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2a/1.00/skc

SHRI ANAND SHARMA (CONTD.): Sir, the quest for nuclear technology started soon after our Independence. It was the vision of Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru and also the vision of Dr. Homi Bhabha, the founding father of India's nuclear programme. As for the three-stage nuclear programme, which was being referred to, Sir, we retain our commitment; we reiterate our commitment to the same three-stage nuclear programme, which Shri Yashwant ji was referring to, where, in the first stage, it is the heavy water reactors with the natural Uranium -- just to add to that, because you forgot that part -- and after that, the Plutonium which comes out of that goes into the fast breeder reactors, and the third stage is that of the breeder reactors with the Uranium 233 when Thorium will be used.

Sir, from whatever little that I know -- this is not a subject which I have studied, but I have tried to be educated by our able officials and by the nuclear scientists about what we are doing ...(interruption)... Sir, I am only trying to share what I have learnt with the august House. Surely, if there are greater nuclear scientists -- I don't claim to be one -- they are welcome to their observations.

Sir, I can only say that India is fully committed to this programme. This was the vision of Bhabha and Nehru, as I said earlier. I have also mentioned that our nuclear scientists and establishments worked under the most difficult circumstances; they have done the country proud and we respect them. If they have concerns, we shall address those concerns. But the same nuclear scientists, that Shri Yashwant Sinha was referring to, in their statement, have welcomed the July 18th Statement and termed it as a historic opportunity. Do not go in for selective quotes; please, go by the full text. They have not cast any aspersion on the integrity of this Government. They have not cast any doubt on the intentions of this Government.

Sir, it was in 1974 that Pokharan-I took place. That led to the imposition of sanctions, denial of technology, denial of fuel and denial of reactors. But, Pokharan-I happened when Shrimati Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister of this country. That was in 1974. Shri Yashwant Sinhaji, 1998 came 24 years later! That was the courage of Shrimati Indira Gandhi, the commitment of the Congress Party, to India's independent foreign policy and to develop the nuclear technology. We saw the Pokharan-I. Let us not try to deny the facts of history.

SHRI C. RAMACHANDRAIAH: You must continue that...(interruptions)...

DR. MURLI MANOHAR JOSHI: This should have been continued ..(interruptions)...

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: No interruptions, please. No interruptions, please.

SHRI ANAND SHARMA: Sir, I would like to say one thing here. Much has been said by Shri Yashwant Sinha; he has raised specific points and said that we have compromised and shackled our strategic programme. He has referred to the Separation Plan. He has referred to the safeguards arrangement, thereby giving an impression that this Government is not mindful of India's needs, India's sovereignty and India's independent decision-making.

Sir, the Separation Plan, which was tabled in this House, which was referred to, is with regard to the separation of the civilian facilities from the military nuclear facilities. So, the Separation Plan itself is a reiteration and a very loud proclamation that India has a dedicated nuclear programme, military nuclear programme, which India wants to separate and keep out from any inspection, from any safeguards arrangement, so that our scientists can continue on this strategic programme uninterrupted. (Contd. by 2b/hk)

HK-MCM/2b/1.05

SHRI ANAND SHARMA (CONTD.): Sir, the Separation Plan has been worked out not by the Prime Minister, not by the Government, but it has been worked out by our nuclear establishments and those scientists who oversee the strategy. They know what they are doing. It is only fourteen of our reactors which are on the civilian list and the eight remain dedicated to the Military Nuclear Programme with the upstream and down-stream linking facilities. The minimum credible deterrence has been maintained. ..(Interruptions)..

SHRI YASHWANT SINHA: Credible minimum... ..(Interruptions)..

֮֮ ִ : ׻֋, כֻ ״׮ִִ

0 ֮ : , ֯ ֮

SHRI ANAND SHARMA: Let me say one thing. Our colleagues on this side did not interrupt Shri Yashwant Sinha even once. Joshiji, you are an elder, be kind ... ..(Interruptions)..

DR. MURLI MANOHAR JOSHI: That is why I am correcting you. You are making a horrendous mistake, and I want to correct you.

SHRI ANAND SHARMA: Sir, as I was saying, the integrity of the Military Programme has been maintained, kept intact, not compromised. India has not accepted any demand to cap the production fissile material. We have not. As far as the reference to the FMCT was concerned, the FMCT is not a bilateral arrangement between two countries. The FMCT will be a multi-lateral treaty which will be negotiated in Geneva. Yashwant Sinhaji know that. India will also negotiate along with other countries. We have our own views. Merely to say to work together with the US and other countries does not mean that you have similarity of views. We will work with all other countries and that is the right way to move forward. To allege that we have agreed to capping, we have agreed to give up our dedicated Military Nuclear Programme, our deterrence, is not correct, and I am just setting the records straight. Sir, I may also add here that a reference was made earlier about the Fast-Breeder Reactor. We are very clear that the Fast-Breeder Reactor is kept out completely. The Prototype Fast Breeder Reactors are not on the table; we are only talking of civilian nuclear energy cooperation. What is indigenous is indigenous, is protected, is kept out. Now, again India retains the right to construct more reactors in future, both military and civilian, and what would be a civilian reactor in future that would be the sole determination of this country. Now I come to safeguards. Sir, July 18 Statement when it referred to the Separation Plan, it also very clearly referred to the safeguard arrangements which India will negotiate and enter into with the International Atomic Energy Agency for its civilian-nuclear facilities which have been identified in the Separation Plan. I have given the numbers. The Safeguards Agreement that we are negotiating will be India-specific Safeguard Agreement. The Safeguard Agreement itself and explicit in that is the acceptance of the fact that India has a dedicated Military Nuclear Programme and that is why we use the word 'India-specific' because that Agreement, which we will enter into, will not be similar to other non-nuclear weapon States because we have declared weapons programme. You refer to Yashwantji about nuclear weapons States not having any Safeguards Agreement. They do have Safeguards Agreement. But it varies; there is no one standard. You can say draft which is applicable to the nuclear weapon States. The Safeguards Agreement which they have, they all have. (Contd. by 2c/KSK)

ksk/1.10/2c

SHRI ANAND SHARMA (CONTD): Now, we are negotiating something keeping in view India's national interest and long-term needs. We will have, in the Safeguards Agreement, if I may add, also multi-layered assurances of uninterrupted fuel supply. Even the Agreement, which we will have with America, if we have one and when we have one, will also have inbuilt in that the fuel supply guarantees. But, with the IAEA, that is what the safeguards arrangements will be, and it is not only the uninterrupted fuel supply but also, Sir, India will have the legal right to build a strategic fuel reserve for all the nuclear reactors for their life-time. No other country has this arrangement. Let the people not be misled and misinformed. Let no misapprehensions be created. Out of the 14 reactors, six are already under safeguards. You referred to Kudankulam. So, whether it is Rajasthan - RAPS-I and II; whether the Tarapur - TAPS-I and II; and, also the Kudankulam-I and II, that is very much clear. Any of those reactors for which outside technology or assistance has been there, in the Separation Plan, it is clear that there are six which are already there and the other eight will be put under safeguards in a phased manner between 2007 and 2014. Because much has been talked that we are about the sequencing, that we are already negotiating with the IAEA and that is what US Congress wants, and the Prime Minister had given an assurance of placing the facilities under safeguards only after restrictions are lifted. That is what exactly the position of the Government is, and I reiterate what the hon. Prime Minister had said, Sir, in this House and in the other House in July and repeated in March, that our facilities will be placed under safeguard arrangements only after all restrictions are lifted and as I said, co-operation will be instantaneous.

Sir, there will be a time, when we will discuss Freudian slip. But, now, we are discussing the Civilian Nuclear Energy Co-operation. What I am saying, Sir, is that the strategic fuel reserve, which I referred to, the phased manner in which the facilities would be placed under safeguards arrangement, is a double cushion. As I said, we have taken care of any future interruptions. Just to make it clear, and I am repeating: the strategic reserve for the entire life cycle of the reactor, so that nobody can say tomorrow that we are stopping. We are not going to go through that experience. The Government has taken care. Should this Government, our establishment, be congratulated for achieving this, for protecting India's national interest, for retaining the integrity and autonomy of a dedicated strategic programme, for ensuring that India is never held hostage when it comes to fuel supply ever in future. This Prime Minister and this Government do not deserve unwarranted accusations and the criticism. This House will be doing justice by complimenting the Prime Minister and the establishment for safeguarding India's interest by ensuring that we retain our freedom of a foreign policy, of a decision making and of a nuclear programme. Sir....(Interruptions).

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Mr. Jothi, your name is there. Please, there is absolutely....(Interruptions). It has been decided that there will be no interruptions. (followed by 2d)

GSP-SC/1.15/2d

SHRI ANAND SHARMA: Sir, there are two more things which I need to mention. Sir, I have referred to the detonation in detail. There is a question about what you were referring that the cooperation would cease in case India were to detonate. In any case, there is a huge difference since our position is to continue the unilateral and voluntary moratorium and does not go beyond that. Anything beyond that is unacceptable to India. We are seeking a permanent waiver, an irreversible waiver and also the same rights and benefits that the other Nuclear States have. That is the purpose and objective of this Civilian Nuclear Energy Cooperation.

Regarding this certification which Yashwantji was referring to, Sir, there is some provision in the US law which predate July 18, and, we are clear that any reference to certification is contrary to the spirit of July 18 understanding. Even a mention in non-binding section will be unacceptable to India; even a mention. So, our position is very clear. We will not be dictated as to what foreign policy we have to pursue, we will not be capping our programme and we will not be compromising where India's vital interests are concerned. And, Sir, after all, as I said, discussion and debate is the essence of democracy and it is the right of the Parliament to discuss and to be informed which this Government, and I am repeating it, has done so repeatedly. At the same time, Sir, there is a campaign, which was built up over the last few months. I use three words: misgivings, concerns and criticism. Misgivings can be genuine, concerns can be bonafide and we have to address those concerns. The Prime Minister himself is very clear, and, as Government, we are also very clear. Criticism can also be bonafide; we don't mind that. But what about the motivated criticism, the partisan political propaganda targeting the Government, targeting the Prime Minister. Sir, let me make it clear that the Congress Party had given the independent foreign policy, which we are proud of, as I said, starting from Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru to Shrimati Indira Gandhi, Lal Bahadur Shastriji, Rajiv Gandhiji and the present Prime Minister. Sir, we do not need any sermons or certification on patriotism or on safeguarding India's interest. (Interruptions)

SHRI C. RAMACHANDRAIAH: Is he sermonising us, Sir? (Interruptions)

MR. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Please have patience. Why are you getting agitated? (Interruptions) No, please sit down. That is his right to speak. (Interruptions)

SHRI ANAND SHARMA: Well, Sir, surely my dear friend's agitation is not going to change the facts of history. They will not be read not by you but by your future generations and my future generations. (Interruptions)

SHRI C. RAMACHANDRAIAH: That is what we are reading today. (Interruptions)

SHRI ANAND SHARMA: That is what you will continue to read. Please don't distort. (Interruptions) I come to the last point which I have to mention. Sir, we have a Parliamentary system of Government where the Parliament is supreme. The Government and the Prime Minister are accountable to the Parliament. The assurance being given by the Prime Minster to this august House and to the Lok Sabha should be treated as final. We are using a phrase -- this has become a trend -- and everybody today talks about the 'Sense of Parliament'. It is a borrowed phrase from US Congress. Like, 'Sense of Congress', 'Sense of Parliament' you want to make. You want to turn our parliamentary democracy on its head. What system would we have when the assurance of the Prime Minister with full sense of responsibility to the Parliament about the sincerity of the government, about its commitment to India's independent foreign policy, its commitment to safeguard India's national interests is doubted, is questioned.

After listening to what I have said, that there is no shifting, there is no departure and we remain committed to what we have said, you will hear the Prime Minister later, and, I would urge with all respect and humility to all my friends to please respect that. (Contd. by 2e-sk)

SK-MP/2e/1.20

SHRI ANAND SHARMA (CONTD.): Let us not, for the sake of our partisan politics, create an impression that India's interests have been compromised nation wide. Thank you, Sir. (ends)

ָ (ָ Ϥ) : ֳ֯ן , - ֮־֤ ֤ ֲ ֯ ׾ֵ ָ ֮ ׻֋ ֛ , ָ ָ ֤, ߓ ֛ ֤ ....(־֮֬)... ֋, ֯ כÙ օ ...(־֮֬)...

ֳ֯ן : ̸ ִ

ָ : ֤ ײֻ ׾֤ ӡֵֻ , ֕ ׮ ׾µ ӳ־֮ ֤ߵ ֿ־ӟ ֮ ָٳ֟ ֌־ , ֮ ֵԿ ־ , - ׾֤ ӡ ֵ֟ ? ָ ֣ ֮֮ ִ , ә , ־ ׾ֿ ִ֣Ԯ ֯ ״ֻ , ׾ִ֮ϟ ֣ Sense of House ׻֋ ֯ ֯ע ֯ Sense of House ־ֿ ? ָ Sense of House ? ֮֮ ָ Sense of House ? ֯ ֻ ...(־֮֬)... ... ָ ׻ֵ օ ֤ ֮ ִ֮֮ - ֣ , ֯ , ֯ ֕ פ ׾֤ ֕ ӡ , ֯ ָ ׾֤ ӡ ֵ֟ ֮ ֌־ , ׬š֟, ֵ ֵ֟ ָ ֣ Strobe Talbott ״ֻ, ָ ֣ Condoleezza Rice ״ֻ, Talbott ֌ , Rice ֌ ....(־֮֬)...

֕߾ ㌻ : ֯ ،֙ ֌

ָ : , Talbott Rice ֌ ....(־֮֬)... ֯ ֯ ֮ פ, ֮ ...(־֮֬)....

ֳ֯ן : ㌻ , ߓ - ֟ ו֋ ֋, כ...(־֮֬)... ㌻ , ֮ ... It has been agreed that this debate is a very serious debate and we will participate seriously. ....(־֮֬)...

ָ : ָ ֯ ֤ ֻ, ֤ ֻօ ָ ֯ օ ...(־֮֬)...

ֳ֯ן : ߕ, ֯ ׻֋

ָ : ֟Դ֮ nuclear deal ִֵ ִ֮ և , ֲ ӯ ׾ ֮֕ן unipolar פ ׸ ִ֕־֤ ָ֓ ֮ ָ ָ ָ ָ ֜ ׮ָ֟ þ֟ӡ ׾֤ ן ֵֻ֮ ֵ ָ ׾֤ ן ׻֋ ֵ־ ָ ׻֋, ϳ, þֵ֢֟ ӛ ׻֋ ָ֟ ֮ ֕ ֤ ׮ָ Ӥ֮ ֤ ָ, ߙ ׮ָ֟ ׻֋ ״׻֟ ϵ֟ , ֤ ֮ ֮֕ן ׾ָ֟ ֯ ׾֓׻֟ ֵֻ֮ , ׻֋ ׻֋ ϴ ֺ , ֮ , ֯ ָ ׾֮֫ ....(־֮֬)...

ֳ֯ן : ָ , ׻֋, ָ-ָ ֟ ֋

ָ : , ֯ ֮ , ֮֟ , ֮֮ ָ , ָ֬ ׮ֵ ֵֻ֮ ׻֋ ֮ , ָ ֮֯ Ը֮ ׾ֹ פ , ӿֵ օ ֕ Sense of House כӛ , ֕ ؓ֟ ߅ ֵֻ֮ ֮֯ פ Sense of House ֯ ו֮֟ , Sense of Nation ֵ - Ը֮ ֟ ָ, Ը֮ ׾ֹ ׸ ־ ָ ֿ (2 / ָ ֿ:)

ASC-YSR/1.25/2F

ָ (֟) : ֯ ָ ־ ֋ ֟ ָ ָ ־ ֋ ֻ ׮ß֮ - ݻ ׾֤ ӡ ֕ ֈ ֮ Ù , פ, ֵ֮ פ ֮ ָ ֻ ר֢ ִ ָ 'Ӥ ' ֛ ֲָ , 'Ӥ և' ןš ׾׻ִֵ , ׻ ו-ו ׮Ե ׬ָ ָ , ׸ ֟ ן֯פ ן ׾ֺ י , 'Ӥ և' ׻ - , Ù , ֕ ִ , ו֮ ֮ ־ֿ ™ ...(־֮֬)..

ֳ֯ן : ֟ ו֋

ָ : ֕߾ ㌻ ױ : ֮ ִָ ֮֜ ׻֋ ...(־֮֬)..

֕߾ ㌻ : ִָ ֮֜ ֺ ? ...(־֮֬)..

ָ : ׸ ֤ ו ß־ ָ, ָ ָָ ֛ ֟ ϱ׻֟ , ָ þ֟ӡ ָ ן և ןֲ׬֟ ֟ ָ ׸ ָ 123 ߴ ӳ־֟: ذ , ו ӳ־֟: ִָ֟ ֋ ָ Civilian ָ ֵ US Congress ױ ׾ָ֓ ߅ ױ US Congress ָ ߬ ֤֮֟ , ִ ָ ״ֻօ ָ 3(5) (6) ׸ Cap, roll back ֟ ִ ָ և ֵԾ ׸ ™ן ִ֬ , ϟ ׸ ֟֋ ֮ ֟

׸ ™ן ָ֬ ָ ָ ״׻֙ ׾׻ֵ֮ ֵ ָ֮ ׸ ֤ ־ָ ֵ֟ ׸ ָ ָ ױև י׸ֻ ֤ Ӥ

ָ ׸ 韾 ֻ ָ 18 և Accord ָ, Proliferation Security Initiative ױ Ù׻ֵ ָ֕ ִ, ֲ ״ֻ ֟ Proliferation Security Initiative Ը™ߵ ֮

ָ ׸ ָ ִ ָ֬ ָ 18 և, 2005 ׌ֵָ ָ֮֯ ߴ 29 և ֤ Ϭ֮ ӡ ֵ֮ ֤ ׸ ָ ֟ ֯Ù ׾ָ֯ߟ ֤־ ֵ

׸ ߮ ֈ ׸ϕי ׸ ß־ ӳ߸ , ֯ע֮֕ ֱ ָ þ֟ӡ ָ ֵ ß ֡ , ׯ֟ ָ þ֟ӡ ׾֤ ן ֮ ָ ׸ ׯ֔ ֛օ ֕ ָ ϴ ָ ׮ ؓ֟ ָ ֤ߵ Ϭ֮ ӡ . ִ֮ ϴ ׮ ָֻ ؓ֟ ϴ ִָ֓֡ ֜ ֮֮ ָ ׸ ִ ָ Civilian ָ ֵ ִ׸ ָ ֵ ߴ ׸ ִ Ϥٿ֟ օ ָ ׾֤ ן , ֮ ֣ ־ָ , ָ ׸ ϳ־ ֮ ֤Կ ֛? IAEA ß֟, 'Safeguard in perpetuity for the Civilian Programme,' ׸ ׌ֵָ -ָ֮֯ ߴ ֤ ָ ֬֟ ? ָ ָ IAEA safeguard ִ ß֟ ָ ןֲӬ, ָ Ӭ֮ ֯ ? פ ָ־ֿ fuel ׻֋ ָ , ך֮ ? ֤ߵ Ϭ֮ ӡ ֤ פ֮ , ֕ ָ ™ן ֲ ׮ , ָ , ׸ ָ ֮ פ օ (2G ָ ָ)

-ASC-NB/VKK/2G/1.30

ָ (֟) : ָ ֮ ֵ֮օ ֕ ָ fuel ֟ , , fuel ֯և ׮ָָ Nuclear Supplier Group ־֮֬ ֋? ָ ׌ֵָ ֮ ֣ ֕߾ Ӭ ֮ Delhi Declaration ָ֬ ָ, ָ ׾ָ ׳ֵ֮ ֋? ָ ֮ ֕ ָ ָ ï ֮ , IAEA ׮ָ ֮ ֻ ָ ײֻ ָ ï ֮ ־֮֬ ֵ India-specific protocol , IAEA standard modified protocol.

֤ߵ Ϭִ֮ӡ ֤ , ׾ִ֮ϟ ָ ï™ ָ ֯ ֣ ֲ֕ ׻֋ ֛ , ֯ ֬ ׻֋ ֛ ָ ָ ֤, House of Representatives ߮ ָ ׾־פ Ͽ , ֕ ׾־֤ ֮, ֮ ֕ ָ ֟ ָ ֤, ׬ָ , ֮ ™ߵ ׻֋ ײֻ ָ, ָ֟ ׻֟ ָ-ָ end-product ӟָ֕ , ֲ end-product ֋, end-product ֮֮ ֻ ֟ ֮ ָ ֤ ֹ ֲ ™ߵ ׾֯ע ֟ , ָ "-" , ָ "-" , "-" , ׬ӿ "" þָ ֟ ״ֻ ָ, ֮ ָ, ß֮ ֮ ß֮ , Ϭִ֮ӡ ֣ ֲ֕ , ָ Ϭִ֮ӡ ָ ־ ֻ ֋ ָ ָ ן ׾֤ ן þ֟ӡ

ֳ֯ן , ֤ ֣ ֻ ָ ָߵ ָ֕, WTO ָߵ ֮ ָ֤ ָ ָ ָ ׾֤ ן ָ ן, ָ Ӭ ָ ָ - ֟ Ϭִ֮ӡ ֵ֮ ֤ ï™ ֋, ו ו , ָ ׾֤׿ֵ ϳ־ ٣ ִ , ֮֕ן ִ ָ ֵօ ָ Ù כ ֮ և, և ָ֯ , פ ֕ ևԅ Ϭִ֮ӡ , ֻ , WTO ָ ֌ ָ ױ ٣ ֮֕ן ִ ָ ֜ ? ֵ ָ ӿֵ , Ӿ ֮ ߴ ֠

ִ֯ӣ ֯ ӟָ ֯ ֮ٛ ִֵ֮ ֯ , ֤ ֯ , ִ֣Ԯ ֯ ִ֣Ԯ ָ Ϥ -֓ ״ֻ ׌ֵָ ֮ Ù ָ ָ ן ӿֵ , discrimination ָ ן ߴ , ן ӿֵ , perpetuity of ban for nuclear programmes with no exit clause ָ ֓ , ָ֯ fuel ٟ֯ ָ և, ׾ָ ָ , ӿֵ ֯ ֤ ׻֋ ֛ , ֯ ׾ָ ׻֋ ֛ , ָ ֮֟ ־ , ָ ׬ָ ֮֟ Ͽ ָ ֟ ֯ ִ֣Ԯ ו֋, ׻֋ ִ֣Ԯ ״ֻ, ֯ ו֋, ֯ 韾 ׾ ֯ ִ֣Ԯ ֺ , ִ֯

sense of the House ֤ Resolution ֟ , ָ , ׯ֔ פ ֮֮ ָ , PoK ָ ָ 2h/AKG ָ ֿ:

-AKG/MKS/2H/1.35

ָ (֟) : ֻ ֯ ә ֕֋ ֟ , ֮֯ ָ-ָ ֤ , - ֮ ֮֯ פ , ׸֟Ԯ ֲ ׸ , ׸ ߮ , ։ ׸ׯϕי ֲ ׮ָ ׻֋, ִ֯ ׻֋, ׾ִָ ׻֋ ֯ ֤ ׻֋ ָ ։ ֋, ו ֺ ׸֮ ֋ ֯ ֵ֮ ִ֬ - ײ֮ ָ ï™ ֋, ֯ע ִ֕֜ ֻ , ֕ ֤ ֕ ָ

"֮ ֣ - Ϭ֮ ӡ

֮ ֣

ֵ֟ ֵ֟ ִ

֮

֕ ָָ ִ"

- ֮־֤ (ִ֯)

SHRI SITARAM YECHURY (WEST BENGAL): Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, at the outset, I must welcome this discussion that is taking place. Sir, I would like to compliment the Government for agreeing to have such a discussion on an important matter, and, if this be the precedent, I think, we will be setting a new trend in the Indian parliamentary democracy. I think, this ought to be the trend, and, therefore, I will begin with that acknowledgement.

But I am also rising, Sir, with a degree of anguish and a deep concern over many issues connected with the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. Now, I have heard the spirited defence of my friend, the Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Anand Sharma, and the assurances that he has given, that India will not compromise its sovereignty, that India will not, in any way, lower its guards, its nuclear weaponisation programme, etcetera, etcetera. We are happy, but the point that I want to state here is that if that is what the Government is agreeing to say, why can't it be part of the proceedings where this House expresses its own opinion unanimously? And that is the point we wanted to raise on those aspects. That is why, Sir, while I have this deep concern and anguish, I need to state that we are a party that is supporting this UPA Government from the outside, that we are a party which is supporting this Government on the basis of the Common Minimum Programme, that we are a party which accepted the Foreign Policy section in the Common Minimum Programme where we have repeatedly underscored that India's foreign policy shall be an independent foreign policy; while developing relations with all countries, we will not succumb to pressures from any country. Now, having stated that, if that comes under doubt, there is a question of credibility of this Government for which, as a supporting party, I am as concerned as the people are and as our nation is, and, therefore, when we raised certain concerns, often it has dismissed as anti-imperialist rhetoric. And let me tell you that the Left's anti-imperialism is not rhetoric. We understand today's world; we understand what is happening and what imperialism is doing in the world today. We have seen, without their support, this atrocity. This absolute inhuman atrocity in Lebanon was impossible without the U.S. support that is being given. We understand how, under globalisation, they are trying to economically--they are trying; it is not that they will succeed; hope they will not--recolonise the developing world. Now, all this is a reality, Sir. Therefore, when we express our anti-imperialistic concerns, we are expressing on behalf of the majority of the world's people that this is something that India as a country should not and cannot succumb to. And I am glad that eight of the high priests of the Indian nuclear establishment have also expressed similar concerns. After all, these are people who built our nuclear capacity. And they had built it when the United States of America opposed it tooth and nail. They have built it overcoming the sanctions. They have built, and they have created for us that self-reliant base on which we can today stand and talk about all these things. And if they raise some concerns, do not dismiss them as bickering; do not dismiss them as something that is - - They are concerns which we also echoed; these are concerns which need to be addressed in right earnest. Therefore, Sir, I have said it earlier in this House, and I want this House to respect this aspect that do not question the integrity when the issues and concerns are raised. You can definitely question my infallibility. I may be wrong, but do not question my integrity whenever these questions have been raised, and it is on that point, Sir,--not only me but anybody else--that we are wanting this House to express its concern which, we think, will strengthen the Prime Minister and the Government's hands. (Contd. by MKS/2J)

MKS/HMS/1.40/2J

SHRI SITARAM YECHURY (CONTD.): And what are those concerns? On three occasions--in July, 2005, in August, 2005 and in March, 2006-- the Prime Minister has, if you shortlist many of the things he said, has assured the country, in the House, that full civilian nuclear cooperation will be achieved because of this deal, that India's credible nuclear deterrents will not be lowered. "The nuclear India would be treated--I am quoting, Sir--with the same rights and benefits as the nuclear weapons States that India shall do nothing unless there is reciprocity, and, finally, that India will proceed on this only when the U.S. amends its laws." Hon. Prime Minister has stated all this. Now all that we are asking is that if these assurances, because we perceive there are shifts in the goalposts--and why we perceive, I will just come to it--are reiterated as an expression of this House's opinion, I think, this will only strengthen the Government and the Prime Minister when the President Bush can come and tell us on that, "What can I do? My Congress and my Senate has said this." We go back and say, "What I can do!" This is the Indian Parliament's opinion, and beyond this, we are not going to come down. And it is with that issue in mind, Sir, that we have asked for an expression of this position. I am fully aware what Mr. Anand Sharma has said here of the constitutional arrangement that we have in India which is different from that of the United States of America. In India, the executive is answerable and accountable to the legislature, and because of this being answerable and accountable to the legislature, the framers of the Constitution--I have recently gone through the debates--spent a huge amount of time on this issue, whether a parliamentary ratification of an international treaty is required or not, and, then, they came to the conclusion that it is required because of this accountability. In the United States of America, I am fully aware, the President is not accountable to their Houses and, therefore, the ratification is not required. Therefore, I am not drawing a parallel from what is happening there. In the Indian context, there is a flaw which we need to correct. And that, Mr. Deputy Chairman, Sir, I think, involves all of us, including the Presiding Officers, that in India since the executive is accountable to the legislature, and if the legislature does not agree with what the executive has done, we have the right to outvote the Government. But if the Government has already signed an international treaty, the Indian Parliament can outvote the Government, but it cannot rescind the treaty. And that is a flaw that needs to be corrected, Sir. It is that flaw that needs to be corrected, and when we asked for a sense of this House......(Interruptions)... Thank you; you have read it. I am very glad that Mr. Narayanasamy has read my articles, Sir! Therefore, Sir, when we ask for a sense of the House, the resolution is not borrowing phrases from America. I mean, we borrow anything good from everybody, including the USA. We borrow only when it is good, but it is not that we are borrowing the phrase; it is an expression of our concern that yes, for the Executive of the day, today, this is the denominator below which we shall not go. It is that sort of an assurance we want. That was why, Sir, we wanted to have this discussion. And I am glad that it is taking place.

Sir, coming to the deal, there are two aspects of it, which, I think, need to be considered. One is the implicit concerns; the other one is the explicit concerns. And I am more worried about the implicit concerns; let me make it very clear. I will come to the explicit concerns later. But the implicit concerns are connected with the initial concern that I expressed regarding our country's foreign policy. Now, you may say that one senator said this and another senator said that. But this was said by Senator Lugar who recommended to the Senate to approve this Bill. And in his opening remarks, in his recommendation, he says--I quote, Sir: "We have already seen strategic benefits from our improving relations with India. India's vote at the IAEA on the Iran issue last September, and this past February, demonstrates that New Delhi is able and willing to adjust its traditional foreign policies and play a constructive role on international issues."

Now, this is the quotation, Sir, of the Senator when he moved, and, accordingly, the Senator discussed and the U.S. lawmakers are proceeding onwards. The implicit issue is this. This nuclear deal, we see, is not only concerning the explicit issue of nuclear energy, but it has got a very implicit bearing on the strategic ties between India and the United States of America. (Contd. by TMV/2K)

TMV-PSV/1.45/2K

SHRI SITARAM YECHURY (CONTD.): In this strategic ties, if India is tied down to protecting and advancing US strategic interests, then, I think, we are violating the very essence of the Common Minimum Programme understanding that we shall pursue an independent foreign policy. When the Americans said that our vote in Iran was because we wanted to go closer to them, we had criticised here that our own vote in Iran was actually to oppose the US administration. We would also like to know various other developments connected with this. India had initiated it. This Government had initiated it. We had welcomed the strengthening of the ties between India, Russia and China. At the level of Foreign Ministers, I think, meetings were taking place. Now, for some time, it is not just happening. Is it also an implicit pressure that we are succumbing to?

THE PRIME MINISTER (DR. MANMOHAN SINGH): We had a meeting of the Heads of States, Heads of Governments, in St. Petersburg. President Hu Jintao, President Putin and I took part in it. (Interruptions)..

SHRI SITARAM YECHURY: Anyway, I am glad that the Prime Minister has intervened and said that the Heads of Governments met. We are only urging you, let this process of Foreign Ministers meeting, the Shanghai Cooperation, etc., to go ahead. The point is that the signal that we are giving to the world is that we are not, at the present moment, today, succumbing to the pressures of the USA and its administration also. That is something very vital for us and, I think, it has got something to do with the dignity and self-respect of India as a nation. So, we don't want this deal to be used as a carrot and stick policy where we only find the carrot dangling and the stick is being used against India to browbeat us into various positions. That is the concern and that is the fear which the Government will have to allay. That is what we are asking from this Government because we are seeing now what is happening in the world today, as I said earlier. Given this, we would like to have a categorical assurance from this Government that this can't and will not happen. This, I think, is also reflected in the nature of the deal itself. A certain degree of explanation is required, whether it is a nuclear deal or a deal concerning civilian nuclear cooperation. Then comes the question whether we are being treated as a nuclear weapon State or not being treated as a nuclear weapon State. Do we have the same rights and benefits as the Prime Minister has said in quotation or not? This is one side of the issue. On the question concerning nuclear issues, I would also like to know--I have raised this issue earlier when we had a debate on this--what has happened to the famous Rajiv Gandhi plan which was enunciated in the UN General Assembly. Now, are we committed to universal disarmament today or not? What is the reiteration? What is the implication of this particular deal connected with that? Are we pursuing this entire goal of universal disarmament? That is why certain elements--I will come to that a little later--in this deal which actually appear to be going contrary to that. Therefore, what we are saying is that India's position of even taking a voluntary moratorium on further nuclear testing is a right which should leave for ourselves, not at the behest of anybody else. We were opposed to Pokhran II. We have said that we are still opposed to nuclear stockpiling. We are opposed to nuclear weaponisation. But we will be the first ones to defend that that right will be India's right and we will not listen to any dictates from anybody else. We will have our internal differences. That is okay. But our right cannot be infringed upon. Therefore, if this whole issue is about civilian nuclear cooperation and if it is meant to augment India's nuclear energy, then I would actually like to know whether any study has been done on the basis of which you are moving towards this option of augmenting India's nuclear energy. Has the Atomic Energy Commission ever discussed this entire issue? What is the right fuel mix that we have? What is the thing that we should have? We fully understand the Prime Minister's concern. India is growing at eight per cent or plus. Very good. We wish it grew faster. It requires a tremendous energy augmentation. This energy augmentation has to come. But has there been any proper evaluation from which source, from which you will augment this energy? Which is the best way to augment this energy? They are relying on nuclear energy. We have our apprehensions. The Atomic Energy Commission is also under the Prime Minister. At least, the country does not know and the Parliament does not know what their opinion on this entire nuclear deal is and whether such augmentation is feasible or possible.

(Contd. by RG/2L)

RG/1.50/2L

SHRI SITARAM YECHURY (contd.): What I want to ask is: What are the facts on the basis of which you have to make this decision? In 2005, of the installed capacity that you had of electricity generation, the nuclear electricity generation was a mere 2.5 per cent, and that was, actually, 3310 MW. Now if this were to increase to 10,000 MW, which is what is being planned, by the year 2015, this would still be only 5 per cent of India's projected capacity generation then. So, for this 5 per cent of the projected capacity generation, are we going to tie down our country's strategic interests in such a manner? And, if you look at it in another way, that is, cost-wise, -- Shri Yashwant Sinha also referred to the question of the cost of nuclear production, it is the most expensive one -- if you actually look at the ratio, as compared to electricity generation with coal, the ratio will be: nuclear would be 3 and coal would be 2; with gas, nuclear would be 2 and gas would be 1; and with hydro electicity, nuclear would be 5 and hydro electricity would be 3. So, in all counts, the nuclear energy production is the most expensive one. And, if by 2015, we have only 5 per cent coming in from there, and the most expensive one that we are going in for, why are we doing this? Compared to this, our own National Hydro Power Corporation has estimated that India has 50,000 MW of untapped hydro potential. Add to this, the estimates that they have made for Nepal, our neighbouring country, that is 83,000 MW, which is untapped there. Now our interest in tapping this untapped potential is not only in terms of energy augmentation, but it is also in terms of preventing my own people from dying every year due to floods. Taming these rivers, taming these waters, coming particularly from Nepal, apart from helping our neighbouring country, is actually vital for the annual existence of the millions of Indians. Now, instead of choosing that option, why are we spending our resources on a more expensive option of nuclear power generation? This is a question that needs to be answered, and I hope that this will be taken up. Now what is our apprehension? For the last three decades, the United States of America has not installed a new nuclear reactor for electricity generation. Why? They themselves admit that it is because of its high costs and the problem of disposing of the nuclear wastes. Therefore, they are not building nuclear power plants. In three decades, they have not built it. But they want you to enter into this deal so that we buy their reactors. We buy their reactors; spend a huge, awesome amount of money for generating 5 per cent of our electricity by 2015, and we get saddled with the problem of how to dispose of the nuclear wastes. What are we doing? Are we actually helping the American economy to survive and sustain? Or, is it in the vital interests of India? Now this is an issue which, I think, we have to consider because unless we have a serious evaluation of whether we should go into this deal for that particular aspect, we will not come into an impassioned analysis of whether this deal is really required for India's civilian energy needs, or, whether it is a part of a larger strategic concept of Indo-U.S. relations, on which we have our serious apprehension, as I said earlier. If it is the former, then, we have to answer this question as to why the most expensive option is being chosen. If it is the latter, then, we should reject all these things if it is going to draw us into the U.S. strategic interests in the global situation today. It is, therefore, based on this position that we have identified, and we feel that at least on nine areas, there has been a 'shifting of goal posts' done by the United States of America during the course of these discussions. And, on these issues, we would like the Prime Minister, for the interests of India and its people in the House, to give us assurances on these aspects, and that, I think, would be doing Indian polity and the Indian future good. I fully understand what Shri Anand Sharma said about the system of democracy that the United States of America has. You are right in that. What will now happen is that both the Houses, the Senate and the Congress, will pass this Resolution. It will then go to the Reconciliation Committee. They will have I, II and III Resolutions, and on the basis of these I, II and III Resolutions, there will be a waiver given to the U.S. President to conduct negotiations for a deal with India. We all understand that. But our point is what waiver does the President of the United States get. (Continued by 2M)

TDB/2M/1.55

SHRI SITARAM YECHURY (CONTD.): That their Senate and Congress will decide. And if it is a conditional waiver, with all these conditions that come, is India prepared to discuss a deal under that conditional waiver? ...(Interruptions)... No, not. ...(Interruptions)... That is it. So, what the Senate and the Congress are now doing? The Senate and the Congress are precisely laying down these conditions. Now, that is where...

THE MINISTER OF STATE IN THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (SHRI ANAND SHARMA): I have explained it clearly that after the waiver authority is given, then the negotiations of a bilateral agreement will take place. India has made its position known...(Interruptions)... And this is exactly what we reiterated that it will be within the templates of July 18, India will not accept any additional conditions or obligations. That we have made it very clear.

SHRI SITARAM YECHURY: Mr. Minister, the point is that if we have made it very clear that -- the American law-makers are discussing these conditions, presently -- if such conditions are attached to the waiver to the US President, 'we shall not enter into any deal or discussion'. If that is being done, then, these things are happening despite your saying that. Now, the fact is, this is happening despite the Indian Prime Minister conveying it. That only strengthens my case. Despite the Indian Prime Minister conveying, despite the Indian Government conveying, if the US law-makers are still continuing with this, that only means that they are trying to browbeat us. And that is where this assurance and this debate in the House become important. What are these nine points? I would just like to briefly go through them. The Prime Minister has assured this House, both the Houses of Parliament and the nation that India will not compromise its strategic interests. I am just quoting from the resolution of the US Senate. It says, "such cooperation will induce the country" meaning India, "to give greater political and material support to the achievement of US global and regional non-proliferation objectives," Sir, under line the words, 'US global and regional non-proliferation objectives' "especially with respect to dissuading, isolating and, if necessary sanctioning and containing states that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups; that are seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass destruction capability and the means to deliver such weapons." Then, it continues, Sir, and I quote, "secure India's full and active participation in US efforts to dissuade, isolate and if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons capability, etc., etc." Now, what we are being told is that this is a non-binding section of the resolution. My worry is, if it is a non-binding section, if it is not binding, why is it there at all? We have seen in the past, with some other countries; we have the experience of the famous, infamous, let us say, of the Pressler Amendments being imposed, and how it was misused to help Pakistan, and how it was misused against Cuba. So, this is one area of concern, I think, where a categorical assurance will have to be made by the Prime Minister that we are not drawn into the vortex of actually advancing US strategic interests at the expense of India's.

The second thing, Sir, is that the Prime Minister has said that there will be full cooperation on civilian nuclear technology, which should include the complete fuel cycle. Underline the word, 'complete'. Now, what does section 6 of the Senate Bill tell you? It prohibits the exports of equipment, materials or technology related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the production of heavy water. It further says that to restrict such equipment and technologies to India which means that the current sanctions on a host of technologies considered as dual use would be still under an embargo. When they say, 'they restrict such equipment and technologies to India', it means, in effect, they are arguing that the current embargo continues on these dual use technology products. Now, this is where another assurance will have to be given that this cannot be acceptable to us.

(THE VICE-CHAIRMAN, SHRI KALRAJ MISHRA in the Chair)

Then, on July 29, the Prime Minister himself stated, and I quote, "we committed ourselves to separating the civilian and strategic programme. However, this was to be conditional upon, and reciprocal to, the United States' fulfilling its side of the understanding... steps to be taken by India would be conditional upon and contingent on actions taken by the United States." Then, he said, "Before voluntarily placing our civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards, we will ensure that all restrictions on India have been lifted." (Contd. by kgg/2n)

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