereign India be bound? ׯ֔ ָ ֵ ֋օ

And I had asked, Dr. Alexander had asked whether it is not binding on the US President. He has to enter into an agreement. And unlike our thing, we do not have the power to ratify or reject the treaty. The US Senate has that power. I will tell you just now what the new thing that has been introduced since we met last time. The US Senate rejected...(Interruptions)... President Wilson was the architect of the League of Nations. President Clinton made 30 countries twisted around to sign the CTBT. The US Senate threw out the CTBT, but we said, we will not sign. So, they do not have power. Is the US President not bound? But even more pointed question that I want to ask this House and I hope the Government will reply this: Is the US Congress bound by it or not? Is the US Congress bound by its own Act or not? It is because, Sir, there is a change since we last met. Last time, you know, there was a proposal, the Administration gave a proposal to the Congress that this Agreement 123 will come into force unless the Congress passes a Resolution of disapproval within 90 days, a specific resolution of disapproval. (Contd by 2D)

SSS/2D/1.40

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (CONTD.): 'No, no, this is a trick,' they said, 'because if we pass a resolution of disapproval, the President can over-ride it with a veto. And to over-ride that veto we require a two-thirds majority which we will not be able to get, so we reject this proposal'. There are very strong strictures on this proposal of the American administration. They say, 'no, now this agreement that the US administration may sign with India will not come into force till we specifically pass a resolution of approval within 90 days'. Why are they keeping this power? It is for two purposes, firstly, to examine and review the terms and conditions of the 123 Agreement and secondly, so as not to dilute the power of the US Congress for over-sight. So, what is not binding? It is we who will not be able to bind our Government on 123 Agreement. They will ensure that the 123 Agreement becomes an instrument of attaining all the objectives which they have set up. Sir, just now as I mentioned to you, a very convenient statement has been sent to Indian correspondents in Washington and much reliance will be placed on that. It is a statement of President Bush issued in his name that Section 103, sets out an American policy. He says, 'my approval of the act does not constitute my adoption of the statement for the policy.' See, it is non-binding. Second, he says that the information that I have to supply, I will first assess whether it will damage US foreign relations or not. Now, before anybody relies on this statement, I want to make 2-3 things clear to the House. Sir, first, when you see how these things will come true, even if all this is true, and that this weakened President of the US is prepared to defy the US Congress on this matter, how are you certain that the next US President will do so? Even if you go by US President's interpretation on these matters, both on information and on this business of statement of policy, you are then bound completely and mortgaged to the US President's interpretation of the US law and, in any case as I mentioned to you, the Congress has kept with itself the right to review the terms and conditions arrived at in this Agreement. Sir, I will conclude now with one constructive suggestion on this. I believe that with its great sincerity, with its great acumen, the Government has been led step-by-step into quicksand. There was a thesis for this, which is a strategic flaw in the whole matter, and I will end with that. The reasoning has been and I could give you four such statements which exemplify this that, 'look here, we need high growth, therefore, we need energy. Nuclear energy has to supply 35,000 mega watts. We don't have enough Uranium for this. Therefore, we need imported Uranium. Therefore, we have to sign this Agreement and accept all the conditions, which are implicit there. This is the logic of this particular exercise into which we have been done. A myth has been spread. A myth, which has been taken up by our newspapers that you don't have enough Uranium. I was distressed to see a very senior official of our Government speaking to the executives of American energy companies. You will find it on the website of the Indian Embassy in Washington, 19th April, 2006 saying, 'we don't have enough Uranium. Therefore, we need your help and such bright business prospects are opening up for you.'

(Contd. by 2E)

-SSS/NBR-AKG/2E/1.45

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (CONTD.): Now, Sir, the fact of the matter is, it is true that if we mine and mill only the amount of Uranium which we are doing, we are starved. But, in fact, one of the authors of this Agreement, one of the architects of this Agreement, whom many senior people have met and, certainly, the officials sitting in the gallery have closely been interacting with, is Ashley Tellis. He is now a very important figure in the American security thinking and was one of the main two architects who originated the idea of this particular Agreement. There is a very interesting report of his which, I am sure, the Government would like to access from their website 'mailonline.' It is a report called 'Atoms for War?' He discloses in that, contrary to what is being assumed in India, actually, India has more than enough Uranium reserves. Quoting from the Department of Atomic Energy and the ONCD studies, he said that there are 78,000 tonnes of known reserves. He calculates this as to how much would be required for all the existing reactors, how much would be required for the 8 that are being kept out for military purposes and how much would be required for the 2 research reactors for weapons production. And, from all this, apart from our energy needs, we have enough Uranium for 2023 to 2028 nuclear weapons. He says that the shortage of Uranium, today, in India, I am quoting him, is 'a temporary aberration.' This is occurring solely because Indians have not been able solve their land acquisition problems. It is because it is in tribal lands. We are not able to get over our courts and our activists protests. Wherever there is Uranium mining, activists come. How they come? I don't know. They come, agitation starts and the courts give a stay and we are not able to solve it. Sir, it will be so idiotic for us to mortgage the country's security. And, I am sure, the hon. Prime Minister would not want to do this just because we cannot solve our land acquisition problem. So, Sir, my proposal is this. I will just enumerate it and finish it.

The first one is that please do not depend on nuclear energy. Don't look at it for electricity. That is the flaw. At present, we have Uranium mining and milling. Use it primarily for our weapons programme.

The second one is, look to other clean sources of energy, specially, hydro electric power. When I had the good fortune to work in the North-East, I remember -- many Members here from the North-East will remember -- Dihang-Subhansiri project is a single project to be executed in five or six phases. The hon. Prime Minister is representing the North-East. He knows that this single project has a capacity for 22,000 MW. The first phase is being implemented today by the NHPC with a capacity of 2,000 M.W. This can be compared with our large reactors of atomic energy which are 500 M.W. Four times in just one small project! Then, Sir, in this Dibang project, I remember -- the hon. Prime Minister knows this because he has followed this up -- it is languishing for fifteen years before the Brahmaputra Board. That was a defunct Board; a Board in a comatose. We worked to get it out of that Board. And, in any case, in the Charter of the Board there is no provision for raising money for such projects. We got it out and gave it to the NHPC. With the Government's blessing, direction and encouragement the NHPC today is implementing that project. What is the capacity of that? Sir, it is 3,800 M.W. ֯ 35,000 ־֙ , ׻֋ atomic energy , ׻֋ imported uranium , ׻֋ agreement , ׻֋ conditions . So, that is my second proposal.

The third proposal is to intensify Uranium mining and milling. As I said, we have enough Uranium reserves in the country.

Sir, I have just two points with one quotation and I have done. We must spur the Department of Atomic Energy. The Atomic Energy Agency to be more focussed and it should be more accountable.

(CONTD. BY "2F")

USY/HMS/1.50/2F

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (CONTD.): If peer reviews are required, they should be instituted. I compliment the Government that they have started such a peer review under Dr. Kasturirangan in the Kalpakkam Project. Do that, spur them to do more. I am all with you for that. But do not foreclose your options the way you are doing.

Fifth, we must redouble research on the breeder programme. There is a problem. This has to be done. We keep hearing of the second breeder coming up. But there is a technical problem. I won't take much of your time. We must do much more research devoted to that. Resources! ߕ և , ֟ ֮ ? India will be spending 15 to 20 billion dollars. (Interruptions) ױָ That means we will be spending 75,000 to 1,00,000 crores of rupees on imported reactors. Imagine if you give that. (Interruptions) For hydroelectric, if you did it for research, if you did it to spur the Department of Atomic Energy to a higher growth, what would be the theme? Similarly, we keep hearing about thorium. Dr. Mukherjee, the other day, also mentioned about thorium. We don't know, my own good friend said that it is thirty years away, fifty years away. Thirty years ֟ֆ ֟ֆ ֯ 10 ֻ expedite ׻֋ ?

Sir, my final conclusion is that please remember the American Strategy. I am for good American relations; I am for good relations with everybody. But please remember their strategy. And, I will quote to you, and end with that one sentence. You see, during the hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senators asked Burns and Jojeph, "But why did you not include this in your proposing". They said, "No; no, Sirs, please focus on the gains which have already been achieved. India has four reactors under inspection, under safeguards, now, they are preparing to give two-thirds of their reactors". That means fourteen reactors. And, do you know how much is 'fourteen'? Do you know how many reactors have all the five nuclear weapon States, who have 237 reactors, under safeguards? Only eleven! So, in one go, we have given more than all the five countries -- the US, the UK, France, China and Germany. In that case, they said, "No, this is this". And please remember, they have said, "All future reactors." That means, within a few years, ninety per cent of the reactors would be under safeguards. This is the game. They further said, "Therefore, please focus on the significant gains." And, then, they advised them, this is the sentence with which I want to close and caution the Government as they deal and negotiate with the Americans, "We believe the best course is to lock in the significant gains reached, and, then, seek to achieve further non-proliferation results, as our strategic partnership advances." ׻֋ ֯ ׾ִ֮ ׸ ֤ և ֟-ִ֮ ֟-׮ֳԸ ß ֮և ӌ (ִ֯)

ק (ָ Ϥ) : ָ, ֯ ׸ Ϭ֮ ӡ ָ ֯ ׾ֵ ָ ָ ֟ ״ֻ ֮֟ Ϭ֮ ӡ concerns , ֈ ֤ ֮֟ Ϭ֮ ӡ ֟ ָ ß ֵ֮ , ß ֮֮ ֟ ָ ֟ ß ֻ֟ , ß ָ ֤ ֮ ֻ , ß ׯ ֋ ß ָ ֻ֟ ֋, ֻ֟ ԅ ָ, ֛ ׮ֿ֮ ׾ Ϭ֮ ӡ

(2 /ߋ־ ָ ֿ:)

VP/PSV/1.55/2G

ק (֟) : ָ, ֱ߻ -ָ ֟ ָ ֮ ֻ ֯ ִ֮ -ָ ֟ ֮ , ו֮ ָ ֟ ԅ ׮ֵ֤ ֟ ָ-ָ ֟ߕ ׮֟, ָָ ָ פ ֟ , ״֮ , וֻ ָ ֋, ֯ ׿ֵ֟ , ֯ ָ ׿ֵ֟ ֋, ֻ ֛־ ָ ֮ ו֋ ֟ ָ-ָ ֟ ߮ ֟ ֋߅ 54 123  , 123 ϴ ֻ , ϴ we will meet all the concerns. ָ, ו֋ ֤ ִָ֤ ָ , ָ ֮Ӥ ִ ߅ ו֮֟ ִ ֵ , Hyde Act ֜ There is nothing hidden in the Hyde Act. ߕ ï™ , ֱ 123 ϴ ָ ֯ ֣ ו֋, ֱ ֟ manoeuvrability ׻֋ ï ָ֕ ֟օ ֯ ׸ Ѭ פ , פ ֵ , Hyde Act., ִ ֯ ӕև ֤ ָ ֯ illusion , delusion ֯ և ״׮Ù ֈ ״֙ , ״֙ ߙ , , ִ ֟ ֯ ָ ״֙ ֈ ָ-ָ , ֲ ֯ ֮֟ ֯֠ ״֙

( ֳ֯ן ߚ߮ )

ߙ ֋ ׻֋ argument , 123 ϴ , ִ ֯ ֮ ߙ և ״׮Ù ״֙ , ֋ Nobody is going to buy that argument. ו֮ - ֜ , ֮֟ ִ־ ׻֋ ָ , ֯ ָ ׸ ֈ ִֻ ֱ ™ߵ , ӟָ™ߵ , ֮ ֻ 100-200 ֻ ֛ , ֛ , ָ ׾µ , ָ ֻ֟ ߮ ֋, ֟ ֻ ֻ ׻֋ ָ ֮ ו֋ - ֲ ל, ֯ ו֮֟ ֟ ֛ ָ ֣ ֵ֤ legal terms detail ֟ ָ כ ֵ֤ ֮ ß ֕ ߕ instant , ָ instant reaction reaction depth օ ׻֋ ָ, , ׸Ù , ֈ ִ֣Ԯ ϴ ֯ , ϴ ָ և , ֯ ֮֟ ֲ ϴ , ֲ ϴ ֈ ֯ ֋ ֈ ϴ ֮֯ , is it in accordance with the Hyde Act? ׻״֙ ֮֋ , rigid and iron framework ֵ֮ , framework ϴ , ָ ָ- , ִ֟ ֮֮ ֻ ֯ ֋օ ֈ , ָ ֯ ׾֮֟ ߻ , ϴ , ֈ և, ٻִֵ և ٻִֵ ֟ ϴ , ϴ in accordance , Ϭ֮ ӡ ֤ , ״֙ , ײ Ӆ ֮֟ ָ constitutional position , ָ executive legislature ָ֮ ׻֋ ֮ ֯ , ׾ Ϭ֮ ӡ ֕ ״֙ ϴ ָ ִ ֤ ϴ ָ և օ ָ ָ և ֵ ֤ ָ ֈ ֋, ױ ָ ֋ꅠ ֯ international obligations ֮ ֻ ָָ, Ѭ ֋ (2/000 ָ ֿ:)

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