



REPORT NO.

**213**

**PARLIAMENT OF INDIA  
RAJYA SABHA**

**DEPARTMENT-RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE  
ON HOME AFFAIRS**

**TWO HUNDRED THIRTEENTH REPORT**

**SECURITY SITUATION IN THE NORTH EASTERN STATES OF INDIA**

**(PRESENTED TO RAJYA SABHA ON 19<sup>th</sup> JULY, 2018)**

**(LAID ON THE TABLE OF LOK SABHA ON 19<sup>th</sup> JULY, 2018)**



**Rajya Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi  
July, 2018/Ashadha, 1940 (Saka)**

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\* To be appended at printing stage

**COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE**  
**(re-constituted w.e.f. 1<sup>st</sup> September, 2017)**

1. **Shri P. Chidambaram** - **Chairman**

**RAJYA SABHA**

2. Shri Pratap Keshari Deb  
3. # Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi  
4. Dr. V. Maitreyan  
5. Shri Shamsher Singh Manhas  
6. @Shri Manas Ranjan Bhunia  
7. Shri Neeraj Shekhar  
8. Shri K. Bhabananda Singh  
9. % Vacant  
10. Shri R.K. Sinha

**LOK SABHA**

11. Dr. Sanjeev Balyan  
12. Shri S. Selvakumarachinnayan  
13. Shri Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury  
14. Dr. (Shrimati) Kakoli Ghosh Dastidar  
15. Shri Ramen Deka  
16. Shri Prataprao Ganpatrao Jadhav  
17. Shri Mallikarjun Kharge  
18. Shrimati Kirron Kher  
19. Shri Ram Mohan Naidu Kinjarapu  
20. Shri Kaushal Kishore  
21. Shri Ashwini Kumar  
22. Shri P. Nagarajan  
23. \*Dr. Prasanna Kumar Patasani  
24. Shri Dilip Patel  
25. Shri Lalubhai Babubhai Patel  
26. Shri Natubhai Gomanbhai Patel  
27. Shri Bheemrao B. Patil  
28. Shri Mohammed Faizal PP  
29. Shri Bishnu Pada Ray  
30. Shri Prem Singh Chandumajra  
31. \$ Vacant

**SECRETARIAT**

Dr. P.P.K. Ramacharyulu, Secretary  
Shri Rohtas, Joint Secretary  
Shri Vimal Kumar, Director  
Dr. (Smt.) Subhashree Panigrahi, Additional Director  
Shri Bhupendra Bhaskar, Additional Director  
Shri Pritam Kumar, Under Secretary

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\* Dr. Prasanna Kumar Patasani, MP, Lok Sabha nominated w.e.f. 6<sup>th</sup> April, 2018 to fill the vacancy caused by shifting of Shri Baijayant "Jay" Panda, MP, Lok Sabha to Committee on Industry

# Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi nominated w.e.f. 2<sup>nd</sup> June 2018 consequent upon the vacancy arose on the expiration of term of Shri K. Rahman Khan from the membership of Rajya Sabha on 2<sup>nd</sup> April, 2018

\$ Vacant consequent upon resignation of Shri B. Sriramulu from Lok Sabha Seat (i.e., Bellary Parliamentary Constituency of Karnataka) w.e.f. 18<sup>th</sup> May, 2018.

% Shri Ram Chandra Prasad Singh, Member, Rajya Sabha resigned from the Membership of DRSC on Home Affairs w.e.f. 2<sup>nd</sup> June, 2018  
@Shri Manas Ranjan Bhunia, Member, Rajya nominated w.e.f. 9<sup>th</sup> July, 2018 in place of Shri Derek O'Brien

## INTRODUCTION

I, the Chairman of the Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, having been authorised by the Committee to submit the Report on its behalf, do hereby present this Two Hundred Thirteenth Report on 'Security Situation in the North Eastern States of India'.

2. The Committee in its meeting held on 13<sup>th</sup> November, 2017, heard the presentation of the Ministry of Home Affairs on the Security Situation in the North Eastern States of India. The Special Secretary (Internal Security) briefed the Committee about the prevailing security situation in the North Eastern States. As some of the issues could not be discussed in the absence of the Home Secretary the Committee in its next meeting held on 27<sup>th</sup> November, 2017 heard the Home Secretary along with Director, Intelligence Bureau and the Interlocutor on the Naga Peace Talks.

3. The Committee while making its observations/recommendations has mainly relied upon the following documents:-

- (i) Background Note on the security situation in the North Eastern States of India;
- (ii) Annual Report (2016-17) of the Ministry of Home Affairs;
- (iii) Presentation made before the Committee in its meetings held on 13<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup> November, 2017 by the MHA and clarifications given by the Home Secretary, DIB and Interlocutor, Naga Peace Talks on the issues raised by the Members in the Committee's meeting;
- (iv) Replies furnished by the Ministry of Home Affairs to the questionnaire sent by the Secretariat;
- (v) Crime in India – 2016 Statistics published by the National Crime Records Bureau; and
- (vi) Seventh Report of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission

4. The Committee considered the draft Report in its sitting held on 21<sup>st</sup> May, 2018 and adopted the same.

5. For facility of reference and convenience, observations and recommendations of the Committee have been printed in bold letters in the body of the Report. For convenience, abbreviations used in the Report have been compiled in a table under the Acronyms section.

21<sup>st</sup> May, 2018  
New Delhi  
31 Vaisakha, 1940 (Saka)

**P. Chidambaram**  
**Chairman**  
Department-related Parliamentary  
Standing Committee on Home Affairs

## ACRONYM

AFSPA	Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act
AASU	All-Assam Students Union
ABSU	All Bodo Students' Union
ANVC	Achik National Volunteers Council
ANVC/B	Achik National Volunteers Council/ Bernard
ATTF	All Tripura Tiger Force
ADCs	Autonomous District Councils
ASAK	A'chik Songna An'pachakgipa Kotok
BAC	Bodo Autonomous Council
BLT	Bodo Liberation Tiger
BTC	Bodoland Territorial Council
CADC	Chakma Autonomous District Council
CAPFs	Central Armed Police Forces
CoBRA	Commando Battalion for Resolute Action
GHADC	Garo Hills Autonomous District Council
GNLA	Garo National Liberation Army
HALC	Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council
HNLC	Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council
IRBs	India Reserve Battalions
JHADC	Jaintia Hills Autonomous District Council
KAAC	Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council
KLNLf	Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front
KPLT	Karbi Peoples Liberation Tigers
KHADC	Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council
KNO	Kuki National Organisation
LAEF	Liberation Achik Elite Force
LADC	Lai Autonomous District Council
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MoPF	Modernization of State Police Forces
MoS	Memoranda of Settlements
MNF	Mizo National Front
MADC	Mara Autonomous District Council
M/o DoNER	Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region
NCHAC	North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council
NER	North Eastern Region
NSCN	National Socialist Council of Nagaland
NSCN/IM	Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland/Isak-Muivah
NSCN/K	Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland/Khaplang
NSCN/KN	Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland/ Kitovi-Neopao Konyak
NSCN/R	Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland/Reformation
NDFB	National Democratic Front of Bodoland
NDFB(S)	National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Saoraigwra)
NDFB (RD)	National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Ranjan Daimary)
NDFB(P)	National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Progressive)
NNC	Naga National Council
NLFT	National Liberation Front of Tripura

NLFT(B)	National Liberation Front of Tripura (Biswamohan)
NLCPR	Non Lapsable Central Pool of Resources
SoO	Suspension of Operations
TNV	Tripura National Volunteers
TTAADC	Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council
UAPA	Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act
ULFA	United Liberation Front of Asom
ULFA(I)	United Liberation Front of Asom (Independent)
ULFA(PT)	United Liberation Front of Asom (Pro-Talk)
UPDS	United People's Democratic Solidarity
UNLF	United National Liberation Front
UPF	United People's Front

## CHAPTER-I

### INTRODUCTION

1.0 The North Eastern Region of India covers 8 percent of the country's geographical area and 4 percent of its population (as per the 2011 Census). It comprises of the eight North Eastern States of India *viz.* Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura. This region is strategically located along the countries *viz.* Bangladesh, Myanmar, China, Bhutan and Nepal. Almost the entire border of this region is an international border. This region is linked to the rest of India by a narrow stretch of land, the 'Siliguri Corridor', which is also known as the Chicken's Neck.

#### 1.1 Historical background

1.1.1 The North Eastern States are famous for their cultural and ethnic diversity. The region has more than 200 ethnic groups, which have distinct languages, dialects and socio-cultural identities. The ethnic diversity of the region is due to a constant flow of different tribes from the east, during the pre-British era, and their incomplete racial assimilation. The diversity became more prominent during the British era due to a steady flow of population from the west, particularly the undivided Bengal region. The Partition of India led to a rise in the flow of migrants and refugees, from East Pakistan, who contributed significantly to a noticeable demographic change in some States such as Tripura and Assam. A struggle for land and livelihood in Bangladesh, post-independence, further increased illegal migration to the North Eastern Region. The consequent demographic changes gave rise to a conflict between the natives and the immigrants and fuelled the growth of insurgent and separatist movements.

1.1.2 The Constitution-makers, recognising the diversity and the significant difference in the way of life and administrative set up of the North Eastern region from the rest of the country, provided for special institutional arrangements for the tribal areas in the region, granting them a significant degree of self-governance through various Autonomous District Councils under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. Post-independence, the reorganisation of the States in India fuelled the demands for statehood in the North Eastern Region. Administrative reorganisation of the region was gradual and led to the formation of the States of Nagaland (1963), Meghalaya (1972), Manipur (1972), Tripura (1972), Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram (1978).

1.1.3 While several administrative and institutional arrangements, such as the creation of different States and Autonomous Councils, show considerable attention given by the government to reduce conflict in the region, these measures, however, fell short of adequately fulfilling the aspirations of various ethnic groups. The resultant discontentment and assertion of specific cultural and ethnic identities led to persistent demands for autonomy ranging from the idea of autonomous self-governance to one of a sovereign nation. Moreover, alliances between some major insurgent groups increased the complexity of the North Eastern Region's security situation, which remained vulnerable for several decades.

1.1.4 The underground militant outfits indulged in violent terrorist activities, and confronted security forces and people with arms. They maintained safe havens and camps in neighbouring countries, sought cross-border support, procured arms and weapons, recruited and trained their cadres, and indulged in unlawful activities. Conflicts in the region were broadly of three types:-

- (i) 'National' conflicts based on the demands for a separate and sovereign nation.
- (ii) 'Ethnic' conflicts based on the differences between smaller less dominant tribes and



- politically and culturally dominant tribal groups.
- (iii) 'Sub-regional' conflicts based on assertion of sub-regional aspirations against the State Governments and autonomous councils.

1.1.5 As a result, most of the North Eastern States have suffered the scourge of ethnic conflicts, insurgency, separatist movements, communal violence and illegal immigration for a long period of time.

## **1.2 Measures taken by the Central Government**

1.2.1 Law & Order is a State subject. However, the Central Government has been supplementing the efforts of the state governments to curb the illegal and unlawful activities of militant/insurgent groups of North Eastern States through various measures. These include the deployment of Central Armed Police Forces, reimbursement of security related expenditure to the state governments under SRE Scheme, central assistance to the state governments for modernization of State Police Forces, sanction of India Reserve Battalions, banning 'unlawful associations' operating in the North Eastern Region under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), declaring specific areas/states as 'disturbed areas' for the purpose of Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) and issuing notifications for Unified Command Structure, etc.

1.2.2 The Central Government has deployed Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) to aid the State authorities in carrying out counter insurgency operations and providing security to the vulnerable institutions and installations. For the purpose of guarding the border region, 413 Companies (Coys) of various CAPFs are deployed along the international borders of Nepal, Bhutan, China, Bangladesh and Myanmar. To strengthen internal security and carry out counter insurgency operations, 389 Coys of CAPFs and 16 CoBRA teams are deployed in various North Eastern states. To curb the illegal and unlawful activities of abductions, extortions, killings, recruitment and training of armed cadres, explosions and attacks on infrastructural installations by insurgent groups of North Eastern States, the Government has declared sixteen insurgent organizations "unlawful associations" and/or "terrorist organizations" under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

1.2.3 To deal with the armed insurgency in the North East, the States of Manipur (except Imphal Municipal area), Nagaland and Assam are under AFSPA. In Arunachal Pradesh, 11 police station areas bordering Assam and three districts of Tirap, Changlang and Longding are designated as 'disturbed areas' under AFSPA. In Meghalaya, a 10 kilometer belt, bordering Assam, has been declared as 'disturbed' under AFSPA.

1.2.4 The Central Government has pursued a policy of talks/negotiations with the groups that abjure violence, lay down arms and seek solutions for their problems peacefully within the framework of the Constitution of India. A number of outfits have come forward for talks with the Government and have entered into Suspension of Operations (SoO) Agreements. Some groups have signed Memoranda of Settlements (MoS), some others have dissolved themselves while negotiations are going on with the remaining groups. Those who refuse to engage in negotiations are dealt with by the security forces through counter-insurgency operations.

1.2.5 The Government has also been implementing schemes for the surrender-cum-rehabilitation of insurgents who lay down their arms and bringing them back to mainstream society. Under this scheme, the Government provides financial assistance, incentives for weapons surrendered and vocational training.

1.2.6 The Government of India is also assisting the State Governments in augmenting and modernising their police forces for dealing with insurgency and militancy. Towards this end, 51 India Reserve Battalions (IRBs) have been sanctioned for the NE States, including Sikkim. These include nine battalions each for Assam, Tripura, Manipur, Nagaland, five each for Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram, four for Meghalaya and three for Sikkim. The Ministry of Home Affairs is also assisting the State Governments for the modernization of the police forces of the North Eastern States. Under this scheme, assistance is being provided to the States for procurement of modern equipment and weapons, computerisation and augmentation of training and police infrastructure. Thus, a multipronged strategy of intervention comprising political mediation, military action and developmental efforts has curbed violence and improved the overall security situation in the region.

### **1.3 Present Security Situation**

1.3.1 In the past twenty years, despite several measures taken by the Government and the security forces, the region has seen a lot of insurgency related violence. There were as many as 1963 insurgency related incidents and 907 civilian deaths in insurgency related incidents in the year 2000. As many as 289 Security personnel sacrificed their lives while fighting insurgency in the year 1997 in the NE Region.

1.3.2 In recent years, the security scenario has improved due to the concerted efforts of the Central Government and various security forces. While some insurgent groups have been brought to the negotiating table by the Government, others have been countered effectively by the security forces. The underground militant outfits indulge in violent and terrorist activities and confront security forces and people with arms. Due to sustained security operations in the region, some insurgent groups have made efforts to regroup themselves to achieve their objectives.

1.3.3 Therefore, lasting peace has remained elusive and sustained efforts are required to maintain stability and achieve sustainable peace and growth in this strategic region. The security situation of the North-East, therefore, remains an area of concern.

1.3.4 Considering these factors, the Committee took up the subject “Security Situation in the North Eastern States of India”<sup>1</sup> for detailed examination. The Committee sought a background note on the subject from the Ministry of Home Affairs and held two sittings, on 13<sup>th</sup> November and 27<sup>th</sup> November, 2017, to discuss the subject. In these sittings, the Committee invited the representatives of the Ministry of Home Affairs, including the Home Secretary, the Director, Intelligence Bureau, the Interlocutor of the Government on the Naga Peace Talks, and other senior officers concerned, who deposed extensively before the Committee.

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<sup>1</sup> Parliamentary Bulletin Part-II, dated 14<sup>th</sup> November, 2017

## CHAPTER-II

### SECURITY SCENARIO IN DIFFERENT STATES OF NER

#### 2.1 Overall Security Scenario

2.1.1 The Ministry of Home Affairs, in its background note on the subject, informed the Committee that the overall security situation in the North Eastern States improved substantially in 2016 and 2017. While the States of Mizoram, Tripura and Sikkim remained free from insurgency, a marked improvement was observed in the states of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya and Manipur.

2.1.2 The details submitted by the Ministry of the security scenario during the last seven years is as follows:-

Table 2.1

Year	Number of Incidents	Extremists Killed	Extremists Arrested	Extremists Surrendered	Civilians Killed	Security Forces Casualties	Arms recovered	Persons kidnapped
2012	1025	222	2145	1195	97	14	1856	329
2013	732	138	1712	640	107	18	1596	307
2014	824	181	1934	965	212	20	1255	369
2015	574	149	1900	143	46	46	897	267
2016	484	87	1202	267	48	17	698	168
2017	308	57	995	124*	37	12	371*	66*

\* Figures upto 31<sup>st</sup> October 2017

2.1.3 The Ministry of Home Affairs submitted that the number of insurgency related incidents in the region decreased by more than 15 percent in 2016 compared to 2015. During 2015, the number of such incidents was 574, which came down to 484 in 2016. The number of casualties suffered by the security forces also declined from 46 in 2015 to 17 in 2016. Counter insurgency operations in the region led to the neutralization of 87 militants, arrest of 1202 militants and the recovery of 698 weapons during 2016. The year 2017 saw a further improvement in the security scenario as the number of incidents came down to 308 while the casualties suffered by the security forces came down to 12. The year 2017 witnessed the lowest number of insurgency related incidents since 1997.

**2.1.4 The Committee observes the declining trend of insurgency-related incidents and improvement in the overall security situation in NER that could be achieved due to efforts of the Central Government and the State Governments. The Committee, however, cautions the Government that sustained efforts must continue in this direction to achieve the goal of making the North Eastern Region completely free from insurgency.**

#### 2.2 Arunachal Pradesh

2.2.1 The MHA informed the Committee that, at present, Arunachal Pradesh does not have any active indigenous insurgent group. Settlement of a large number of Chakma refugees from Bangladesh in the State led to some conflicts, but over the years the issue has subsided. The geographical contiguity with Myanmar and ethnic similarities among the residents of some districts of Arunachal with the residents of Nagaland has been exploited by insurgent groups based in Assam and Nagaland for their nefarious activities.

2.2.2 The State is affected by the spill-over militant activities of Naga insurgents belonging to the Nagaland-based underground factions of NSCN (NSCN/IM, NSCN/K, NSCN/R and NSCN/KN), in Tirap, Changlang, and Longding districts. The two major NSCN factions, NSCN/IM and NSCN/K, are engaged in a battle for supremacy in these three districts, including forced recruitment to their cadres, area domination, kidnappings and extortions etc. The cadres of Assam-based NDFB(S) and ULFA(I) are also sometimes active, seeking shelter and transit in the State, particularly in the areas bordering Assam and Myanmar. Sometimes, the Assam-based outfits try to affect the political and economic activities in the State with an aim of raising funds through extortions.

**2.2.3 The Committee while taking into account the submission of the Ministry of Home Affairs that Arunachal Pradesh has no active insurgent group and is affected by the spill-over activities of the insurgent groups based in Nagaland and Assam, feels that the Government must improve the security situation in the border areas of Arunachal Pradesh that are located along the India-Myanmar border. The Committee, in this connection, recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs must encourage, facilitate and strengthen the interaction and co-operation between the police forces of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh to obviate any unwarranted incidents along the border areas of Arunachal Pradesh.**

2.2.4 The Committee was informed by the Ministry of Home Affairs that the Government is trying to improve the security situation by upgradation of the police set-up and development of infrastructure projects in the three affected districts. The Ministry of Home Affairs maintained that in 2017 there were 61 insurgency incidents, in which 9 insurgents were killed and 44 were arrested. The Ministry of Home Affairs also submitted the details pertaining to the security situation in the state of Arunachal Pradesh, during the years 2012 to 2017 (upto 31<sup>st</sup> October, 2017), which are given in the following Table:-

**Table 2.2**

<b>Years</b>	<b>Number of Incidents</b>	<b>Extremists arrested</b>	<b>Extremists killed</b>	<b>Extremists surrendered</b>	<b>SFs killed</b>	<b>Civilians killed</b>	<b>Persons kidnapped</b>
2012	54	66	14	17	-	05	17
2013	21	49	07	02	01	02	09
2014	33	86	09	07	-	02	49
2015	36	55	05	03	03	01	33
2016	50	59	07	04	02	-	25
2017	61	44	09	03	-	03*	27

\* Figures upto 31<sup>st</sup> October 2017

**2.2.5 The Committee while perusing the data of ‘Crime in India–2016’ of cases of kidnapping and extortion in Arunachal Pradesh published by the National Crime Records Bureau, finds the number of such cases to be 146 in 2014, 175 in 2015 and 112 in 2016. This shows that the number of kidnapping and abduction cases in Arunachal Pradesh remain high *vis-à-vis* the State’s population.**

**2.2.6 The Committee is also constrained to express its concern that unlike the overall North Eastern Region, which shows a declining trend of insurgency-related incidents and casualties suffered by the civilians, and an improvement in the security scenario, the State of Arunachal Pradesh has seen a rise in the number of such incidents. The Committee is alarmed to observe that in 2012, Arunachal Pradesh accounted for just 5 percent of the incidents in the entire region, however, in 2017, it accounted for almost 20 percent of the incidents in the region. This is an indication of the fact that the security situation has deteriorated in the State of Arunachal Pradesh *vis-a-vis* the entire North Eastern Region. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Government should intensify its efforts to contain the spill-over insurgency activities from other States and improve the overall security scenario in Arunachal Pradesh.**

## 2.3 Assam

2.3.1 Assam has been affected by a wide variety of ethnic conflicts since independence but insurgency in Assam began much later in 1979 as a consequence of an anti-alien movement under the All-Assam Students Union (AASU). This movement culminated with the signing of the 'Assam Accord' in 1985. However, insurgency had also taken shape with the formation of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) in 1979. Till 1984-85, ULFA operated in the backdrop of the 'anti-alien' movement. Soon, ULFA began recruitment and training of its cadres with an objective to establish a "sovereign socialist Assam" through an armed struggle. Soon, ULFA grew into a powerful group that enjoyed significant support of the public during the 1980s and 1990s. A number of extremist outfits led by ULFA have remained active in Assam for a very long period of time. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission found several factors responsible for the youth to join the ranks of ULFA. These factors were influx of illegal migrants, unemployment, corruption in the government machinery, dominance of non-Assamese in the business sector, perception of exploitation of Assam's natural resources by the Centre, and alleged human rights violations by the security forces. However, due to a large scale criminalisation of its cadres and various other reasons, ULFA soon lost its credibility and public support.

2.3.2 The Government of India had classified it as a terrorist organisation and had banned it under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act in 1990. Two major operations by the Army forced the leaders of ULFA to seek refuge in the neighbouring countries of Bhutan and Bangladesh. In 2003, a military crackdown by the Bhutan Royal Army destroyed the camps of ULFA in Bhutan. In Bangladesh, the new government formed in 2009 launched a crackdown against the militant outfits, particularly ULFA. As a result, most of the top leaders of ULFA were arrested and handed over to the Indian authorities in 2009. Since then, most of the ULFA factions have come to the negotiation table, however, a few factions, such as ULFA-I, that were opposed to the talks still remain active.

2.3.3 In the northern Assam, in 1987, the All Bodo Students' Union (ABSU) began the Bodoland Movement to fulfill the aspirations of an independent state for the Bodos, who are the largest ethnic group from among the plain tribes of Assam. Simultaneously, a violent movement also began for a sovereign state of Bodoland. This movement was spearheaded by a militant group named Bodo Security Force, which was later renamed as the National Democratic Front of Bodoland in 1994. The Bodo Accord was signed in 1993 among the ABSU, the Government of India and the Government of Assam, and it was committed therein to form an elected Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC). However, this accord failed to bring the desired peace in the State due to issues over the territorial jurisdiction of BAC, limited autonomy given to it and non-implementation of major provisions of the Accord. Another militant outfit named Bodo Liberation Tiger (BLT) was formed in 1996 with the demand for a separate state to be achieved through an armed struggle. BLT became the most powerful Bodo outfit during that time. A ceasefire was signed between the central government and BLT in 2000, and negotiations culminated in the creation of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) in 2003. Another insurgent group the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) also signed a ceasefire agreement in 2005. But NDFB's anti-talks faction, the NDFB (RD), continued violent activities until 2011, when it was forced to declare a unilateral truce after the arrest of its leader. But again a splinter faction of NDFB(S), which

was opposed to talks with the Government, was formed in 2012. NDFB(S) has continued its violent activities and remains active till date.

2.3.4 Apart from ULFA and the Bodo insurgencies, there were other insurgent movements initiated by Karbi and Dimasa tribes, and the Adivasis that affected Assam. Karbi and Dimasas demanded autonomy whereas the Adivasis demanded greater recognition of their rights. However, the government has been able to bring most of these groups to the negotiation table. United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), formed in 1999, and Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF), formed in 2004, spearheaded these insurgencies. UPDS was disbanded in 2011 after signing a Memorandum of Settlement with the Central Government and the Assam State Government. KLNLF, which was a breakaway faction of UPDS, also came to the negotiation table in 2010. However, Karbi Peoples Liberation Tigers (KPLT), a splinter group of KLNLF, formed in 2011, continues its violent activities in Karbi Anglong District of Assam with an objective of forming an Autonomous Karbi state.

2.3.5 The Committee was informed that in Assam the major militant outfits that are presently active are United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I), National Democratic Front of Bodoland - Saoraigwra (NDFB-S). Both have been declared as unlawful associations under the provisions of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. Besides, Karbi Peoples Liberation Tigers (KPLT) is active in Karbi Anglong district of Assam. ULFA(PT), NDFB(RD), NDFB(P) and Karbi Longri NC Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF) are under the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement with the Government of India and/or the Government of Assam.

2.3.6 After the wanton killings of tribals in Sonitpur, Kokrajhar and Chirang districts of Assam in December, 2014, sustained counter insurgency operations are continuing against NDFB (Saoraigwra) group. During the period from December 2014 to December 2017, around 1015 cadre/linkmen of NDFB-S have been arrested. Recovery of a large quantity of arms and ammunition was also made and 60 cadres were neutralized in counter insurgency operations.

2.3.7 There was a substantial improvement in security situation in the state in 2017 the insurgent-related incidents declined from 246 in 2014 to just 81 in 2015, and further came down to 75 in 2016 and to 33 in 2017 being lowest since 1997. The casualties of civilians and security forces personnel were also lowest at 9 in 2017. This was approximately 99 percent less than the 1136 deaths of civilians and security forces that occurred in 1997. Moreover, 16 insurgents were killed while 204 were arrested during 2017. The security situation in Assam during last six years is as follows:-

**Table 2.3**

<b>Years</b>	<b>Incidents</b>	<b>Extremists arrested</b>	<b>Extremists killed</b>	<b>Extremists surrendered</b>	<b>SFs killed</b>	<b>Civilians killed</b>	<b>Persons kidnapped</b>
2012	169	412	59	757	05	27	79
2013	211	348	52	92	05	35	125
2014	246	319	102	102	04	168	94
2015	81	645	49	30	-	09	27
2016	75	366	51	15	04	29	14
2017	33	204	16	11*	03	06	02*

\* Figures upto 31<sup>st</sup> October 2017

2.3.8 While the number of kidnappings related activities of the insurgents show a marked decline from 94 in 2014 to 14 in 2016, the number of kidnapping and abductions, in general, as reported by the National Crime Record Bureau in the Crime in India-2016 report, shows a significant rise during this period from 4824 in 2014 to 6128 in 2016. The data given in this report also shows that with a rate of 18.8 kidnappings and abductions per thousand persons in 2016, Assam had the highest rate of kidnappings and abductions among all the states across the country. The State of Assam also had the highest rate of violent crimes among all the states in 2016. An overwhelming 87 percent of the victims of kidnappings and abductions were women. Moreover, out of 6128 abductions, only 249 victims were recovered. Assam also reported a huge number of 13,413 unrecovered victims of kidnappings and abductions that happened before 2016.

2.3.9 The Committee came across news reports that pointed out that the abductions by insurgent groups have declined yet a constant increase has been witnessed in the number of overall incidents of abductions and the persons kidnapped. The reports asserted that due to the delay in final rehabilitation and settlement of the cadres who had surrendered, they were indulging in illegal activities such as abductions for ransom.

**2.3.10 The Committee is disconcerted to note that Assam has the highest rate of violent crimes, and kidnappings and abductions, among all the states of India. The Committee accepts that the insurgency-related instances of kidnappings and extortions may be on a decline, but a general rise in the instances of such crimes is worrying and the Committee is perplexed that despite a waning trend in insurgency, violent crimes and kidnappings have been on a rise. The Committee apprehends that this rise may be due to poor rehabilitation and settlement of former insurgents who may be indulging in such crimes for ransom. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Central Government, in coordination with the State Governments, should closely monitor the activities of insurgents who have surrendered during the last decade, and also those with whom the government is presently holding negotiations.**

**2.3.11 The Committee is deeply worried to note that a large number of victims who were kidnapped or abducted in Assam before and during 2016 are yet to be recovered. Even more worrisome is the fact that a large majority, at more than 81 percent, of victims are women. The Committee is of the view that this may also point towards a connection between such abductions and human trafficking. The Committee, therefore, recommends that an inter-state investigation may be carried out to find out the reasons for this extremely high rate of kidnappings of women. The Committee also recommends that sustained operations must be launched to trace and recover the victims of kidnappings and abductions. The Committee desires that the Ministry submit a detailed status note about the action taken to recover such victims.**

2.3.12 The Committee, during its meeting held to discuss the security situation in the North Eastern States, sought to know the present status of the activities of NDFB/P and NDFB/RD. The representative of the Ministry of Home Affairs replied that both NDFB/P and NDFB/RD had declared ceasefire and signed Suspension of Operations agreement in 2005 and 2013 respectively, and were presently in negotiations with the government. They have been demanding creation of a separate State and therefore the issue is somewhat complex. The government has a separate interlocutor, who is talking to these groups. One of the members, however, raised the issue that for a long time now the talks were not being held and they were on hunger strike as well. He also pointed out that they had held up the National Highway and railway line that crosses Kokrajhar district, and if the talks do not progress then the situation may worsen.

2.3.13 The representative of MHA informed the Committee that this issue had cropped up as the interlocutor for these groups had been pre-occupied with ongoing negotiations in Kashmir and the Central Government was yet to take a decision on how to make further progress in talks with NDFB factions and whether a separate interlocutor should be appointed or not. An interlocutor for talks with Assam-based insurgent groups, was appointed, in October 2017, as the representative of the Government of India to initiate and carry forward a dialogue with the elected representatives, various organizations and concerned individuals in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

**2.3.14 The Committee observes that the Government's interlocutor, who was appointed for holding talks with the Assam-based insurgent groups, was recently assigned the responsibility to initiate dialogue with various stakeholders in Kashmir due to which the talks with the two factions of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland have been stalled. The Committee also notes that due to the stalled talks, the insurgent groups have become restive and have even resorted to hunger strike. The Committee is constrained to observe that there is a lack of seriousness of purpose shown by the Government on this issue, by first shifting the interlocutor to J&K and then not appointing another one immediately. The Committee cautions the Government that if suspension of talks due to the absence of interlocutor is allowed to become prolonged, the insurgent groups may become further restive and indulge in illegal activities. The Committee is apprehensive that a lack of seriousness by the Government in holding the dialogue with the insurgent groups may result in violation of SoO agreements by them. The Committee, therefore, strongly recommends that the Government must urgently appoint a separate interlocutor for talks with the Assam-based insurgent groups, particularly NDFB/RD and NDFB/P. The Committee also recommends that Government must ensure that the talks are held on a continuous basis with utmost sincerity to keep the insurgent groups at the negotiation table and maintain the security scenario in NER that has been achieved with painstaking efforts and numerous sacrifices.**

## **2.4 Manipur**

2.4.1 The Committee was informed that Manipur is an insurgency-ridden state affected by the activities of Meitei, Naga, Kuki, Zomi, Hmar and Muslim underground outfits. The valley region of Manipur, comprising nearly 25 percent land of the state, is resided by the Meiteis, which constitute more than 70 percent population of the State. The Meiteis occupy a dominant position in the political and economic systems of Manipur. They comprise a majority of the State's population, occupy the most productive and fertile lands of the State and play an influential role due to their historical association with the former monarchs of Manipur. Tribals account for around 30 percent of the State's population and broadly belong to Naga, Kuki-Chin and Mizo groups. Naga tribes are concentrated mainly in the Districts of Ukhrul, Tamenglong, Senapati and Chandel, while the Kuki-affiliated tribes are dispersed over the five hill districts, with larger concentrations in Churachandpur, Senapati and Chandel districts.

2.4.2 The conflicts in Manipur have primarily been over socio-economic and political issues, with ethnicity being a catalyst for mobilization of different groups. Presence of various ethnicity-based insurgent groups and underground organizations has also contributed to the sharpening of the ethnic divide in the state. The Nagas and Kukis are in conflict with each other, as well as with the Meiteis, due to several historical and contemporary factors. Major causes of ethnic conflicts in Manipur are territorial conflicts, control over the land resources, border trade, preservation of identity, unemployment and underdevelopment, invoking of AFSPA and the alleged extra-judicial killings by the security forces.



2.4.3 Insurgency in Manipur first raised its head during 1960s with the emergence of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) due to resentment within a section of Meitei society against the merger of Manipur state with the Union of India. Since then, several other insurgent groups came into existence to demand an independent Manipur. Meitei insurgency began with the formation of UNLF. The birth of the People's Liberation Army radicalised the Meiteis further. Denial of Scheduled Tribes status to the Meiteis also became a reason for discontentment.

2.4.4 Kuki insurgent groups began militant activities in the early 1990s and several Kuki insurgent groups were formed following the ethnic clashes between the Kukis and the Nagas due the refusal of the Kukis to pay illegal taxes to NSCN(IM). Subsequently, the 20 odd Kuki insurgent groups regrouped under two umbrella organisations namely Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and United People's Front (UPF) to negotiate with the government. A tripartite Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement was signed between the Government of India, the Government of Manipur and the KNO-UPF in 2008. Since then the SoO agreement has been extended periodically till date, however, the cadres of these groups still sometimes indulge in illegal activities and violent clashes. Kukis have now been demanding a separate state to be carved out of Manipur. Some of the districts claimed by the Kukis are also home to the Nagas, who claim such areas as their own.

2.4.5 The hill areas of the State have been affected by different strands of militancy. More often than not the violence perpetrated by different Naga groups in Nagaland has spilled over to these areas, which have also been affected by the conflicts between different factions of NSCN. The violence in the hill areas had reduced due to a cease-fire between the Union Government and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) but this has given rise to other conflicts as the NSCN insists on a greater 'Nagalim' which would include four districts of Manipur. The demand of a greater Nagalim by the Nagas is resolutely opposed by the Meiteis as it would lead to disintegration of the State of Manipur. Thus, on one hand the inhabitants of hill areas, Nagas and Kuki, oppose the assimilation and integration of hill and valley areas, while on the other hand, the valley people, the Meiteis are against any policy measures that will lead to a distinction between the two areas. The security situation in Manipur during last six years is as follows:-

**Table 2.4**

<b>Years</b>	<b>Incidents</b>	<b>Extremists arrested</b>	<b>Extremists killed</b>	<b>Extremists surrendered</b>	<b>SFs killed</b>	<b>Civilians killed</b>	<b>Persons kidnapped</b>
2012	518	1286	65	350	08	21	57
2013	225	918	25	513	05	28	22
2014	278	1052	23	80	08	16	29
2015	229	805	41	04	24	15	26
2016	233	518	09	-	11	11	25
2017	167	558	22	74*	08	23	17*

**\* Figures upto 31<sup>st</sup> October 2017**

2.4.6 The Ministry of Home Affairs informed the Committee that Manipur accounted for about 48 percent of total violent incidents during 2016, and around 54 percent of incidents during 2017, in the entire North Eastern region. In 2016, there was a major attack by insurgents on the security forces in Manipur on 20<sup>th</sup> May, 2016 in which 6 security personnel were killed. While the number of incidents marginally increased from 229 in 2015 to 233 in 2016, this number declined by 28 percent to 167 in

2017. The number of security forces personnel killed came down from 24 in 2015 to 11 in 2016 and 8 in 2017. However, the casualties of civilians increased substantially from 11 in 2016 to 23 in 2017. Within the state of Manipur, Meitei insurgency accounted for about 62% of the insurgency incidents in the state.

**2.4.7 The Committee observes that despite experiencing a decline in the number of incidents, the violent incidents in Manipur, accounted for a staggering 54 percent of the total number of violent incidents in the entire North eastern region during 2017. Moreover, the number of civilian casualties more than doubled during 2017 as compared to the casualties during 2016. The Committee is perturbed by the fact that the State of Manipur is still affected by the insurgency-related activities, and the number of violent incidents remains quite high. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Government should intensify the pace of engagement with insurgent groups and hold regular talks with them not only to arrive at a settlement but to also maintain peace in the state.**

## **2.5 Meghalaya**

2.5.1 Meghalaya is home to two main tribal groups: the Hynniewtreps and the Achiks. The Hynniewtreps pre-dominantly inhabit the Eastern Meghalaya districts and comprise Khasi, Jaintia, Bhoi and War tribes. The Achiks, popularly known as Garos are the inhabitants of the Garo Hills, located in the Western part of Meghalaya. The divide between the Khasis and the Garos has dictated the politics of the State. Several insurgent groups, representing the interests of various tribes or the groups of tribes have sprung up in the State.

2.5.2 Initially, insurgency in Meghalaya began as a struggle against the domination of the outsiders. Hynniewtrep Achik Liberation Council (HALC), the first insurgent outfit in Meghalaya, was formed in 1992 and claimed to represent the united interests of the three major tribes of the state viz. the Khasis, the Garos and the Jaintias. Differences in the interests of the three major tribes soon led to a split in the outfit and two major outfits emerged from the split of HALC: the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), representing Khasis and Jaintias, and the Achik National Volunteers Council (ANVC), representing the Garos. In order to strengthen themselves, both the groups formed alliances with the major insurgent outfits of NER, such as NSCN-IM, ULFA and NDFB. HNLC was primarily active in the Khasi Hills region and perpetrated several attacks in Shillong. The Garo Hills region was dominated by ANVC.

2.5.3 Over the years, both the outfits were weakened by the counter insurgency operations of the security forces. HNLC's Chairman surrendered in 2007, but despite suffering major reverses due to sustained counter-insurgency operations, the outfit has tried to revive its activities in Khasi Hills and Jaintia Hills districts, without any tangible success. HNLC, however, is yet to be brought to the negotiation table.

2.5.4 ANVC is under a ceasefire agreement since 2004. However, they continue to dominate the Garo Hills region while carrying out extortion activities in West Khasi Hills along with the East and South Garo Hills region. Since the ceasefire agreement between the government and ANVC, the Garo Hills have remained peaceful. However, several other outfits, capitalising on the vacuum left by ANVC, emerged in the aftermath of the ceasefire agreement,. In 2006, an outfit named Liberation Achik Elite Force (LAEF) was formed. Most of the top leaders of this group were either arrested or neutralised by

the security forces by 2008. Most of the remaining cadres also surrendered or were arrested in the subsequent years.

2.5.5 A Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) was signed on 24<sup>th</sup> September, 2014 between the Government of India, the State Government of Meghalaya, the ANVC (Achik National Volunteer Council) and its breakaway groups ANVC/B. The ANVC dissolved itself in a ceremony held at Tura (Meghalaya) on 15<sup>th</sup> December, 2014 and 161 underground cadres and 236 over ground workers of ANVC, and 277 cadres of ANVC/B surrendered along with huge quantity of arms and ammunition.

2.5.6 In 2009, a dominant insurgent outfit named The Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) emerged with the aim of creating a separate 'Garoland' in the western region of Meghalaya. The group mostly comprised of the breakaway cadres of ANVC and LAEF and revived Garo insurgency that was on a decline. It was declared a terrorist organisation by the government in 2009. GNLA has been extensively involved in extortion, kidnapping and several violent activities in the Garo Hills region and also parts of West Khasi Hills District. The GNLA has developed operational links with other banned militant groups like ULFA-I, NDFB (S). It is also said to have links with NSCN-IM.

2.5.7 During 2016, Meghalaya experienced a vitiated security situation due to activities of Garo militant groups mainly Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) and A'chik Songna An'pachakgipa Kotok (ASAK) in Garo Hill areas comprising five districts of the State and also parts of West Khasi Hills district. However, there was a significant improvement in security situation in 2017. In 2016, the state witnessed 45% decline in the number of violent incidents from 123 in 2015 to 68 in 2016. This number substantially declined further to 28 in 2017. Number of civilian casualties decreased from 12 in 2016 to just 2 in 2017 and there was no casualty of security forces during 2016 and 2017. Both the number of militants killed and the number of cadres arrested also declined during 2016 as well as 2017. The security situation in Meghalaya during last six years is as follows:-

**Table 2.5**

<b>Years</b>	<b>Incidents</b>	<b>Extremists arrested</b>	<b>Extremists killed</b>	<b>Extremists surrendered</b>	<b>SFs killed</b>	<b>Civilians killed</b>	<b>Persons kidnapped</b>
2012	127	92	16	20	01	36	64
2013	123	75	21	10	07	30	33
2014	179	173	35	733	06	24	110
2015	123	121	25	78	07	12	87
2016	68	59	15	205	0	08	52
2017	28	13	06	33*	0	02	15*

**\* Figures upto 31<sup>st</sup> October 2017**

2.5.8 The Government of India had decided not to engage in peace talks with GNLA and to go all out against the outfit. As a result of massive operations against the outfit, violence by the group reduced and 39 cadres were arrested while 12 cadres were killed in 2015. It has been reported in several news reports that the chief of the military wing of GNLA was recently killed, in February 2018, due to the sustained operations of security forces and most of the cadres of GNLA have surrendered or have been arrested. It has also been reported that a large cache of arms and ammunitions were recovered during the subsequent combing operations.

**2.5.9** The Committee notes that the security forces have been able to neutralise the Garo National Liberation Army and most of the cadres of GNLA have surrendered or have been arrested. GNLA had been a significant security threat to Meghalaya and the efforts of security forces to neutralise it are praiseworthy. The Committee, however, cautions the Government that if the cadres, who have surrendered, are not rehabilitated timely and adequately, then there is a possibility that the disgruntled groups may potentially regroup to form a new outfit or indulge in illegal activities. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs must make sincere efforts to rehabilitate all the cadres who have surrendered, by providing some financial assistance as well as opportunities for bringing them into the mainstream so that these cadres may not relapse into the fold of insurgency. The Committee also recommends that a sufficient number of security forces may be deployed in the entire Garo Hills Region and sustained combing operations may be conducted to tackle all the remaining cadres of GNLA and recover all the arms and ammunition that may be in their possession.

## **2.6 Nagaland**

2.6.1 Nagaland was the original hotspot of insurgency in the North Eastern Region. The violence in Nagaland has been mainly in the form of inter-factional clashes between different groups. Nagas comprise of several tribes, sub-tribes and clans. They had been living in relative isolation for many centuries until the British missionaries began their activities in the region.

2.6.2 The British followed a policy of least interference in the Naga inhabited areas. In 1873, the British introduced the 'Inner Line' system that prevented the people from the plains, except the Christian missionaries, from entering the Naga inhabited areas. The policy of 'Inner Line' helped to prevent dilution and disruption of the Naga culture, but contributed to their isolation and prevented their integration with the mainstream society. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, on the recommendations of the Simon Commission, the Naga Hills were declared as 'Excluded Area' but continued to be administered by the Government of Assam. This new arrangement was somewhat in line with the demands of the Nagas, who did not want the Naga territory to be attached with India.

2.6.3 World War II had a significant impact on the Nagas. It brought unity and integration among different tribes and clans, introduced them to modern guerrilla fighting and provided them a huge cache of arms and ammunition left by the defeated Japanese Army. After the end of the war, the Naga Hills Tribal Council was formed in April 1945 to help in the relief and rehabilitation work. It was converted into the Naga National Council (NNC) a year later with the aim of social and political upliftment of the Nagas. Initially, the NNC sought to establish a political solidarity of all Nagas and inclusion of Naga Hills within the Assam province of free India, with sufficient autonomy.

2.6.4 However, after the independence of India, demands for independence of Nagas were voiced from all quarters of Naga society. NNC rejected the offer of autonomy under the Constitution of India and in 1951, under the leadership of the then NNC President Angami Zapu Phizo, a referendum was held on the issue of Naga independence. The Nagas voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence. They went on to boycott the first General Elections of independent India in 1952. The Central Government, in an attempt to curb the secessionist tendencies, deployed army units in Nagaland and conducted a crackdown on the activities of NNC in 1953. In response, the Nagas formed a parallel government and a

parallel army of their own. Soon the Naga Hills region was embroiled in large-scale conflicts and violence. Phizo left Nagaland in 1956 and ended up in London with an aim of mobilising international support for the cause of the Nagas.

2.6.5 NNC was banned under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967 by the Government of India in 1972. A large scale counter insurgency operation was launched which culminated in the signing of the Shillong Accord on 11<sup>th</sup> November, 1975 between the Government of India and Naga outfits. However, this Accord did not end the insurgency and rebellion against this accord led to the formation of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980. In 1988, due to inter-factional rivalries, NSCN was split into two factions, the Isak-Muivah faction (NSCN-IM) and the SS Khaplang faction (NSCN-K). Both the outfits had an objective of establishing a 'Nagalim' or greater Nagaland, comprising all Naga inhabited areas of the States of Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and the neighbouring Myanmar.

2.6.6 In Nagaland, the insurgent groups have been indulging in extortion, in the name of imposing and collecting 'taxes' from many sources, including the government departments. NSCN-IM has had the largest extortion network spanning almost all the villages of Nagaland. It also emerged as the biggest supplier of arms in the Northeast. Arms were smuggled from China, through Bangladesh, and sold to insurgent outfits across the North Eastern Region.

2.6.7 After years of violence, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the NSCN-IM and the Government in August, 1997 and since then negotiations have been going on to arrive at a settlement. Another ceasefire agreement was signed between the Government and NSCN-K in April 2001; however, negotiations with NSCN-K did not begin. Though limited peace was achieved after the ceasefire agreements, the conflicts between NSCN-IM and NSCN-K continued to affect the security situation in Nagaland as well as in the neighbouring States. On multiple occasions, ceasefire has been violated by both the factions.

2.6.8 While NSCN-IM has signed Ceasefire Agreement for an indefinite period and continues holding negotiations with the Government, NSCN-K unilaterally abrogated the ceasefire agreement with the Government in March, 2015. The NSCN-K was declared as unlawful association and terrorist Organization under UAPA, 1967. Its breakaway faction, NSCN-R signed a ceasefire agreement with the Government in April, 2015.

2.6.9 Peace initiatives have been going on ever since a ceasefire was signed. The NSCN-IM dropped its demand of sovereignty, after several rounds of negotiations with the Government; however, the issue of integration of all Naga-inhabited areas in the Northeast, with the existing State of Nagaland, to create a single State remained a thorny issue. Simultaneously efforts were made by both the factions, as well as several civil society organizations, to arrive at reconciliation between the two factions. In a significant development, the Government of India entered into a framework agreement with NSCN-IM in August, 2015.

2.6.10 The Committee was informed that even though various steps have been taken by the Government from time to time to control insurgency, the NSCN factions continue to indulge in inter-factional conflicts and violence, and other violent and illegal activities adversely affecting the security situation in the State. The security situation in Nagaland during last six years is as follows:-

**Table 2.6**

<b>Years</b>	<b>Incidents</b>	<b>Extremists arrested</b>	<b>Extremists killed</b>	<b>Extremists surrendered</b>	<b>SFs killed</b>	<b>Civilians killed</b>	<b>Persons kidnapped</b>
2012	151	275	66	04	-	08	93
2013	145	309	33	01	-	11	100
2014	77	296	12	-	-	01	65
2015	102	268	29	13	09	09	78
2016	58	198	05	16	-	-	51
2017	19	171	04	02*	01*	03*	12

**\* Figures upto 31<sup>st</sup> October 2017**

2.6.11 The Committee observes that in 2016, the State witnessed a 43 percent decline in violent incidents compared to 2015 and the situation further improved as the number of incidents further declined by 67 percent in 2017 as compared to 2016. There were no casualties in the security forces or civilians in 2016. However, there were 4 casualties suffered in 2017 (till 31<sup>st</sup> October 2017). In 2017, the number of persons kidnapped by insurgents decreased significantly by 76 per cent as compared to 2016.

**2.6.12 The Committee appreciates that the security situation in the State of Nagaland has significantly improved during the last two years. The number of insurgency-related incidents decreased by 43 percent in 2016 as compared to 2015, and by 67 percent in 2017 as compared to 2016. The Committee is of the view that this improvement in the security situation in Nagaland may be attributed to the signing of the Framework Agreement between NSCN-IM and the Government of India. The Committee also believes that the signing of the final Naga Peace Accord can bring long lasting peace to the State that was once the hotspot of insurgency for the North Eastern Region. The Committee, therefore, strongly recommends that the Government should continue its efforts to engage the Naga groups and finalise the Naga Peace Accord.**

## **2.7 Mizoram**

2.7.1 The Committee has been informed by the Ministry of Home Affairs that the seeds of insurgency in Mizoram were sown with the devastation caused by a severe famine known as ‘Mautam Famine’. Mizo Cultural Society, formed in 1955, changed its name to ‘Mautam Front’ during the famine period of 1959-60 and became a leading organisation for demanding relief for the people. In September, 1960, it changed its name to ‘Mizo National Famine Front’ and took lead in providing logistics for the relief material. As a result, MNFF became quite popular and several Mizo youths joined it. This organisation again changed its name to Mizo National Front (MNF) and became a political organisation with the stated aim of achieving sovereign independence of Greater Mizoram. In 1966, MNF took to violence to secure its goal and was banned by the Government in 1967. However, the demand for statehood gained momentum and on 21<sup>st</sup> January, 1972, the Union Territory of Mizoram came into existence. The Mizo leaders accepted the UT status on the condition that Mizoram would be granted full statehood soon in the coming years.

2.7.2 MNF assured the Central Government to lay down the arms and surrender by its cadres if Mizoram is given statehood. In June 1986, Mizo Peace Accord was signed between both the parties. Consequently, the MNF cadres surrendered before the Government along with their arms. Soon,

Parliament passed a Constitution Amendment Bill in August 1986 to confer statehood on Mizoram. Thus, Mizoram became a full State on 20<sup>th</sup> February, 1987. Thereafter, all the insurgents were absorbed in the political stream and the State of Mizoram has since then remained peaceful.

2.7.3 The peaceful situation was disturbed by the forced migration of Brus, also known as Reangs, from Mizoram to Tripura in 1997 following atrocities on them due to ethnic clashes. They were temporarily housed in six relief camps in the Kanchanpur district of North Tripura. Since 2000, the Brus have continued to stay there. Efforts have been made to repatriate them to Mizoram, however, the State Government of Mizoram has been non-committal on the issue. As a result, some militant outfits such as Bru National Liberation Front and Bru Liberation Front of Mizoram were formed and perpetrated in some violent activities in the Mizoram State.

2.7.4 The Ministry of Home Affairs further informed the Committee that since the year 2009, the Mizoram Government decided to allow repatriation of over 5000 Bru families. Since then, several efforts have been made to repatriate them in a phased manner. Repatriation was halted due to protests by some Mizo NGOs in 2011, 2012 and 2015. By 2015, around 1622 families have been repatriated and resettled in Mizoram. Thereafter, the repatriation stopped due to reluctance of Brus and non-cooperation of Bru leaders. They demanded review of the financial assistance being offered to the repatriated families, which was not satisfactory. The Supreme Court, in a PIL filed on the issue of repatriation of Brus and poor living conditions in the relief camps, had criticised the Ministry of Home Affairs on its failure to provide adequate relief material and decent living conditions in the relief camps. As per the Annual Report 2017-18 of the Ministry of Home Affairs, the repatriation of the remaining Bru families was to begin from March 2018. The security situation in Mizoram during the last six years is as follows:-

**Table 2.7**

<b>Years</b>	<b>Incidents</b>	<b>Extremists arrested</b>	<b>Extremists killed</b>	<b>Extremists surrendered</b>	<b>SFs killed</b>	<b>Civilians killed</b>	<b>Persons kidnapped</b>
2012	-	02	-	-	-	-	06
2013	01	03	-	-	-	-	06
2014	03	-	-	03	-	-	14
2015	02	04	-	-	03	-	13
2016	-	02	-	-	-	-	01
2017 *	-	05	-	-	-	-	-

\* Figures upto 31<sup>st</sup> October 2017

2.7.5 The Committee observes that since the year 2009, when the repatriation of Brus to Mizoram began, only 1622 families out of around 5000 families have been repatriated. The Committee is disappointed to note that not a single family could be repatriated during the last two years. The Committee recommends that the Ministry should initiate urgent measures to restart the repatriation process and ensure an early repatriation of the Brus. The Committee also recommends that the Ministry should prepare an adequate financial assistance package comparable to the package being offered to the Kashmiri migrants to encourage repatriation of Brus. The Committee further recommends that the Ministry should also incorporate provisions in the rehabilitation package to provide vocational training and opportunities for meaningful livelihood, such as government jobs, to ensure peaceful rehabilitation of the Brus. The Committee desires to be apprised about the action taken and progress achieved in this regard.

2.7.6 The Committee observes that every time the repatriation process began, some protests occurred to block the process and this has caused a huge delay in the repatriation process. The Committee is of the view that this cannot be a coincidence and the protests seem to aim at blocking the repatriation process. The Committee recommends that the Ministry should put adequate

security measures in place, in the relief camps and in the areas where the Brus are to be rehabilitated, to tackle protests effectively and to instil a sense of security among the Brus.

**2.7.7** The Committee is at pains to observe that the Brus have been living in pitiable conditions in the relief camps. The Committee also notes observations of the Supreme Court regarding poor living conditions and failure of the Government to ensure decent living conditions for the Brus who have been suffering for a long time. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry should urgently review the poor living conditions in all the six relief camps where Brus are residing and provide all basic amenities to the people in these camps.

## **2.8 Tripura**

**2.8.1** The Ministry of Home Affairs informed the Committee that Tripura experienced a drastic change in its demography as a result of free flow of migrants from former East Bengal and then from Bangladesh. The Bengali speaking migrants assumed a majority and the tribal population was marginalized from the State politics and administration. Insurgency began in 1960s as a movement against the domination by the Bengali migrants and Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) came into existence. TNV continued its activities until a tripartite agreement was signed in 1988 that led to surrender of the cadres of TNV.

**2.8.2** However, certain rebel cadres of TNV formed the National Liberation Front of Tripura in March 1989. NLFT's leadership and cadres were mostly based in Bangladesh. NLFT's most dominant faction NLFT(B) remained active in Tripura for a very long time. Another outfit that remained active until recently was the All Tripura Tiger Forces, which came into existence in July 1990. The security situation in Tripura during last five years is as follows:-

**Table 2.8**

<b>Years</b>	<b>Incidents</b>	<b>Extremists arrested</b>	<b>Extremists killed</b>	<b>Extremists surrendered</b>	<b>SFs killed</b>	<b>Civilians killed</b>	<b>Persons kidnapped</b>
2012	06	12	02	13	-	-	13
2013	06	10	-	22	-	01	12
2014	08	08	-	40	02	01	08
2015	01	02	-	15	-	-	03
2016	-	-	-	27	-	-	-
2017*	-	-	-	01	-	-	-

\* Figures upto 31<sup>st</sup> October 2017

**2.8.3** The Committee observes that the security scenario in Tripura has shown marked improvement in recent years with a steady decline in violence since 2013. As a result, AFSPA was withdrawn from the areas falling in the jurisdiction of Tripura by the State Government *vide* its notifications dated 27<sup>th</sup> May, 2015. Since then, the State of Tripura has witnessed no incident of violence. The activities of main underground outfits viz. National Liberation Front of Twipra-Biswamohan [NLFT(B)] and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) have been contained. The Committee feels that talks with NLFT(B) leadership for peace at the state level must continue.

## **2.9 Sikkim**

**2.9.1** The State of Sikkim has been the only North Eastern State that has not witnessed any insurgent movement till date.



## CHAPTER-III

### OTHER ISSUES

#### 3.1 Naga Peace Accord

3.1.1 The Home Secretary informed the Committee that a Ceasefire Agreement was signed by the Government of India with NSCN-IM in 1997. Thereafter, ground rules of ceasefire were agreed upon and talks for a settlement have been going on since then. In 2003, three rounds of negotiations were held between the Government and NSCN-IM. During these rounds, ground rules for the peace talks were laid down. The Government of India recognize the unique history and situation of the Nagas and both the parties agreed on the measures to ensure the continuation of negotiations. NSCN-IM subsequently dropped its long standing demand of sovereignty but continued its another persistent demand of integration of all Naga inhabited areas with the State of Nagaland to create a greater Nagaland or 'Nagalim'. Issues like the unification of the Naga inhabited areas remained an obstacle in all the three rounds of peace talks held in 2007. However, an important development occurred in 2007 when both the Government and the NSCN-IM, decided to extend the ceasefire indefinitely.

3.1.2 The Committee was informed that in February 2010, Shri R. S. Pandey was appointed as the interlocutor, replacing Shri K. Padmanabhaiah, who had served as the government representative since the inception of negotiations in 1997. The deadlock in the talks continued till the resignation of Shri R. S. Pandey in December 2013. In August 2014, Shri R. N. Ravi was appointed as the interlocutor for the Naga Peace talks. On 3<sup>rd</sup> August, 2015, a Framework Agreement was signed between the Government of India and the NSCN-IM. It is an overarching agreement on broad principles and lays the foundation for a final settlement.

3.1.3 While briefing the Committee, Shri R.N. Ravi Interlocutor for Naga stated that the Government has been talking with NSCN (IM) for the last twenty years and their position from the very beginning has been that Nagas were exceptional, Nagas were not Indians, Nagas were sovereign and any settlement could be reached only on the basis of the fact that this is a settlement between two sovereigns. While the Government kept them engaged, they had continued their position that they will be with India on the basis of a negotiated agreement, and would not be 'within India'.

3.1.4 During the course of the last several years, the Government started opening out and reaching out to civil society organisations, Naga Tribal bodies and other stakeholders to get the views of the stakeholders other than NSCN (IM). In 2015, the Government reached an understanding with the NSCN (IM), which agreed for a settlement within Indian federation, with a special status. The Interlocutor informed the Committee that this was a departure from their earlier position of 'with India, not within India' and the Government called it 'Framework Agreement' and signed it.

3.1.5 Subsequently, the Government contemplated the details of the power sharing with the Government of Nagaland or with other stakeholders. The Interlocutor apprised the Committee about the broad status of the negotiations and submitted that the negotiations were proceeding towards a situation, where boundaries of any State will neither be changed nor altered. Initially the Nagas had stuck to the idea of unification of Naga inhabited areas, resolutely maintaining their stand of 'no integration, no solution'. However, they had now reached a common understanding with the Government that boundaries of the States will not be touched. Instead, some special arrangement would be made for the Nagas, wherever they are. The negotiations were going on over some symbolic issues, which are

sensitive to both the Government and the Nagas as well, and attempts are being made to reach a common understanding.

**3.1.6 The Committee observes that any final agreement will have some implications for the three States viz. Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam, where Nagas are residing in certain areas. The Committee is of the considered view that any agreement that may be finally arrived at must allay the fears of the stakeholders in these States and the State Governments must be kept abreast with the emerging dynamics of the talks.**

3.1.7 The Committee was also informed by the Interlocutor that while the Government was moving forward with NSCN(IM), the integration, of the other relatively smaller armed groups with the peace talks, was a challenge. NSCN(IM) had threatened to pull out from the talks if any other group was engaged by the Government of India. However, integration of these smaller groups was important as they were getting desperate. The Government was successful in achieving this and during the last one year, six Nagaland-based Naga Armed Groups had come together and were engaged formally with the peace process. However, NSCN(K), which had violated ceasefire in 2015, was not a part of the peace process.

3.1.8 The Committee was informed that the contours of the agreement had not been spelt out in the framework agreement. The framework agreement was just about the recognition of the uniqueness of Naga history by the Government of India, and an understanding that inclusive settlement will be within the Indian federation with due regards to the uniqueness of the Naga history. However, the Interlocutor stated that it was implied in the agreement that some special arrangement will have to be made for the Nagas.

3.1.9 On being asked what the special arrangement will be, the Committee was told that with respect to Nagaland, there is already a special arrangement. Article 371A of the Constitution makes it very clear that they are special and a special status has been accorded to them. A similar kind of status, with some local variation, and some change to the Nagas in the neighbouring States can be explored.

**3.1.10 The Committee takes note of the developments that have taken place in the last few years regarding Naga Peace Talks. While there have been positive outcomes, the Committee apprehends that the Naga groups and tribal bodies are becoming restless due to the delay in concluding the talks. Recently the representatives of all political parties, following an appeal by the Core Committee of Naga Tribal Hohos and Civil Society Organisations, had signed a declaration that they will abstain from the election if it is held without concluding the Naga Peace Agreement. This is indicative of the growing unrest among the Naga Hohos. The Committee wonders as to why there is a delay in concluding the peace talks when all other stakeholders other than the Government appear to be eager to conclude it. The Committee apprehends that any further delay may harm the progress achieved during the last few years. The Committee, therefore, strongly recommends that the Government should conclude the peace talks, at the earliest, based on a broad understanding over the most contentious issues. The Committee also recommends that the Government should tread carefully on the issues sensitive to the Nagas and not let vested interests hijack the peace narrative.**

**3.1.11 The Committee, keeping in view the historical dynamics of insurgency, wishes to remind the Government that the most important aspect of any agreement with insurgents is the adequate rehabilitation and settlement programme for the cadres of the insurgent outfits. NSCN (IM), being the largest group in the entire region would have thousands of cadres who must be**

adequately settled to make the agreement successful and to prevent the emergence of any rebel splinter groups. The Committee, therefore, strongly recommends that the Ministry should prepare a detailed and generous rehabilitation-cum-settlement scheme for the cadres who will surrender as part of the agreement. The Committee also recommends that the Government should, nevertheless, proactively stay prepared for any kinds of scenario that may emerge in the aftermath of this agreement, and keep the security forces and the intelligence agencies on the alert.

### **3.2 Status of Negotiations in Manipur**

3.2.1 The Committee has been informed by the Ministry of Home Affairs that the Kuki groups are broadly divided under two umbrella groups: the Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and the United Peoples Front (UPF). In 2008, a tripartite Suspension of Operations agreement was signed between the Government of India, the State Government of Manipur and various Kuki underground groups that are under the aegis of either KNO or UPF. This agreement is being extended periodically since then.

3.2.2 The Committee desired to know the present status of the talks between the Central Government, the State Government of Manipur, Kukis, Nagas and Meiteis. The Committee was informed by the Ministry that the talks were going on and the first round of Tripartite Talks between the Government of India, the State Government of Manipur and KNO/UPF, to discuss the political demand of KNO and UPF was held on 15<sup>th</sup> June, 2016 followed by two more rounds on 19<sup>th</sup> October, 2016 and 9<sup>th</sup> August, 2017. UPF and KNO have submitted their political demands. Presently, Interlocutor appointed by the Government of India is holding talks with KNO and UPF.

**3.2.3 The Committee feels that the frequency and pace of the talks do not seem encouraging as during the last two years only three rounds of dialogue have taken place. The Committee understands that there might have been several bottlenecks that would have obstructed the progress of the talks; however, the bottom line is that the Government should ensure that the talks are held regularly and the issues are resolved gradually. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs should make sincere efforts to expedite the talks and hold them more frequently. The Committee also recommends that the Government should tread carefully on the political demands of the Kuki groups and ensure a congruity between the agreement being finalised with the Nagas and the arrangement that may be made for the Kukis.**

### **3.3 Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in the North Eastern States**

3.3.1 The Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Ordinance, 1958, was promulgated by the President on the 22<sup>nd</sup> May, 1958. Section 3 of the Ordinance empowered the Governor of Assam and the Chief Commissioner of Manipur to declare the whole or any part of Assam or the Union Territory of Manipur, as the case may be, to be a disturbed area. The Ordinance was replaced by the Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Act, 1958.

3.3.2 The Ministry of Home Affairs apprised the Committee that to deal with armed insurgency in North East, entire State of Manipur (except Imphal Municipal area), Nagaland and Assam are under AFSPA. In Arunachal Pradesh, 11 police stations areas bordering Assam and three districts of Tirap, Changlang and Longding have been declared as ‘disturbed areas’ under the Act. In Meghalaya, a 10 kilometer belt bordering Assam has been declared as “disturbed” under the Act. The notifications declaring Manipur and Assam as “disturbed area” have been done by the State Governments. In the last

notifications dated 4<sup>th</sup> August, 2017 and 1<sup>st</sup> October, 2017, the areas under AFSPA in Meghalaya were reduced from a 20 km belt on the Assam-Meghalaya border to a 10 km belt, and in Arunachal Pradesh from 14 police stations / police outpost areas of Arunachal Pradesh Assam border to 11 police stations / outpost areas, besides districts of Tirap, Changlang and Longding respectively.

3.3.3 On the issue of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, the Committee was informed that both the Centre and the state have got the concurrent powers to issue notification under the AFSP Act. For instance, the notification, which has been valid in Manipur right from the 1980's was issued by the Government of Manipur. In the last 38 to 40 years, the Government of India had not issued any notification under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act for Manipur.

3.3.4 The Committee was also apprised that with regards to the areas to be declared as disturbed areas, in the State of Assam, there was some difference of opinion between the Government of India and the State Government. The Government of Assam through their notification declared the whole state of Assam as disturbed area under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act because they have got concurrent power. The State Government of Assam had explained that it was slightly early to reduce the area under the AFSPA Notification.

**3.3.5 The Committee is unable to comprehend the divergent perceptions of the situation in Assam. On the one hand, the Ministry has asserted that there has been an improvement in the security situation in Assam and, on the other hand, the area declared as disturbed under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, has been increased. The Committee also notes that the State Government of Assam has notified the whole State as disturbed area on the plea that it is not the appropriate time to reduce the area under AFSPA. This is a paradoxical situation that needs to be resolved. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Central Government and the State Government should hold extensive discussions on the issue and narrow down their perception about the necessity of AFSPA in Assam.**

3.3.6 In order to assess the impact of removing AFSPA from Tripura, the Committee desired to know whether it could be used as a model to initiate the process for removing AFSPA from other states where the security situation has significantly improved. The MHA replied that in exercise of powers conferred under Section 3 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, certain areas of Tripura were under AFSPA since 1997. Over time, due to the sustained operations of the security forces, there was a decline in extremist related incidents in the State. Gradual improvement in the security scenario was accompanied by surrender of militants in the State. The State Government of Tripura, therefore, *vide* Notification dated 27<sup>th</sup> May, 2015, completely withdrew AFSPA from the State. The Ministry informed the Committee that the withdrawal of AFSPA has sent a positive signal across the state and the North Eastern region.

3.3.7 Further, considering the improvement in law & order situation in Arunachal Pradesh and Meghalaya, the areas under AFSPA in Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh have been reduced *vide* notifications dated 1<sup>st</sup> October, 2017.

**3.3.8 The Committee observes that the withdrawal of AFSPA from the state of Tripura has been quite successful in ensuring a peaceful situation and has given a hope to the other States in the region. The Committee is of the view that exercise of force must always be proportional to the operational requirements. The Committee, therefore, recommends that with the improvement in security situation in most of the States, the Government should consider gradually reducing the area under AFSPA, especially in the States of Assam and Meghalaya.**

### 3.4 Functioning of the Autonomous Councils in NER

3.4.1 The Sixth Schedule to the Constitution provides for formation and governance of Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. These ADCs are as under:-

**Table 3.1**

S. No.	Name of council	Number of members
<b>Assam</b>		
1	Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council (KAAC)	30
2	North Cachar Hills Autonomous Council (NCHAC)	30
3	Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC)	46
<b>Meghalaya</b>		
4	Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (KHADC)	30
5	Garo Hills Autonomous District Council (GHADC)	30
6	Jaintia Hills Autonomous District Council (JHADC)	30
<b>Tripura</b>		
7	Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC)	30
<b>Mizoram</b>		
8	Lai Autonomous District Council (LADC)	28
9	Mara Autonomous District Council (MADC)	25
10	Chakma Autonomous District Council (CADC)	24

3.4.2 The Committee sought to know from the Ministry about various measures that have been taken to strengthen the functioning of various Autonomous Councils in the North Eastern States and the impact of such Councils in fulfilling the aspirations of people and also their demands for greater devolution of power to them. The Ministry replied that the Autonomous District Councils have been given autonomy in the governance of their respective district council areas. These ADCs are responsible for administration of subjects transferred to them by the State Governments. Funds to these ADCs are also provided by the respective State Governments. There is no direct transfer of funds from Central Government to ADCs. The ADCs function under the overall supervision of the Governor of the State.

3.4.3 There is a provision of Non Lapsable Central Pool of Resources (NLCPR) under the Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region (M/o DoNER) for development of infrastructure in the North East Region, which includes area of ADCs. The State Government/ADCs forward projects to the Ministry of DoNER for consideration/financial support for implementation of the project.

3.4.4 The Committee desired to know specifically about the functioning of all the Autonomous Councils in Manipur as well as the various factors that have hampered the functioning of these councils. The Committee was informed that there are six Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) viz. Tamenglong, Ukhrul, Senapati, Chandel, Kangpokpi and Churachandpur in Manipur. These ADCs were established under 'The Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Act, 1971' and do not come under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution.

3.4.5 The Government of Manipur, in the year 2001, had conveyed its consent to the Ministry of Home Affairs for extension of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution in the Tribal areas in the hill district of Manipur with certain 'local adjustments and amendments'. The Government of Manipur, thereafter, has been asked to clarify the details of local adjustments and amendments that it seeks. However, the State Government is yet to clarify on this issue. The Committee was also informed that a proposal is under consideration of the Ministry, to bring amendments to the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, i.e. order to improve the working of ADCs.

**3.4.6** The Committee notes that the State Government of Manipur has agreed to extend the provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution to the Autonomous District Councils in Manipur with certain local adjustments. However, the State Government has not clarified what local adjustments it seeks and the proposal is stuck due to lack of a response from the State Government. The Committee recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs should pursue the matter and hold meetings with the State Government to seek clarifications on the ‘local adjustments’ suggested by them.

**3.4.7** The Committee is aware that the Autonomous District Councils (ADC) in Manipur have remained ineffective due to various reasons. The Committee notes that the Ministry of Home Affairs is considering a proposal to amend the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution to improve the working of ADCs. The Committee is of the view that the functioning of the ADCs needs to be strengthened through sufficient devolution of funds and functions. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry should take an early decision on the proposal to amend the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India.

### **3.5 Modernization of State Police Forces (MoPF)**

**3.5.1** The Ministry of Home Affairs is supplementing the efforts of the State Governments to modernize their police forces by providing financial assistance under the Scheme of Modernization of State Police Forces. Under this Non-Plan scheme, assistance is being provided to the North Eastern States for procurement of modern equipment, for surveillance, communications, and forensic activities; acquisition of latest weaponry, procurement of vehicles, computerization, upgradation of training infrastructure and construction of police infrastructure.

**3.5.2** The North Eastern States are utilizing the funds provided under this Scheme to acquire advanced weaponry such as AK-47, INSAS Rifles etc., police equipments such as Night Vision Devices, Deep search metal detector, state-of-the-art equipment for State Forensic Laboratories and Cyber Investigation Laboratories and different types of operational vehicles and communication equipments.

**3.5.3** Additionally, the Cabinet Committee on Security has approved a component ‘Assistance to north-Eastern States for Special projects/Programmes for upgrading police infrastructure, training institutes, investigation facilities, etc.’ under the sub-scheme of ‘Assistance to States for Special Projects/programmes for upgrading Police infrastructure, including forensic laboratories & institutes and equipments’ for three years from 2017-18 to 2019-20, under the umbrella scheme of ‘Modernisation of Police Forces’.

**3.5.4** From the financial year 2015-16, the plan component of MoPF Scheme was removed and the fund is now provided to the North Eastern States under the non-plan component only. Funds provided/allocated to the North Eastern States, under the MoPF Scheme, are as follows:-

**Table 3.2**

State	2012-13	2013-14	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	(in Rs. crore) 2017-18
						Allocated
Arunachal Pradesh	2.00	10.77	9.69	3.05	2.69	4.79
Assam	13.41	59.93	43.29	62.59	4.68	32.23
Manipur	4.85	20.64	28.45	7.79	8.37	11.66
Meghalaya	1.91	8.12	6.98	8.38	0.67	4.58
Mizoram	6.40	17.92	19.03	5.41	8.12	5.83

Nagaland	5.46	37.15	31.39	13.78	18.05	13.12
Tripura	3.99	20.19	22.69	7.00	1.40	9.58
Sikkim	0.90	5.09	3.57	0.22	1.96	2.17
Total	38.92	179.81	165.09	108.22	45.94	83.98

**3.5.5 The Committee observes that the funds provided to the North Eastern States, under the Modernisation of Police Forces (MoPF) Scheme, had substantially declined during 2015-16 and 2016-17. As compared to the amount of Rs. 179.81 crore provided in 2013-14, an amount of only Rs. 45.94 crore was provided during 2016-17. The Committee is aware that the MoPF Scheme was restructured during 2016-17 and this may explain the low allocation of funds. However, the allocation of Rs. 83.98 crore granted in 2017-18 also falls way below the allocations granted during the previous years. The Committee, therefore, strongly recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs should enhance the allocation made for the North Eastern States under this Scheme during the current financial year to adequately modernise the police forces of the North Eastern States.**

## RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS — AT A GLANCE

### Security Scenario in Different States of NER

#### Overall Security Scenario

The Committee observes the declining trend of insurgency-related incidents and improvement in the overall security situation in NER that could be achieved due to efforts of the Central Government and the State Governments. The Committee, however, cautions the Government that sustained efforts must continue in this direction to achieve the goal of making the North Eastern Region completely free from insurgency.

(Para 2.1.4 of 213<sup>th</sup> Report)

#### Arunachal Pradesh

The Committee while taking into account the submission of the Ministry of Home Affairs that Arunachal Pradesh has no active insurgent group and is affected by the spill-over activities of the insurgent groups based in Nagaland and Assam, feels that the Government must improve the security situation in the border areas of Arunachal Pradesh that are located along the India-Myanmar border. The Committee, in this connection, recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs must encourage, facilitate and strengthen the interaction and co-operation between the police forces of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh to obviate any unwarranted incidents along the border areas of Arunachal Pradesh.

(Para 2.2.3 *ibid*)

The Committee while perusing the data of ‘Crime in India–2016’ of cases of kidnapping and extortion in Arunachal Pradesh published by the National Crime Records Bureau, finds the number of such cases to be 146 in 2014, 175 in 2015 and 112 in 2016. This shows that the number of kidnapping and abduction cases in Arunachal Pradesh remain high *vis-à-vis* the State’s population.

(Para 2.2.5 *ibid*)

The Committee is also constrained to express its concern that unlike the overall North Eastern Region, which shows a declining trend of insurgency-related incidents and casualties suffered by the civilians, and an improvement in the security scenario, the State of Arunachal Pradesh has seen a rise in the number of such incidents. The Committee is alarmed to observe that in 2012, Arunachal Pradesh accounted for just 5 percent of the incidents in the entire region, however, in 2017, it accounted for almost 20 percent of the incidents in the region. This is an indication of the fact that the security situation has deteriorated in the State of Arunachal Pradesh *vis-a-vis* the entire North Eastern Region. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Government should intensify its efforts to contain the spill-over insurgency activities from other States and improve the overall security scenario in Arunachal Pradesh.

(Para 2.2.6 *ibid*)

#### Assam

The Committee is disconcerted to note that Assam has the highest rate of violent crimes, and kidnappings and abductions, among all the states of India. The Committee accepts that the insurgency-related instances of kidnappings and extortions may be on a decline, but a general rise



in the instances of such crimes is worrying and the Committee is perplexed that despite a waning trend in insurgency, violent crimes and kidnappings have been on a rise. The Committee apprehends that this rise may be due to poor rehabilitation and settlement of former insurgents who may be indulging in such crimes for ransom. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Central Government, in coordination with the State Governments, should closely monitor the activities of insurgents who have surrendered during the last decade, and also those with whom the government is presently holding negotiations.

(Para 2.3.10 *ibid*)

The Committee is deeply worried to note that a large number of victims who were kidnapped or abducted in Assam before and during 2016 are yet to be recovered. Even more worrisome is the fact that a large majority, at more than 81 percent, of victims are women. The Committee is of the view that this may also point towards a connection between such abductions and human trafficking. The Committee, therefore, recommends that an inter-state investigation may be carried out to find out the reasons for this extremely high rate of kidnappings of women. The Committee also recommends that sustained operations must be launched to trace and recover the victims of kidnappings and abductions. The Committee desires that the Ministry submit a detailed status note about the action taken to recover such victims.

(Para 2.3.11 *ibid*)

The Committee observes that the Government's interlocutor, who was appointed for holding talks with the Assam-based insurgent groups, was recently assigned the responsibility to initiate dialogue with various stakeholders in Kashmir due to which the talks with the two factions of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland have been stalled. The Committee also notes that due to the stalled talks, the insurgent groups have become restive and have even resorted to hunger strike. The Committee is constrained to observe that there is a lack of seriousness of purpose shown by the Government on this issue, by first shifting the interlocutor to J&K and then not appointing another one immediately. The Committee cautions the Government that if suspension of talks due to the absence of interlocutor is allowed to become prolonged, the insurgent groups may become further restive and indulge in illegal activities. The Committee is apprehensive that a lack of seriousness by the Government in holding the dialogue with the insurgent groups may result in violation of SoO agreements by them. The Committee, therefore, strongly recommends that the Government must urgently appoint a separate interlocutor for talks with the Assam-based insurgent groups, particularly NDFB/RD and NDFB/P. The Committee also recommends that Government must ensure that the talks are held on a continuous basis with utmost sincerity to keep the insurgent groups at the negotiation table and maintain the security scenario in NER that has been achieved with painstaking efforts and numerous sacrifices.

(Para 2.3.14 *ibid*)

## **Manipur**

The Committee observes that despite experiencing a decline in the number of incidents, the violent incidents in Manipur, accounted for a staggering 54 percent of the total number of violent incidents in the entire North eastern region during 2017. Moreover, the number of civilian casualties more than doubled during 2017 as compared to the casualties during 2016. The Committee is perturbed by the fact that the State of Manipur is still affected by the insurgency-related activities, and the number of violent incidents remains quite high. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Government should intensify the pace of engagement with insurgent groups and hold regular talks with them not only to arrive at a settlement but to also maintain peace in the state.

## **Meghalaya**

**2.5.9** The Committee notes that the security forces have been able to neutralise the Garo National Liberation Army and most of the cadres of GNLA have surrendered or have been arrested. GNLA had been a significant security threat to Meghalaya and the efforts of security forces to neutralise it are praiseworthy. The Committee, however, cautions the Government that if the cadres, who have surrendered, are not rehabilitated timely and adequately, then there is a possibility that the disgruntled groups may potentially regroup to form a new outfit or indulge in illegal activities. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs must make sincere efforts to rehabilitate all the cadres who have surrendered, by providing some financial assistance as well as opportunities for bringing them into the mainstream so that these cadres may not relapse into the fold of insurgency. The Committee also recommends that a sufficient number of security forces may be deployed in the entire Garo Hills Region and sustained combing operations may be conducted to tackle all the remaining cadres of GNLA and recover all the arms and ammunition that may be in their possession.

(Para 2.5.9 *ibid*)

## **Nagaland**

The Committee appreciates that the security situation in the State of Nagaland has significantly improved during the last two years. The number of insurgency-related incidents decreased by 43 percent in 2016 as compared to 2015, and by 67 percent in 2017 as compared to 2016. The Committee is of the view that this improvement in the security situation in Nagaland may be attributed to the signing of the Framework Agreement between NSCN-IM and the Government of India. The Committee also believes that the signing of the final Naga Peace Accord can bring long lasting peace to the State that was once the hotspot of insurgency for the North Eastern Region. The Committee, therefore, strongly recommends that the Government should continue its efforts to engage the Naga groups and finalise the Naga Peace Accord.

(Para 2.6.12 *ibid*)

## **Mizoram**

The Committee observes that since the year 2009, when the repatriation of Brus to Mizoram began, only 1622 families out of around 5000 families have been repatriated. The Committee is disappointed to note that not a single family could be repatriated during the last two years. The Committee recommends that the Ministry should initiate urgent measures to restart the repatriation process and ensure an early repatriation of the Brus. The Committee also recommends that the Ministry should prepare an adequate financial assistance package comparable to the package being offered to the Kashmiri migrants to encourage repatriation of Brus. The Committee further recommends that the Ministry should also incorporate provisions in the rehabilitation package to provide vocational training and opportunities for meaningful livelihood, such as government jobs, to ensure peaceful rehabilitation of the Brus. The Committee desires to be apprised about the action taken and progress achieved in this regard.

(Para 2.7.5 *ibid*)

The Committee observes that every time the repatriation process began, some protests occurred to block the process and this has caused a huge delay in the repatriation process. The Committee is of the view that this cannot be a coincidence and the protests seem to aim at blocking the repatriation process. The Committee recommends that the Ministry should put adequate

security measures in place, in the relief camps and in the areas where the Brus are to be rehabilitated, to tackle protests effectively and to instil a sense of security among the Brus.

(Para 2.7.6 *ibid*)

The Committee is at pains to observe that the Brus have been living in pitiable conditions in the relief camps. The Committee also notes observations of the Supreme Court regarding poor living conditions and failure of the Government to ensure decent living conditions for the Brus who have been suffering for a long time. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry should urgently review the poor living conditions in all the six relief camps where Brus are residing and provide all basic amenities to the people in these camps.

(Para 2.7.7 *ibid*)

## **Tripura**

The Committee observes that the security scenario in Tripura has shown marked improvement in recent years with a steady decline in violence since 2013. As a result, AFSPA was withdrawn from the areas falling in the jurisdiction of Tripura by the State Government *vide* its notifications dated 27<sup>th</sup> May, 2015. Since then, the State of Tripura has witnessed no incident of violence. The activities of main underground outfits viz. National Liberation Front of Twipra-Biswamohan [NLFT(B)] and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) have been contained. The Committee feels that talks with NLFT(B) leadership for peace at the state level must continue.

(Para 2.8.3 *ibid*)

## **Other Issues**

### **Naga Peace Accord**

The Committee observes that any final agreement will have some implications for the three States viz. Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Assam, where Nagas are residing in certain areas. The Committee is of the considered view that any agreement that may be finally arrived at must allay the fears of the stakeholders in these States and the State Governments must be kept abreast with the emerging dynamics of the talks.

(Para 3.1.6 *ibid*)

The Committee takes note of the developments that have taken place in the last few years regarding Naga Peace Talks. While there have been positive outcomes, the Committee apprehends that the Naga groups and tribal bodies are becoming restless due to the delay in concluding the talks. Recently the representatives of all political parties, following an appeal by the Core Committee of Naga Tribal Hohos and Civil Society Organisations, had signed a declaration that they will abstain from the election if it is held without concluding the Naga Peace Agreement. This is indicative of the growing unrest among the Naga Hohos. The Committee wonders as to why there is a delay in concluding the peace talks when all other stakeholders other than the Government appear to be eager to conclude it. The Committee apprehends that any further delay may harm the progress achieved during the last few years. The Committee, therefore, strongly recommends that the Government should conclude the peace talks, at the earliest, based on a broad understanding over the most contentious issues. The Committee also recommends that the Government should tread carefully on the issues sensitive to the Nagas and not let vested interests hijack the peace narrative.

(Para 3.1.10 *ibid*)

The Committee, keeping in view the historical dynamics of insurgency, wishes to remind the Government that the most important aspect of any agreement with insurgents is the adequate

rehabilitation and settlement programme for the cadres of the insurgent outfits. NSCN (IM), being the largest group in the entire region would have thousands of cadres who must be adequately settled to make the agreement successful and to prevent the emergence of any rebel splinter groups. The Committee, therefore, strongly recommends that the Ministry should prepare a detailed and generous rehabilitation-cum-settlement scheme for the cadres who will surrender as part of the agreement. The Committee also recommends that the Government should, nevertheless, proactively stay prepared for any kinds of scenario that may emerge in the aftermath of this agreement, and keep the security forces and the intelligence agencies on the alert.

(Para 3.1.11 *ibid*)

#### **Status of Negotiations in Manipur**

The Committee feels that the frequency and pace of the talks do not seem encouraging as during the last two years only three rounds of dialogue have taken place. The Committee understands that there might have been several bottlenecks that would have obstructed the progress of the talks; however, the bottom line is that the Government should ensure that the talks are held regularly and the issues are resolved gradually. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs should make sincere efforts to expedite the talks and hold them more frequently. The Committee also recommends that the Government should tread carefully on the political demands of the Kuki groups and ensure a congruity between the agreement being finalised with the Nagas and the arrangement that may be made for the Kukis.

(Para 3.2.3 *ibid*)

#### **Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in the North Eastern States**

The Committee is unable to comprehend the divergent perceptions of the situation in Assam. On the one hand, the Ministry has asserted that there has been an improvement in the security situation in Assam and, on the other hand, the area declared as disturbed under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, has been increased. The Committee also notes that the State Government of Assam has notified the whole State as disturbed area on the plea that it is not the appropriate time to reduce the area under AFSPA. This is a paradoxical situation that needs to be resolved. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Central Government and the State Government should hold extensive discussions on the issue and narrow down their perception about the necessity of AFSPA in Assam.

(Para 3.3.5 *ibid*)

The Committee observes that the withdrawal of AFSPA from the state of Tripura has been quite successful in ensuring a peaceful situation and has given a hope to the other States in the region. The Committee is of the view that exercise of force must always be proportional to the operational requirements. The Committee, therefore, recommends that with the improvement in security situation in most of the States, the Government should consider gradually reducing the area under AFSPA, especially in the States of Assam and Meghalaya.

(Para 3.3.8 *ibid*)

#### **Functioning of the Autonomous Councils in NER**

The Committee notes that the State Government of Manipur has agreed to extend the provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution to the Autonomous District Councils in Manipur with certain local adjustments. However, the State Government has not clarified what local adjustments it seeks and the proposal is stuck due to lack of a response from the State Government. The Committee recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs should pursue the

matter and hold meetings with the State Government to seek clarifications on the 'local adjustments' suggested by them.

(Para 3.4.6 *ibid*)

The Committee is aware that the Autonomous District Councils (ADC) in Manipur have remained ineffective due to various reasons. The Committee notes that the Ministry of Home Affairs is considering a proposal to amend the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution to improve the working of ADCs. The Committee is of the view that the functioning of the ADCs needs to be strengthened through sufficient devolution of funds and functions. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry should take an early decision on the proposal to amend the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India.

(Para 3.4.7 *ibid*)

#### **Modernization of State Police Forces (MoPF)**

The Committee observes that the funds provided to the North Eastern States, under the Modernisation of Police Forces (MoPF) Scheme, had substantially declined during 2015-16 and 2016-17. As compared to the amount of Rs. 179.81 crore provided in 2013-14, an amount of only Rs. 45.94 crore was provided during 2016-17. The Committee is aware that the MoPF Scheme was restructured during 2016-17 and this may explain the low allocation of funds. However, the allocation of Rs. 83.98 crore granted in 2017-18 also falls way below the allocations granted during the previous years. The Committee, therefore, strongly recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs should enhance the allocation made for the North Eastern States under this Scheme during the current financial year to adequately modernise the police forces of the North Eastern States.

(Para 3.5.5 *ibid*)

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