PREVIOUS PAGE

-USY/VP/4.00/3N

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (CONTD.): You show me a person who can read from the July 18 Agreement that we will agree to close this Cyrus Reactor when we do not have another reactor to produce that same kind of thing. So, all sorts of things are being read into it. But what is said on the face of it? It said, "President Bush affirmed that as a responsible State with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other States." And what did Prime Minister pledge India to? He said, "India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibility and practices, and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology such as the United States." Now, Sir, as you see, Shri Yashwant Sinhaji was reminding us, immediately after this, within two days, the Prime Minister's Office issued a background. We are from the Press, so, we get the background. In five places that background said that we will acquire the same status and the safeguards as a nuclear weapons state. A principal negotiator on behalf of India, he said that our objective is to be recognised as a nuclear weapon state and the quotation is, "Nothing more, and nothing less". Now, I will come to that. Today also Shri Anand Sharma said that great play was made of the fact that safeguards will be India-specific. I will tell you whether that condition is seen at all in this case.

Secondly, we were told all along that this is an agreement about energy and that under no circumstances, does the Agreement bind India to capping the nuclear weapons programme. I will read out only one sentence from the Prime Minister's reply in the Lok Sabha on the 10th March this year. He was mentioning this. "We have not compromised our autonomy with regard to our strategic programme. We have not agreed to any formula or any proposal which would amount to a cap on our nuclear programme. I have taken full care about it. We have made sure that we have taken care of India's present requirements and future requirements as far as possible humanly. We have not accepted a cap on the nuclear programme. There is no question of India accepting a cap on our deterrent potential." This is the understanding of the Prime Minister. Now, we just see what is the understanding of the U.S. on this. Not only understanding verbally, what is it that they have legislated by which the U.S. Executive will be bound. Now, Sir, section 2(5) of the Bill which has been passed says that the objective is to bring within the ambit of the NPT discipline countries that have not signed up. Just now, Shri Digvijay Singh was also reading out what Dr. Condoleezza Rice told the U.S. House in this. She said, " India is not, and is not going to become a Member of the NPT as a nuclear weapon state. We are simply seeking to address an untenable situation." What is that situation? India has never been a party to the NPT and this Agreement does bring India into the non-proliferation framework and thus strengthen the regime. This is their declared objective. Then, Sir, you see section 2(6)(c) of the Bill. It says that the Agreement, which both the President and the Prime Minister have signed, induces the country to refrain from actions that would further the development of its nuclear weapons programme. Section 3(b) (5) states that the policy of the U.S. in pursuing this deal is to seek, to halt the increase of nuclear weapons arsenals in South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination. And we are told this is about energy! Even Dr. Kasturirangan just now said that this FMCT is a multilateral agreement for which we have to wait. He gave us his sage advice that we have ten years interval. They are saying in their legislation, in section 3(b)(7) that the U.S. aim shall be to encourage India not to increase its production of fissile material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities pending implementation of a multilateral moratorium. (Contd. By PK/3O)

PK/3O/4.05

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (CONTD.): So, even before that moratorium comes into being, the US has clearly stated its aim. Section 3 (a) (i) specifies: "That the United States through the agreement and other devices will oppose the development of a capability...... . ..(Interruptions).. to produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon State within or outside the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons." In fact, the Bills of the Senate and of the House go even further, "we are thinking only on the US." Dr. Kasturirangan was telling us about the time we have on multilateral things, but see what they are saying. Section 3 (a)(iii) of the Bill says:- " The United States Executive will work to strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines concerning consultation by Members of violations by any country of this particular agreement, and by instituting the practice of a timely and coordinated response by NSG Members to all such violations, including the termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient that discourages individual NSG Members from continuing cooperation to such recipient in any form whatsoever." So, it is not just that they are going to do it, but they are going to make sure that the entire Nuclear Suppliers Group will act as one to discipline the country, so that their objectives are going to be furthered. In section 4 (2) (d) (iv), it says, "If nuclear transfers to India are restricted pursuant to this act, the President should seek to prevent the transfer to India of nuclear equipment materials or technology from other participating Governments in the NSG from any other source." So, they are saying that we are going to discipline you. We have a clear objective. We are going to ensure that, and we are going to make sure that the entire cartel of 45 countries will do this. My friend, Anand, was talking of nuclear apartheid. This is the foundation for the nuclear apartheid that will be created, and now, I will come to you with the conditions which they will say...(Interruptions)..

SHRI ANAND SHARMA: Would you please yield for a minute, please?

You are actually misleading. ..(Interruptions)..Will you yield for a minute? You are reading something which is not material at all. ..(Interruptions)..

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Please, just one second, Sir...(Interruptions)..

SHRI ANAND SHARMA: We made it very clear what matters to us within the agreement.

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Right, Sir.

SHRI ANAND SHARMA: And, this does not apply to us...(Interruptions)..

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: We will see that...(Interruptions)...

SHRI ANAND SHARMA: Don't try to mislead..(Interruptions)

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: That is right. As Mr. Yashwant Sinha said, as nothing applies to some people; the other people are passing their laws. This certainly applies to the US President who is signing the agreement with the Indian Prime Minister...(Interruptions).. Not only that, Dr. Kasturirangan was saying that, yes, we will negotiate an FMC Treaty. But as he knows, the US has already put in a draft in May in the Geneva Conference, and it does not have what you were saying, what others have always been emphasizing, which has been the consistent stand, as Mr. Natwar singh will bear out of Indian Governments for 20 years that unless there is a universal credible verification mechanism, we will not proceed. Not a word of that clause is in the draft Treaty and they have put in a clause saying that this will come into force the moment the P-5 have signed it. And, not only that, Sir, in the Bill, in section 4 (c) (2) (d), it says: "That the US has taken and will take steps to encourage India, to identify and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons unilaterally." Now, we are not to wait for anybody; they are not waiting for anybody. They are saying, actually, pending that Treaty, you have to declare a date unilaterally. (Contd. by 3P/PB)

PB/3p/4.10

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (CONTD.): The US President is certainly bound to work on these guidelines, on these mandatory laws. Sir, the Senate Bill is the ultimate Bill. The Senate has the power to ratify or reject treaties or agreements which the US President sign, unlike us. That Bill says in Section 103 (1) that it shall be policy of the United Sates -- the US will do what will it do vis-a-vis India -- to achieve as quickly as possible a cessation of the production by India and Pakistan of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and any other nuclear explosive devices. Section 103(9) says that "exports of nuclear fuel to India should not contribute to, or, in any way, encourage, increases in the production by India of fissile material for non-civilian purposes." This is a very important clause because they say that 'you have to do it consistently with the obligations of the US under article 1 of the NPT. Many of us would not know that article 1 of the of the NPT says that that country will not do anything which will directly or indirectly help the other non-nuclear weapon States to acquire nuclear weapons. Therefore, in some of the briefings, it was suggested ... ...(Time-bell) Sir, I will just take a few things.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Please conclude because I have to regulate the time.

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Sir, I am only confining myself to this Bill.

MR. DEPUTY CHIARMAN: I have to regulate the time.

SHRI C. RAMACHANDRAIAH: Sir, we can sit for one more hour.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: That is all right. But since the time is fixed for it, we have to regulate the time also. Please try to confine to the time.

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: I am requesting some more time from you only because ... ...(Interruptions)...

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: I have given you the maximum time. You have already taken extra time.

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Sir, article 1 of the NPT says, "Neither directly nor indirectly." Now, they export uranium to us. It was suggested and implied to many persons here, -- 'no; no; we have a lot of uranium. So, when they give us some uranium, we can use our own uranium to produce nuclear weapons.' This is what is meant to stop, that you cannot directly or indirectly do this in any way. In fact, India and Pakistan must be disclosing, securing, capping and reducing their fissile material stockpiles, and this will be done 'pending creation of a world-wide fissile material cut-off regime. Now, Sir, these are just very few of the clauses. I can give you many such examples in which this is put out. It is made mandatory for the US President to work for these things. We are told to be 'macabres; no; no; keep waiting, something might turn up. We can't be made a nation of macabres, ...(Interruptions)... end products. The end products will be macabre. We are waiting. Something will turn up.

The second point, Sir, is this. Sir, my friend Anand read about the voluntary moratorium; a moratorium with the tests at that time. Moratorium means a temporarily suspension and it was voluntary. Now, just see, Sir, what Condoleezza Rice says. The Senate clause says, -- she told the House Congressional Committee -- we have been very clear with the Indians that the permanence of the safeguards is the permanence of the safeguards, without condition.' As you know, credible minimum deterrent, which was talked of, is a function, not that 'I will acquire thirty pounds and keep thirty pounds in that credit.' To be credible, the deterrent has to be pegged to what your potential adversary might have. It is a changing capability and the sophistication is not just a number; it is a sophistication of your weapons. Now, Sir, that was the point. Look here. I am just giving you an example of China. The China has acquired x, y, and z capability, and, therefore, we must now test or do something else or increase our fissile material production. Condoleezza Rice says, "No; we have been clear; we have been very clear with the Indians that the permanence of the safeguards is the permanence of the safeguards, without condition; China or no China; sophistication of weapons or no sophistication of weapons.' It is said, "In fact, we reserve the right, should India test, as it has agreed not to do, or should India in any way violate the IAEA safeguard agreement -- to which I will just come -- to which it would be adhering that the deal from our point of view would be at that point be off."

(Contd. by 3q/SKC)

3q/4.15/skc

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (CONTD.): This is not Condaleeza Rice!

Now, Section 110 of the Senate Bill clearly says that any waiver under Section 104, which you were talking of, saying that President is going to get that waiver, shall cease to be effective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the enactment of this Act. So, where is the option that is left with us? And, as I told you, it is more onerous than the ....

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Please, conclude.

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Sir, I shall make only one more point and then finish. There are several points to be made but I would only take up one point.

Sir, there is no option; options are being closed. A cartel is being set up to make sure that India will not budge an inch, not only vis-a-viz the US, but once the US determines, all the 45 countries will have to ensure it as well. And please, remember, China is one of those. Anybody trying to give a favourable interpretation to anything India does would be subject to China's veto. Why? That is because the US Bill requires of the President that he must in the NSG proceed by a consensus. That is the word that they have used. So, consensus will mean that everybody there will get a veto. And you know how this world is! We keep talking of energy security. Everybody is aware of the fact that not only have the prices of Uranium gone up by 300 per cent in two years, but it is also controlled by a much stronger cartel than oil. Governments interfere with it. You may look at Australia. Australia is selling Uranium to China, but it has refused to sell it to India because it is part of an arrangement. So, that arrangement is being perfected through this legislation. And not only is the US President going to be bound by it, but the important point is, you keep hoping that the US Administration will do something, but please read the statements of the US Administration after the Bill was passed by the House. They said it is a tremendous step forward. They did not object to any clause in the Agreement.

Now, Sir, I come to this point that was made much of and has been made much of in the earlier statements also, that these safeguards will be India-specific. Sir, it is a fantasy. The Senate Bill says in Clause 113 that the agreement that India will have to enter into with the IAEA will be in accordance with the standards, principles, policies and practices of the IAEA as set out in the Information Circular 540. That Circular 540 applied only to non-nuclear weapon States. There is no option. And it is probably not seen that the model agreement -- some people might be innocent of these matters and they may access it from the Internet -- itself says that such protocols shall contain all the measures of this model protocol. There is no option! Where is the option of India-specific things? It can only be... (time bell).. Two minutes, Sir.

The impression that was given was that we would have some protocol with the IAEA, which will be minus the model protocol. Actually, it will have to be that model protocol plus some further agreements, because we would have bound ourselves in this way and the nuclear weapon states. I would only read one item to you, Sir.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: You have already taken a lot of time.

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Sir, I shall take only a little more time.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: You may take it, but I will not be able to control the time. If each individual Member takes his own time, it would be very difficult for me. You must understand. You must understand the position of the Chair. If every Member wants to speak earlier, every Member wants to go out of his turn, it would not be possible to do it.

SHRI S.S. AHLUWALIA: Sir, we don't want to speak earlier, we only wish to contribute.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Definitely everybody wants to contribute. But then, why do you fix the time limit?

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Sir, I shall give you an example. We have already placed two-thirds of our reactors under these safeguards. The Bush Administration has said that as all new reactors are going to be under safeguards, soon, India will be placing 90 per cent of its reactors under safeguards. (Contd. by 3r)

HK-MP/3r/4.20

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE (CONTD.): Do you know what the position is with the other countries? Sir, there are 217 nuclear reactors in these P-5. Of them, only 11 are under safeguards. In the US, there are 104 nuclear reactors and only five are under safeguards and the protocol applicable to the US says that it shall be a voluntary offer agreement, and in this, those measures will be incorporated which the Nuclear Weapons State has identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency of the NPT. It is left up to them. The protocol says, "The Agency, that is, IAEA shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibility." Information pertaining to the facilities of only those five out of 104 shall be the minimum necessary. All these things will need not be examined on the plans and designs, which we will have to submit to them in Vienna. They say that these will be examined only on the premises of those facilities; we will not take them out. Clause 33 specifically says, and I will end only with that single example so as not to tax you, that the agreement should provide that safeguards shall not apply thereunder to material in mining or ore processing activities. You contrast this, and I am ending with that. You contrast this and I am ending with that. There is one contrast. Section 4(o)(2)(B) of the Senate Bill says that the US President shall get from India (1) an estimate for the previous year of the amount of Uranium mined in India; (2) the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices; (3) the rate of production of (i) the fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; (ii) nuclear explosive devices; and (iii) an analyses as to whether imported uranium has affected such rate of production, etc. ֯ uranium ores ָ - specific prohibition ! ָ ָ , , - ֈ , ֵ? ֮֯ פ? So, this India-specific myth is a complete fantasy. I don't want to use a strong word like 'fabrication'. It is a hope that the US law by which the US President appears to be bound, we are not bound too. The IAEA protocol itself leaves no option about this fanciful negotiation position that we may think of. Sir, there are many other points about energy security, about full cooperation. Shri Sitaram Yechury made a very good point on how the Bill in both the Houses prohibit on heavy water or on enrichment and even on the use of nuclear waste. You know that in Tarapore a huge problem has arisen due to nuclear waste and yet we have not been allowed to process it and the US has not exercised the option of taking it back. (Time-bell).

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Shri Raashid Alvi. ..(Interruptions)..

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Therefore, for all these reasons, Sir, I feel that this particular agreement might have been well intentioned, but we have been involved in a pincer in the energy field.. ...(Interruptions)..

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Please conclude. ..(Interruptions)..

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: Last point, Sir.

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: I have called the next speaker.

SHRI ARUN SHOURIE: In the energy field, we are going to be just closed in into dependence on imported reactors and imported fuel and, secondly, on the security field, we are going to become dependent on a nuclear umbrella of the US even to survive within our own region. It is not a good agreement and I would sincerely appeal to the Prime Minister, who, I know, has the interest of the country at heart, to please reconsider this issue, and as your friend and as a person who has known you for 30 years, I will plead with you and with the Government, please do not make this particular agreement a matter of personal prestige at all. Thank you. (Followed by 3s/KSK)

ASC-KSK/4.25/3s

׿֤ (֮ Ϥ) : ֳ֯ן , , ו ָ ֲ ֟ , ֲ ֟ ß֮ ׻ ׮ֵ Ӥ ׯ׿֋ ֵ ׮ֵ Ӥ ׻ ֣ ֛ , ו֮ ׻ ֕ͻ ִ ֟ , ָ ׻ Ӥ ֮ Ù ָ Ù ׯϵ׸ ֤֕ ׯ֔ 60 ֻ Ӥ ׮ֵ ֵ֟ Ӥ ֮ ֿ֕ ֋, 74 ָ ֤ 98 ָ ֤, ֮ ָ ֮ ָ ָ , ָ׮ֵ ָ ֻ ֋ ֵ֤ , ו֮ ָ ֤ ׿ֵ ָ ֤ ߅ ֕ ָ ֲ ו ֛ ֟ , 1978 ָ ָ ׸ ֛ ָ, ֮ ׻֋ ߛ׿֯ ֺ , أ ו ևי , ߛ ֮ ߛ, ֮ ֻ ֻ , ߛ ֮ ֻ ׮ֵ ֻ֟ ָ ֻ օ ß֮ Ϭ֮ ӡ . ִ֮ ևי ׻֋ ׻֋ ָ֤ ָ, 19 և ߴ , և֮ Ӥ ֻ ֋, ָ ׸ , ָ ׸ ִ ָ, ֮ ׻֋ ֲ ֛ ֺ ֕ ָ ֻ ׸־ , 22 years ׻֋ ו֮֟ ̴ֿ֮ , ָ ßֻ ֻ 6 ֻ Ӥ ֟ ֋օ ָ ֵ ֕ ֻ֮ ֕ ֱ ֮ ֻ 80 ֻ ׻֋ ָ ָ֟ Ù ׻ִֵ ָ֮ և ֻֿ ָ ߲-߲ ֟ ߅ ֻ֟ Ӥ ָָ ֮ ֮ ßײֻ ֮ ? כ , Ӥ ֕ , ֲ ָ ִԻ ־ָ ֙ ֱ 19 ָ ָ, և Ù ֣ 19 և ߴ , ײ 19 ָ ִԻ ־ָ ֙ , 2014 65 ָ ֋߅ ٻִֵ Ӥ ֮ ָ ߴ ָ , ֵ֤ ߮ ָ ָ և ״׮Ù ٻִֵ Ӥ ֈ Ӥ և Ù Ӥ ֵ֮ ֟ , ֺ ٻִֵ Ӥ ֕ ֺ ָ ٻִֵ Ӥ ֋? ָ, 26 և ָ և ״׮Ù ֈ Ӥ פ, We have made very straight representation to the US Government. Let the process be completed. և Ù Ӥ ֻߙ , ߮ Ӥ (3T/NB ָ ָ)

GSP/NB/3T/4.30

׿֤ (֟) : House of Representatives Ӥ ֲ ֮֟ ָ ֮ ֮ , ֮ ָ֟ ֱֻ , ֮ ֛ ֤֤ Ӥ, House of Representatives Ӥ Foreign Committees Ӥ , ߮ Ӥ , ֤ ָ signatures , ֤ ָ ֟ , 19 և agreement ֱֻ , ֲ ָ ָ֕ և ״׮Ù 26 և ֈ - I spoke to the President Bush himself. Now, I have an assurance that the US administration will do all it can to see that the parameters, the goal posts of July 18, are not tampered with. ֤ ӕև ֟ ? ָ-ָ ֟ և ״׮Ù ֋ ߮ פ֋Ӆ Ù ֤ և ״׮Ù ֤֮߮ ? ֟ ָ ָ ֤ ָ , ֮ և ״׮Ù ָ ָ ֟ ָָ Sense of House ֮֮ ָ ֵ ִֻ , ֮֮ ִֻ Sense of House ֮ ֵօ כ ֟ ? ֮֮ ִֻ ָև כ ֟ - ָָ ֟ sense ֈ Ӥ ֮ , ֮ Resolution ֵ, ֮ Resolution ֈ Ӥ ? ֟

ָ ֣ ָ ׸ , ֕ ׮ֵ ֵ֟ ֤ , ׮ֵ Ӥ , ־ָ Foreign Policy ֌ ֣-֣ ֤֟ , ־֕ ָ ֣ ָ ׸ , ָ ֣ ֮ agreement , ־֕ ׮ֵ ֮ ̸և , ֮֮ ֣ ֛ ָ Foreign Policy ָ ֛օ

ֳ֯ן , ָ ָ ָ֕֟ ֋, ָ ֟ և, ָ Strategic Programme ָ ֵ, ָ ֮ ָ ֵ, ָ ֵ India's fissile material production ֲӤ ֋߅ ו֮ ָ֕֟ , ֿ־ӟ ֮ Foreign Minister , Annual Report 1999-2000 ֱ ֜ ִֵ NDA ָָ ߅ Annual Report 1999-2000 official document , וִ ֵ ָ ֣ ָ ֟֓ߟ , ִ ߕ ָ ֟ , ֜ , ִ ֵ - These issues are CTBT, the FMCT, Export Control and other things. The talks are being conducted on the basis of comprehensive proposals that India has put forward. Sir, ֣-֣ Strobe Talbott ֮ ֲ Ӥ ׻ CTBT ָ , ־֮ ֻ ֋, ׻ , "Jaswant said that India would sign the CTBT by the end of May." ֿ־ӟ ֮ , , 1999 CTBT ָ և ֟ ָָ , ־֮ օ ױ ֯ ֜ ֟ "Jaswant said that India would sign the CTBT by the end of May. If this were actually to happen, it would be a significant development, but it would still leave a ratification of the treaty for the indefinite future. When I pointed out, Jaswant assured me that under the Indian system, signature was tantamount to ratification which he called 'a mere formality'."

(Contd. by 3U-sk)

AKG-SK/3U/4.35

׿֤ (֟) : ֕ ֯ ֈ ֟ ֯ ֈ , ֮ ֲ ֜ ֟ ֕ ֯ ߴ ָ ֮ ׸ ֣ פօ ֯ fissile material ֟ ... (־֮֬) ...

. ֺ : ־֮ ֲ ֲ ֲ ?

׿֤ : ־֮ ֲ , ֯ ֜ . ֺ : ֲ ֲ

׿֤ : х , "The second adjustment in the Indian position was a statement that they might join the long sought illusive moratorium on the production of the fissile material." -- ־֮ , ֻ ֋ fissile material ָ -- "But only on the condition that the other six countries, P-5 and Pakistan, they both sign." ָ և , և ꅠ ָ ֕ ֯ ֻ ֮ ִ ? 19 և ߴ , ß֮ ߴ օ ֛ ֲ ß֮ ֋, ָ ß֮ ָָ ߴ, ß֮ ֣ , ־֮Դ ß֮ ֣ ֋ ߴ appreciate , ָ և Ù ֣ ִ ֟

և ֌ Ϭ֮ ӡ ײָ ֕֯ ïߓ ֮֮ ִ ֵ , ֻ ֯ ֟ , "We conveyed our willingness to move towards a de jure formalisation of the obligation. In announcing a moratorium, India has already accepted the basic obligation of the CTBT." -- ֯ ӕ -- "We are prepared to bring this discussion to a successful conclusion so that the anti force of the CTBT is not delayed beyond September 1999." ֮֯ ִָ֟ 1999 ֮֯ פ ߙ߲ߙ ָ ݮָ ׻֋ ָ

ָ, ֕ ײֻ 19 և ߴ , anti-national ִ ָָ פ ָ, և ״׮Ù specific ָ ֈ ָ , 7 ֓ և ״׮Ù ٻִֵ ïߓ , "We will not accept any proviso that goes beyond the parameters of July 19, 2005 Statement and the Separation Plan agreed between India and the USA on March 2."

ָ, ֵ ָ ׌ֵָ Ù օ 19 և ߴ ָ ָ ֻ֟ , ׮ֵ ָ ֻ֟ ָ ֺ Ù , ֺ ֛ ֋, כ Ù , even, according to the agreement of 19th July. և Ù nuclear fuel supply , ֮ ֻ֟ , ׮ֵ ֻ֟ , ָ ֛ , ׻֋ ֲ֕ ֤--֤ և Ù ߴ , fuel , ֮ ֣-֣ ևԋԋ ֣ ׻֋ negotiate ָ և Ù fuel supply ֮ , third countries, ָ countries fuel ָ ߅ It is not an ordinary thing.

ָ, ָ ֓ և Ը֮ cause ָ ִ ָ ָ ֮ ֙ , Ը֮ ֮ interest issues ָ Ը֮ ָ ֣ פօ (3 ָ ֿ:)

-SK/YSR-HMS/4.40/3W

׿֤ (֟) : ֺ և Ӥ Ը֮ ֱֻ ״֮֙ ׻֋ ָ ߴ ָ֕֕ פ ֋ ֻ ׻ֵ ֋ ׸ ֣ ָ ߴ , ֈ ֈ Ը֮ ״/׌ֆ ־ָ ֮ ֋? Ը֮ ֛ ֮ ֋? ß֮, ו ևיÙ Ը֮ ִִ ִԻ פ, ß֮ Ը֮ ֣ ״ֻ ֋ Ը֮ ֛ ֮ ֋?

DR. FAROOQ ABDULLAH: Sir, I would like to inform the hon. Member that in Geneva when Pakistan was going to bring a Resolution against India, the country that supported us -- because I was also there -- was Iran. It was Iran at that time that supported us. I would like to inform him. Mr. Rao was the Prime Minister. At that time, it was only because Iran told Pakistan that it was not going to support Pakistan, Pakistan withdrew that Resolution. It wanted a face-saving, on which India made a statement then and there, and Pakistan withdrew that Resolution. Iran has supported us even being an Islamic country next to Pakistan. It has supported us. That should be corrected.

׿֤ : ֺ ֟ Ը֮ ָ ֣ פ Ը֮ ָ ֱֻ և Ӥ ֮ և ֯ ֿ߸ ָ Ը֮ ָ ֱֻ ...(־֮֬)...

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: I will not allow. (Interruptions) That is his point of view. (Interruptions)

0 ֺ : ֮ ֲ convention , ׮ֵ 10-12 ֻ ֤ , ָ ׸ ָ ֮ և ָ ֲ֤ß օ ֮ և כ օ ֛ ß׮ֵ ִ , օ They cannot defend themselves. ֲ֮ և ״׮Ù ֋ כ ? ...(־֮֬)...

ֳ֯ן : ֯ ֮ ֟ ו֋ You address me..(Interruptions)

׿֤ : ָ, Ը֮ ָ ֮ ß , ֟ ָ , ֟ ִ֮ ׿ֿ ו֋ Ը֮ ֮ әÙ ֵ׸ , ß֮ ֮ әÙ ֵ׸ ָ ֌ , Ը֮ ָ ֣ ֵօ ָ ֌ Ը֮ ֣ ֋, ֲֻ֟ ֕ Ը֮ ֱֻ ָ ־ ִ Ը֮ ָ nuclear ambitions ֯ ֳ Ը֮ ָ ֮ ß , ֯ Ը֮ ׌ֆ ֮ ֋? ֯ ׸ ו֋, ׸ ֣ ָ ׸ , , ָ֕֕ ֟ ֮ ׿ֿ ו֋ ß֮ ׻֋, ß֮ ִֻ֟ ׻֋ ٻִֵ ֋ ...(־֮֬)... ß֮ ֱֻ ...(־֮֬)...

ק : ׌ֆ ߻ ֻ ?

شری شاہدصدیقی : اسکانیوکلئیرڈیلسےکیاتعلقہے؟

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: It is his opinion. (Interruptions) No. It is his opinion. (Interruptions) You give your opinion. (Interruptions) He is giving his opinion. Why are you objecting? (Interruptions) ֯ ׻֋, opinion , ? What can the Chair do?

׿֤ : ָ, ß֮ ֱ ָ פ - ָ ֟Ӳָ ׯ֔ ֻ ָ ָ ֻօ ׯ֔ ָ ֲ Ը֮ פ 22 Ը֮ ֱֻ ֵ֤ ֵ֟ օ ֻ ֲ פ 27 ֱֻ 3 ֵ֟ ָ, ו֮ ֱֻ , ִ ו֯ ״ֻ , ו֮ ֱֻ ִ֮ ״ֻ օ

(3 /ߋ־ ָ ֿ:)

HMS/PSV-VKK/3X/4.45

׿֤ (֟) : ו֮ ֱֻ , ִ ӛ׿ֵ ״ֻ , ו֮ ֱֻ , ִ ֕߻ ״ֻ օ ִִ әߕ ִ ß֮ օ ֮ ֟ ָ-ָ ֟ , ß֮ әÙ ָ Ù ֵ׸

ֲ 000 ָָ , ִֻ ֤ , ֌ ָָ ֮ ׻֋ ָ ߅ ֿ־ӟ ֮ Ù ֜ , וִ " ֮ ֻ ", ֲֻ֟ ӛ ֛֮ օ ֌ ׮ֵ Ӭ 4 דֽ ׻ ָ ֯ ִ , ֱֻ ױ׿ֵֻ דֽ ׻ ߅

ָ, ָ ֱ ׌ֵָ ֵ ׌ֵָ ־ָ Ù ״ֻօ ָ, ״׮Ù , ״׮Ù ָ, ֣ ֛ ...(־֮֬)...

׾ ֤ : ׿ֿ ָ ֋ ...(־֮֬)...

׿֤ : ָ, ׌ֵָ ־ָ Ù ֮֮ ׻֋ ֟ ֲ ֤ ֺ ֟ 000 ִִ ˮߕ, ˮָ ֻ, 150 151 , ֯ ָ ֟ ֮֯ 1967 ׌ֵָ Ù ׻ֵօ ֟ כ ֟օ ָ և Ù 000 , և Ù օ ֣-֣ ֛ Ù ִִ ׻֙ߕ, ִִ և, ׌ֵָ ֮ Ù , כ Ù ִִ և ָ ׻֙ߕ כ ״ֻ߅ ...(־֮֬)...

0 ֮ : ָ , ָ ו֋ ...(־֮֬)...

ֳ֯ן : ֯ ׻֋ ...(־֮֬)... ֯ ׻֋...(־֮֬)...

SHRI RAASHID ALVI: "The offshoot of this is that India could shop anywhere for new reactors and nuclear fuel sources." ֛ Ù ֜ "In the meantime, the United States will encourage its partners to also consider the request to supply nuclear fuel to India." , ֛ Ù , ֯ ֜

ָ, ֮ ֟ ִ օ ֣ ו ָ propaganda , ׮ֵ֤ ֻ ֵ , ֵ ׻֋ և ״׮Ù congratulate Thank you very much. (ִ֯)

DR. P.C. ALEXANDER (MAHARASHTRA): Thank you, Sir. I should start by saying that I deeply regret the Government's decision not to go in for a sense of the House Resolution. All sorts of arguments have been put forward. Somebody said that there is no Constitutional provision for the sense of the House Resolution. Mr. Anand Sharma said this morning that that is a US practice and we have our own traditions. These are all arguments which can be put forward just for the argument's sake. Why do I say that a subject like this requires a consensus backing the Prime Minister? It is because this is too serious a matter for the House to be divided on party lines or on any particular line. The Prime Minister's position in his further negotiations which are to follow would have been considerably strengthened if the world knew that we, as Members of Parliament, had laid down certain benchmarks which would reflect consensus of the Parliament, as a whole. (Contd. by 3y)

-VKK/MKS/KLG/4.50/3Y

DR. P.C. ALEXANDER (CONTD.): .....and not only of certain sections of the House. Those who say that there are no precedents or constitutional provisions, forget that when our predecessors in the Parliament in 1962 thought it necessary to have such a resolution faced with the most disastrous invasion of our country by China. I am not saying that we are facing such a situation, but this issue has all the potential of not merely accepting things which we may regret later, of not merely legislating for the present but even legislating for the future, and, if not, for in perpetuity, on which not only we, but the succeeding generations may also feel guilty about. Therefore, I felt very strongly that the House, as a whole, should lay down the minimum points on which there is an agreement. I am sure, that agreement is there, but somehow or rather, I am very sorry to say that the Prime Minister seems to think that if such a resolution is passed in the House, it may be seen or misunderstood by people outside our country as wanting in or lacking in trust in his leadership. The entire House would have given him strength by passing a resolution on which he could fall back upon when he is to negotiate this matter further. I would not have put so much of strength behind the plea for having a sense of the House resolution. I wrote my piece in "The Asian Age" today, strongly, but for one particular incident. A few days ago, an American diplomat, known to some of us in Delhi, whom we had known very intimately as a great friend of our country, met us informally. And he was holding for justifying the great benefits that India was expected to get as a result of this agreement and was expressing his great optimism that the Bill, when it passed through the Congress, would further strengthen the Indo-US friendship and cooperation. I kept quiet listening to him. I was very close to him when he was working here. But when he said that "the Bill, when it passed through the House of Representatives, had been very well received in India, I am told," I intervened. I asked him, "Who told you this? Who gave you this brief? This is something which we in India do not know." On the other hand, I said, "People like me would have gone in the whole mile along with the Prime Minister's stand on the agreement if the Bill had not suffered the setback it has now received in the House of Representatives." It was a shock to him. He said, "I never knew that there was a public opinion against the House of Representatives." And I asked, "Who could have given you a wrong impression?". He said, without batting an eyelid, "I was briefed so by your Mission in Washington." Then, I realised there is a confusion as to what we are about to achieve or what we are seeking to achieve; what we have received; what we have hoped for. There is a confusion around not only among people in the country, not only among scientists, not only among the representatives of the media, not only among the Members of Parliament, but even among the members of our own Missions abroad. I thought it was necessary that I should come forward boldly with the idea of supporting Yechuryji and the BJP this time, that the House should forget party differences, arrive at a benchmark and tell the whole world that we are with the Prime Minister so long as he also follows these basic principles. And this would have helped him a lot in his further negotiations. Sir, I wish to say why this confusion has arisen.

(Contd. by TMV/3Z)

TMV-AKA/3Z/4.55

DR. P. C. ALEXANDER (CONTD.): There are four main areas of this confusion. One is exactly the objective. What is it that we are going to achieve through this cooperation agreement? The Prime Minister's 29th July statement before this House makes the position very clear, in very unambiguous terms. I quote:

"The central element of my interaction with President Bush was the resumption of bilateral civilian cooperation between India and the US which has been frozen for a decade. President Bush and I agreed that we would work towards promoting nuclear energy as a means for India to achieve nuclear security."

In a benchmark resolution or sense of the House resolution, I would have put this statement of the Prime Minister prominently in a set of words and said that the whole House agrees with him on that. But what did the House of Representatives do? I don't want to quote because Shri Yashwant Sinha and Shri Arun Shourie have forcefully brought forward the exact sentences of the House of Representatives' Bill, particularly, from what they call "the sense of the House" part of the Bill. It clearly says that their objective is very different from the Prime Minister's objective. They have not exhibited any doubts or misgivings about it. They have clearly stated that their policy is to achieve, at the earliest possible date, a treaty banning the production of missile materials or nuclear weapons to which India and the US would be parties. While proceeding to define the policy of the US Government in this, they clearly say that they oppose the development of a capacity to produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon State with or without or outside the NPT. So, there is a world of difference between what we want to achieve through this cooperation and what they are aiming at. I am not talking about the other parts of the joint statement. There are so many good things in the joint statement. I am only taking this particular part about the nuclear cooperation. Our Prime Minister had one objective and he is trying to get the US assistance in realising that particular objective, whereas the House of Representatives had a totally different objective. May I remind Shri Anand Sharma that no amount of his argument will convince anybody in this House, including those who are sitting on that side, that what the House of Representatives says in these words are not binding on India? It is convenient for us for the purpose of journalism to say that what they write in their law is not binding on us. It may not be binding on us. But it is binding on the President of the United States. When it is binding on the President of the United States, who is to give that annual certificate before the 31st of January every year? It affects us. It is all right theoretically to say that it is not binding on us. It is certainly binding on us because of what I have just now said. So, let us not take it lightly. We have to make our position clear, where we stand and where we do not stand for or what we do not stand for. That is the first point.

The second point is that a confusion has arisen about India and the US having a congruent foreign policy. It is a new phrase that is being sold. In other words, they will consider extending certain benefits to non-NPT countries like India, provided--there is a condition--that the country has a foreign policy that is congruent to that of the US. During the 59 years of independence, no responsible politician, whatever may be his political party, whether Congressman, the Communist, the Socialist or the BJP, no party in India today, ever said that our foreign policy should ever be aligned with that of the United States. On the other hand, we took a firm stand, even when we were weak economically, even when we were down as a third rate country economically. We had the courage, boldness and determination to tell the whole world that we will decide our own foreign policy.

(Contd. by RG/4A)

PREVIOUS PAGE